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DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN MIGRATION STUDIES 
 
MOBILE PEOPLE, IMMOBILE STRUCTURES: A STUDY OF INTERNAL MIGRANT 
ACCESS TO STATE SOCIAL PROTECTION IN INDIA 
 
 
This thesis compares the experiences of internal migrants engaged in low-skilled and unskilled 
labour, with their local non-migrant counterparts in urban India to explore patterns and structures 
of access to state social protection. While Indians are constitutionally permitted to work and settle 
anywhere within the country, migrants face a range of barriers to accessing state social protection, 
in term of policy and implementation. The thesis uses the example of the Public Distribution 
System (PDS) - a universal food subsidy scheme and India’s largest social protection programme 
- and takes into account the role of governance to explore how social protection access is 
experienced by diverse types of labour migrants, with local labourers living in the same city.  
 
The thesis is based on evidence gathered over nine months through mainly qualitative methods 
(semi-structured interviews and observation, supplemented by a sampling survey) in two cities: 
Ahmedabad and Nashik, representing the states of Gujarat and Maharashtra respectively. A final 
round of supplementary key informant interviews was conducted in Delhi.  
 
The empirical findings show that both migrants and local labourers face a range of significant 
barriers to access, though to varying degrees. However, a strong dichotomy between their 
experiences is not observed. Instead these complex and diverse experiences can be represented as 
a broad and overlapping ‘spectrum’ of vulnerabilities: where local labourers face relatively fewer 
barriers, and migrants – varied in terms of spatial and temporal factors – face distinctly intense 
barriers. The findings also highlight that, while individual state context does not have a strong 
effect on barriers to accessing the PDS, divergences between constitutional law, government 
policy and implementation across India are influential in structuring the experiences of 
precariousness among labour migrants.  
 
Finally, the thesis presents evidence on how all poor, urban labourers deploy multiple strategies 
to overcome barriers to access. Migrant agency however is displayed in distinct forms. The 
findings illustrate how labour migrants, regardless of temporal or spatial factors, actively maintain 
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Aadhaar card identity card under the UID scheme 
Adivasi tribal caste 
anganwadi crèche or day-care centre for infants 
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to find work 
'nega sevak' urban community leader (Maharashtra 
only) 
pachan patra documents/paperwork 
pukka  construction made from permanent robust 
materials (more expensive than kacha) 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
Migration (and settlement) anywhere within India is constitutionally permitted for national 
citizens without restriction,1 yet labour migrants moving from rural to urban areas face a “hostile 
policy environment” (Deshingkar and Farrington, 2009: 25).  The characteristics attributed to this 
environment include: implicit and explicit barriers to formal social protection programmes that 
are biased toward sedentary populations; exclusionary patterns of policy implementation, and 
schemes which actively discourage movement and settlement in urban areas (Deshingkar and 
Farrington, 2009; Kundu, 2014; Bhagat, 2017). India’s urban population increased to 377 million 
in 2011 due in large part to internal migration, and the rapid pace of urbanisation has resulted in 
significant regional inequalities (Bhagat, 2011; Census of India, 2011).  The social exclusion of 
groups such as labour migrants is therefore a crucial issue in discussions of social protection and 
efforts to address inequalities.   
 
This research aims to improve our understanding of internal migrants’ access to formal social 
protection in urban areas, through an empirical comparison of labour migrants with their non-
migrant counterparts (belonging to the same socio-economic categories, living in the same cities 
and engaging in the same labour sectors) in accessing the Public Distribution System (PDS) - a 
universal food subsidy scheme and India’s largest social protection programme. This thesis 
presents evidence on labour migrants and their non-migrant,2 or local, counterparts in two cities 
located in western India: Nashik, in the state of Maharashtra, and Ahmedabad, in the neighbouring 
state of Gujarat.  The migrants are typically involved in semi-, low or unskilled labour in the urban 
informal sector (Breman, 1996; Srivastava and Sasikumar, 2003).   
 
                                                     
1 Constitution of India (1950) Article 19. Available here: 
https://india.gov.in/sites/upload_files/npi/files/coi_part_full.pdf  
2 Henceforth in this thesis I will mainly use the term ‘local labourer’ to denote non-migrant research participants. The 
terms are used for ease of reference in the discussion of findings rather than to reinforce normative assumptions 
which serve to ‘other’ or exclude communities. ‘Native place’ is also commonly used in Indian-English vernacular to 




Access to state resources such as social protection, can be considered integral to an overall 
livelihood ‘package’ which goes beyond economic income to include multiple sources of support 
for poor and vulnerable groups (Carney, 1998; de Haas, 2008). The composite of disadvantages 
or ‘precarities’ faced specifically by labour migrants has been described in multiple literatures 
ranging from development and labour studies to geography (Waite, 2009; Standing, 2011; Lewis 
et al., 2014; Buckley et al., 2017) and exclusion from social protection can exacerbate such 
disadvantages (Sabates-Wheeler and Waite, 2003; Srivastava and Sasikumar, 2003). While 
migrants are locked out of social protection access due to a set of implicit, and explicit barriers, 
the evidence from Nashik and Ahmedabad shows a complex set of agency-based factors that come 
into play when they seek to overcome such barriers.  
 
This thesis draws from three thematic (rather than disciplinarily-bound) groups of literature to 
interpret and further develop my empirical insights into the structural barriers faced by labour 
migrants and the ways in which they navigate access structures. The thesis seeks to link 
contemporary theorisations of vulnerability and precariousness of migrant labour with those on 
governance in order to understand how access to social protection is shaped by the state. To 
understand the role of the state in producing “lesser” “citizenship outcomes” (Abbas, 2016: 150) 
for internal migrants compared with sedentary citizens, I invoke the scholarship on Indian 
governance in relation to social inequality either developed during, or reflecting upon, the recent 
tenure of Congress-led3 government (see: Chatterjee, 2004; Corbridge et al., 2005; Jayal, 2009; 
Berenschot, 2010; Ruparelia, 2013; Aiyar and Walton, 2014; Deshpande et al., 2017).  
 
In order to understand the modalities and limitations of migrant agency I also engage with 
empirically-grounded debates on the impact of migrant labour on livelihoods in India (see: Rogaly 
et  al., 2002; Mosse  et al., 2002; Breman, 2004; Deshingkar and Farrington, 2009; Srivastava 
and Sutradhar, 2016); and the dense scholarship on vulnerability and precariousness among 
                                                     
3 The Indian National Congress party in India led a coalition of centre-left parties from 2004-2014 known as the 




labour migrants, which continues to evolve (see: Kabeer, 2007; Waite, 2009; Benedict, 2010; 
Buckley, 2012; Paret and Gleeson, 2016).4 Finally, I touch upon the debates surrounding the role 
of social protection itself – and whether they alleviate the ‘hostile policy environment’ faced by 
migrants – to understand the limitations and opportunities of  access structures for programmes 
such as the Public Distribution System (PDS) in addressing vulnerabilities faced by labour 
migrants.  
 
This thesis proposes that barriers to social protection can be attributed in part to the divergences 
between India’s constitutional rights and policies, and their implementation at local government 
level. India’s federal system of governance gives rise to politically diverse states5 which can lead 
to heterogenous outcomes of national policies – including those related to social protection - 
across individual states (Chopra, 2015; Deshpande et al., 2017; Tillin and Pereira, 2017). In 
addition to comparing labour migrants with their non-migrant counterparts, this thesis also seeks 
to contribute to understandings of the role of governance context at the sub-national level in 
creating a “hostile policy environment” for migrants (Deshingkar and Farrington, 2009). To this 
end, I focus on urban migrant destinations in two sub-national states to try and compare the role 
of each governance context - including the gap between policy and implementation - in shaping 
access conditions and experiences for labour migrants and their non-migrant counterparts.  
 
The relatively wealthy states of Gujarat and Maharashtra are two major migrant-receiving states 
in India, reflecting the sharp regional inequalities across the country as depicted in Figure 1.1 
(Bhagat and Mohanty, 2009). While both states are popular destinations for internal migrants 
(ranked as the second and third highest recipients of net migration in India)6 and characterised by 
                                                     
4 It should be noted that both literatures referred to in this paragraph implicitly or explicitly contribute to evidence 
and theories on the vulnerabilities and/or precariousness faced by labour migrants.  
5 The outcomes of centrally-set social policies in federal India have been highly heterogenous across different states 
in India. The literature has attributed this to a plurality of political party systems at the state level, many of which 
have launched their own social programmes or individual iterations of federalised programmes to differing levels of 
success (Tillin and Pereira, 2017). At the sub-national state level, the political context, degree of corruption and 
clientelism are among key factors cited in the literature for bringing about diverse policy outcomes (Chopra, 2015; 
Deshpande et al., 2017; Tillin and Pereira, 2017). 




extensive industrial development, rapid urbanisation and high growth; they have shown mixed 
trajectories in terms of making this growth inclusive through expenditure, and attention on social 
protection7 (Deshpande et al., 2017). In addition, each state contrasts in terms of socio-political 
attitudes toward migrants from elsewhere in India (Weiner, 1978; Rajan et al.,2011; Bhagat, 
2015). 
  
In terms of broader research objectives, this thesis explores the interplay of sedentary policies and 
migrant dynamics within a shared citizenship regime, against a context of legislative 
developments intended to improve lives for vulnerable groups yet perpetuating the exclusion of 
migrants (Deshingkar and Farrington, 2009; MacAuslan, 2011; Abbas, 2016). The research sits 
within wider discussions of labour migration and welfare; migrant access and inclusion; 
governance and accountability and the nature of rights-based citizenship. The findings also speak 
to contemporary trends of digitalisation in India across federalised access structures (Masiero, 
2015), and highlight the importance of the role of governance as well as technological 
advancements in achieving social inclusion objectives.    
 
With this thesis, I aim to contribute to understandings of spatial, as well as socio-economic 
impacts on citizenship by invoking contemporary theories of vulnerability and precariousness, 
social protection and state accountability.  The thesis compares migrant and non-migrant 
experiences in their urban destinations, rather than focusing on migration outcomes in their rural 
source contexts.  In doing so, this work aims to illuminate the relatively understudied area of 
internal migration (within the contemporary migration literature). The global literature on 
                                                     
of net migration and Gujarat is the third highest. See: 
http://censusindia.gov.in/Data_Products/Data_Highlights/Data_Highlights_link/data_highlights_D1D2D3.pdf 
7 A hallmark of India’s federalised system was the Centrally Sponsored Schemes (CSS) mechanism of centre-state 
fund transfers. Prior to the Modi government (from 2014 onward), subsidies for welfare and social protection 
spending were disbursed from central government to sub-national states through CSS. However, the “proliferation” 
of centrally-sponsored schemes (CSS) (Deshpande et al., 2017: 91) led to concerns around the misuse of funds in 
public expenditure (Rao, 2015). Some of the most important concerns around CSS are linked to the need for matched 
funding required by states, which can effectively limit their policy and fiscal autonomy. The CSS were controversial 
due to their discretionary nature (initiated either by central ministries or requested by individual states) among other 
factors and at the time of fieldwork, were undergoing a series of enquiries and investigations. See: ‘Report of the 
Committee on Restructuring of Centrally Sponsored Schemes (CSS)’, last updated in November 2014. Available 




migration has been critiqued for its false dichotomisation of internal and international migration 
(King et al., 2008) despite the fact that some of the earliest and most influential scholarship on 
migration dealt only with internal migration. While classical models of labour migration focused 
on internal migration (sometimes known as ‘domestic migration’ or ‘population distribution’) 
(see: Ravenstein, 1885; Harris and Todaro, 1970; Banerjee, 1983), migration in contemporary 
discourse normatively refers to international migration. 
 
Overall, I seek to address limitations in the literature on internal migration in India (Abbas, 2016), 
by linking existing work on the vulnerability and precariousness of labour migrants – recent 
developments of which have primarily tended to focus on the global North (Buckley et al., 2017) 
- with the literature on governance and inequality to illustrate how citizenship is contested even 
within national regimes. As the evidence presented in this thesis shows, labour migrants within 
India are a diverse population sharing many socio-economic intersections with their local 
counterparts, but also experiencing a range of nuanced and distinct barriers depending on the type 
of migration and labour they undertake. Concomitantly, the range of strategies and opportunities 
to actively overcome barriers is linked to the type of migration and labour undertaken and how 
this intersects with social identities and economic capabilities. The role of the state, in enacting 
restrictive access structures, where social entitlements to state resources are denied or require 
negotiation, further adds to the vulnerabilities of all labour migrants.  
 
 
1.1. Research questions and analytical framework 
This thesis is based on three core research questions: 
 
1. How do labour migrant experiences fare against their non-migrant counterparts in terms 
of access to the Public Distribution System?  
2. What are the structures and patterns of social protection access for different types of 





3. a) How do labour migrants and non-migrants respond to such structures and patterns of 
access? b) How can the state learn from these responses to improve access for migrants? 
 
In order to answer these questions, the research was based on a comparative design: looking at 
the experiences of migrants and non-migrants. By focusing on two migrant-receiving and rapidly 
urbanising cities, I was able to examine the role of governance context in shaping experiences of 
local and labour migrants in trying to access state entitlements. The findings were drawn from 
multiple methods including (in order of importance): semi-structured interviews and survey; key 
informant interviews (KIIs) and observations. The research universe consisted mainly of adult, 
working-age inter-state and intra-state labour migrants, and a small component of local labourers, 
to enable a comparison of experiences in accessing the Public Distribution System (PDS).  Both 
groups engage in low- and un-skilled forms of labour, belong to scheduled caste (SC) and 
scheduled tribe (ST) caste8 groups and earned average wages below the poverty line (BPL).9  Key 
informant and mapping interviews were also held with additional stakeholders such as civil 
society actors working on migrant access and policy actors at national, state and district levels.  
 
The first two research questions are preoccupied with the role of the state in mediating Public 
Distribution System (PDS) access for migrants. The comparison with local labourers – those who 
have not moved from their place of birth - provides a counterfactual for how labour migrants 
experience access structures in each of the field sites. In seeking to answer the research questions, 
I identify two overarching levels of structural barriers related to governance in my empirical 
findings.  
                                                     
8 The caste system refers to India’s system of stratifying society according to social, ethnic, cultural and economic 
markers thought to have originated in ancient India and enduring into the post-colonial era, after being 
institutionalised under British colonisation. Post-independence India sought to address class divisions generated by 
the caste system by formally registering or ‘scheduling’ disadvantaged caste and tribal group identities to facilitate 
positive discrimination and public representation. These groups are historically marginalised, and face deeply 
entrenched structural and social discrimination. The listing of scheduled caste (SC) and scheduled tribal (ST) groups 
falls under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Social Justice. A full list of scheduled groups can be found here: 
http://socialjustice.nic.in/UserView/index?mid=76750 
9 Urban BPL average wage rates were taken as a guide for each respective state: Maharashtra. See: 






• Barriers at the level of design (structural) 
• Barriers at the level of implementation (structural and social) 
 
Migrants and local labourers face both types of barriers to access but to different degrees. While 
migrants are locked out from access to social protection and state resources by barriers of design 
and implementation, their sedentary counterparts tend to mainly experience the latter type of 
barriers. One of the main aspects of PDS design affects only migrants - the need for proof of local 
fixed residence to apply for access to the PDS. The second category of barriers represents the 
“imperfect implementation” (Saxena and Farrington, 2009: 12) that characterises many 
programmes in India, particularly those on poverty alleviation. Barriers of implementation can be 
attributed to ‘informal’ rules of governance according to North’s theorisation of institutions 
(1990) whereas the barriers of design can be seen as ‘formal constraints’ (ibid). I argue that labour 
migrants face the worst of both forms of barriers and thereby are subject to intensified forms of 
vulnerability and precariousness (Sabates-Wheeler and Waite, 2003; Lewis et al., 2014).   
 
The everyday experiences of barriers of implementation faced by both the migrants and local 
labourers are represented in my findings as ‘dhakkas.’ Dhakka is a Hindi word literally translated 
to ‘push’ or ‘pushback’ and used colloquially by the labourers I engaged with to signify obstacles 
or hostile resistance from individuals, such as local bureaucrats or providers of PDS resources, 
and broader institutions that represented power. Dhakkas represent discretionary, corrupt and 
inefficient behaviours, that often divert from policy design. Though often characterised by 
dhakkas, everyday encounters between the state, informal agents and poor and vulnerable citizens 
can also substitute formal instruments of civic engagement and entitlement (such as PDS access) 
for those who otherwise lack awareness or formal access (Corbridge et al., 2005). Barriers to PDS 
access represent divergences between rights, laws, policies; and the ways in which they are 
enacted – including those represented by dhakkas. However, the findings suggest that local 
labourers are relatively more empowered to identify, voice and pursue informal, if not formal, 




social and financial capital,10 typically more accessible when embedded within a local place and 
community.   
 
The thesis also explores whether conditions of access are further shaped by diverse governance 
contexts in migrant-receiving states, to understand the specific role of governance in in terms of 
creating “hostile” policy environments (Deshingkar and Farrington, 2009). I selected two states, 
broadly similar in terms of in-migration patterns and labour demand, but governed by different 
political parties (at the time of fieldwork) with contrasting outlooks on migration. The expectation 
was that the state of Maharashtra, home to prominent anti-migrant political movements, would be 
characterised by openly hostile conditions for migrants, whereas the state of Gujarat with its less 
explicitly anti-migrant environment and openly neoliberal drive toward growth at the expense of 
labour rights and welfare, would generate contrasting results in terms of migrant experiences. 
 
My empirical findings show that migrants can experience different social protection outcomes in 
terms of PDS access in their places of destination, compared with their home states. This finding 
emphasises how the lack of portable access to state social protections such as the PDS puts 
migrants at a specific disadvantage (Sabates-Wheeler and MacAuslan, 2007; MacAuslan, 2011). 
However, differences between PDS access in each place of destination (Maharashtra and Gujarat) 
were highly nuanced and do not necessarily fall neatly along binary lines that are defined by state 
boundaries. At the city level, specific social and economic factors, which will be explained further 
in the forthcoming chapters, affected the daily experiences of migrants and local labourers. 
However, labour migrants face multiple barriers to state resources in both Gujarat and 
Maharashtra, thus highlighting the specificities of migrant disadvantage compared to their local 
counterparts, but not significantly in terms of state context. In developed, relatively wealthy 
migrant-receiving states such as Maharashtra and Gujarat, despite political and social differences, 
                                                     
10 Social capital is used here broadly in accordance to definitions developed by Bordieu (1986) and Putnam (2000): 
access to resources accrued through membership and belonging to certain social groups. It refers to “features of social 
organization such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” 




the overall access outcomes remain broadly similar for labour migrants. Overall, the findings 
show that though there are highly nuanced and varied experiences of PDS access among migrants, 
these variations are more closely linked to factors such as their duration of migration, type of 
migration, and even within such groups, social identities of caste, religion, ethnicity and gender, 
than the specific contexts of advanced, industrialised federal states in Western India.  
 
The experience of labour migrants themselves is not uniform or straightforward, and they are not 
a homogenous group (Waite, 2009). The “varieties of unfreedom” experienced across different 
types of labourers are acknowledged in the literature (O’Neill, 2011; Barrientos et al., 2013) and 
resonate with my empirical findings. Experiences and outcomes depend on multiple factors 
including temporal and spatial status (length of time as a migrant, linkage to place of origin, place 
and distance of origin); identity (caste, gender, religion) and type of labour (sector, duration, 
contract or casual) as well as the governance context. Likewise, the range of strategies available 
to respond to such barriers are dependent upon multiple factors. Here I invoke Katz (2004)’s 
‘disaggregate’ framework of agency and respond to calls made in the literature to take a more 
variegated and nuanced approach to labour agency (Carswell and de Neve, 2013). Katz (2004) 
describes a gradation of strategies, starting with small-scale ‘resilience’ to ‘reworking’ to 
redistribute structural challenges and ending with resistance, which directly challenges capitalist 
regimes.  The framework is useful in helping to unpack the diverse types of agency that can be 
deployed among labourers – both migrant and sedentary.  
 
1.1.1 Characteristics of migrants and local labourers 
The findings of this thesis are framed by the results of an initial sampling survey of 376 
participants (see Appendix Three for breakdown of survey participants). From this surveyed 
sample, I purposively selected 53 participants – representing migrant and local labourers - for in-
depth semi-structured interviews. Table 1.1 presents the most common characteristics of labour 




states. Useful observations about the different socio-economic backgrounds and outcomes of the 
two categories of labourers can be made based on this set of basic attributes. However, it does not 
necessarily illustrate the more nuanced and intersecting conditions of vulnerabilities faced by each 
group as drawn from the qualitative findings, introduced in the following sub-section.  
 
Table 1.1 Typical characteristics of local and migrant labourers 
 
Table 1.1 shows that while both local and migrant labourers show characteristics of disadvantage 
and social exclusion, there is a higher proportion of Scheduled Caste (SC) and illiterate labourers 
within the migrant group.  Regardless of duration of time in the place of destination, migrants are 
                                                     
11 Compared with the migrant sample, 29.3% of the local labourers reported themselves as illiterate 
12 Unlike the migrant sample, the distribution of average monthly income was fairly evenly distributed across three 
income brackets for the sample of local labourers (aggregate of both Nashik and Ahmedabad). The second most 
common income bracket was ‘<2000 INR’ (22.7%) and the third most common was ‘more than 5000 INR’ (20%). 
See Appendix 2 for the different income brackets. 
13 For both local and migrant labourers there is some variation in the distribution of reported days of work for the 
remainder of the sample. See Appendices 4 and 5.  
14 Notably, the second most commonly reported type of housing was also very high. 38.9% of the aggregate migrant 
sample reported living in ‘free’ on-site accommodation, such as a labour camp on a construction site. 
Type of Characteristic Migrant Labourer 
Gender Male (76%) Male (64%) 
Age 18-30 years (52.2%) 31-45 years (45.3%)  




Caste Scheduled Caste (SC) (27.2%) Scheduled Tribe (ST) (24%) 
and Other Backward Caste 
(OBC) (24%) 
Marital Status Married (77.4%) Married (69.3%) 
Literacy Illiterate (40.5%) Drop-out from secondary – 
(46.7%)11  
Average monthly income More than INR 5000 (44.5%) INR 2000-35000 per month 
(26.7%)12 
Average days of work per 
month13 
>25 days (42.2%) >25 days (37.3%) 
Ration card possession 83.4% 74.7%   




less likely to own property in terms of housing (though this may not be the case in their place of 
origin). Interestingly however, a greater number of migrants reported higher average monthly 
wages than their local counterparts. This is in line with claims in the literature that labour migrants 
are preferred by employers for relatively higher-paid but precarious and unstable forms of labour 
(Deshingkar and Start, 2009; Waite, 2009; Anderson, 2010; Breman, 2013). The qualitative 
findings show how multiple forms of vulnerability and precariousness can offset economic 
income for labourers, and labour migrants specifically. We also see that ration card possession is 
high among both groups – in fact it is higher among the migrant group than reported by the local 
group. This highlights that ration card allocation may be high among labourers regardless of 
migrant status but does not necessarily illustrate portability or quality of access. Most of the labour 
migrants (77 percent) are married – though this does not necessarily have a bearing on whether 
they migrated alone or as a family. Overall, the importance of the qualitative findings in building 
upon these attributes is highlighted here. They reveal the multiple and complex forms of structural 
barriers and daily encounters, or dhakkas, that affect access conditions and outcomes in ways that 
go beyond the attributes based on survey findings.  























We can see from Table 1.2 that the findings for migrant characteristics in both cities are broadly 
similar. The more nuanced differences in their experiences are shown in the qualitative findings. 
There is a slightly more diverse religious composition in the city of Ahmedabad which reflects 
the city’s local demography. There is also a larger proportion of higher-earning labour migrants 
in Ahmedabad which aligns with the size and more developed status of the city compared with 
Nashik.  Overall, the migrant labourers are mainly between the age of 18-30 years, male and 
belong to SC and ST categories.  In terms of temporal status, the highest proportions are long-
term migrants (10 years or more) or relatively recent migrants (2-4 years). Most migrants in both 
states are inter-state, based on the Indian Census definition of comparing place of birth with place 
of destination. The migrants are predominantly rural to urban migrants, and the second highest 
proportion of migrants come from cities (see Appendix Five). The main reason for migration 
reported in both states was for livelihood (59 percent), and the second most popular reason cited 
                                                     
15 The question regarding ration cards in the survey asked whether migrants possessed a ration card either in their 
place of destination or origin. The qualitative interviews ascertain whether the migrants had a ration card in their 
place of destination or not.  
Type of migrant 
characteristic 
Nashik  Ahmedabad  
Gender Male Male 
Age 18-30 years 18- 30 years 
Religion Hindu (80.9%)  
Muslim (10.6%) 
Hindu (79.4%)  
Muslim (19.4%) 
Income More than INR 5000 (66%) More than INR 5000 (77%) 
Ration Card15 85% 81.3% 
Literacy Illiterate (41%) Illiterate (40%) 
Type of migration Inter-state (44%) Inter-state (72.5) 
Frequency of visits Twice per year (37.6%) Twice per year (32.5%) 
Duration of migration Long-term (10 years or more) 
(39.7%) 
Long-term (10 years or more) 
(38%)  




was marriage (11.7 percent). In terms of frequency of visits home, the migrants most commonly 
return home twice per year in both states. At the aggregate level, migrants mostly return home 
twice per year (28.2 percent), and then once per annual quarter (16 percent). Most of the migrants 
are family migrants (of households between three and five members) (43.2%) – this correlates 
with the higher number of medium and long-term, presumably settled migrants. The second 
highest group are lone migrants (28.2%). Overall, the data shows that migrants maintain linkages 
with their place of origin through regular visits regardless of duration of migration, commonly 
move as household or alone, and both cities receive a high number of inter-state migrants.  
 
1.1.2. Spectrum of vulnerability 
While the findings – from both the survey and interviews -   suggest that all poor urban labourers 
are vulnerable and face barriers to accessing the PDS (representative of state resources and social 
protection), a subtle gradient of distinct types of vulnerability can be observed. This thesis focuses 
on vulnerability and precariousness primarily through the lens of governance and state-generated 
structural barriers, rather than taking on a detailed investigation into the specific relations 
involved within labour itself – for example the relations between contractors, employers and 
labourers. This lens is used to assess the degree of vulnerability and precariousness as experienced 
by different types of labourers. The evidence is presented accordingly as a broad heuristic 
spectrum consisting of three overlapping categories of labourers. 
 
1. The first category consists of labour migrants working on construction sites and brick 
kilns – referred to here as ‘precarious sites’ of labour; 
2. The second category can broadly be defined as ‘naka’ workers, typically long-term 
migrants engaged in casual or daily labour; 
3. The final category of labourers refers to those who are ‘non-migrant’ or ‘local’ citizens 
from either Nashik or Ahmedabad. 
 
This ‘spectrum’ is a loose framework for mapping out the findings and analysing the highly 




social identities and relations, but it helps us to understand the diversity of labour migrant 
experiences, and how they compare with local labourers. Each loose assemblage of research 
participants represents multiple and intersecting forms of vulnerability and precariousness – 
according to factors such as labour conditions, economic deprivation and social discrimination. 
For example, labour migrants may receive lower wages than their local counterparts but are more 
likely to find stable work in urban settings (Breman, 2013).  The main criterion which influenced 
my organisation of evidence along the spectrum is access to the state. As the empirical findings 
detail, this indicator of vulnerability is by no means definitive and can be redressed in various 
ways. However, state access can reveal important insights into the relationship between different 
forms of vulnerabilities and how they are perpetuated or resolved by the state. Finally, I present 
evidence on the different strategies and levels of agency adopted by all groups, in particular those 
of labour migrants in seeking to overcome barriers to access.  
 
The ‘spectrum’ starts with labour migrants working in brick kilns and large-scale construction 
sites, engaged in precarious forms of labour (Barrientos et al., 2013; Betancourt et al., 2013; 
Srivastava and Sutradhar, 2016). These migrants are typically employed collectively by local 
labour contractors, or ‘thekedars’16 in their home villages or towns either before migrating or upon 
arrival at their place of destination, for contracts of a certain duration. They are predominately 
lone male inter-state migrants, but a significant proportion of family migration is also observed 
(mostly intra-state). While all the groups observed in my fieldwork can be considered as part of 
the ‘precariat’ (as described by Standing, 2011) – this group of migrant workers can be considered 
among the most vulnerable due to the risks, relations and spatiality of such labour. Their lives are 
precarious in existential terms (Giddens, 1991; Ettlinger, 2007) in terms of uncertainty and risk, 
both of which characterise poor and vulnerable groups generally (Chambers, 1989; Choudhuri, 
2003). However, their environments are also precarious in a literal and physical sense: as 
                                                     
16 Hindi word for labour contractor, sometimes used colloquially to also refer to sub-contractor. Further detail on the 
role of the thekedar will emerge in the empirical findings (Chapters 4-7). Also known as known as mukkadams, 




Betancourt et al. observe on a Delhi construction site, “precariously-situated construction 
materials were ever-present” (2013: 5). The construction sites and brick kilns I observed presented 
multiple health and safety hazards for labourers and their families who were living there. I 
acknowledge the well-evidenced distinctions between construction and brick-kiln workers, the 
latter often facing risks of what Breman (2010) calls “neo-bondage” and unfree labour, and the 
former tending to come from relatively well-resourced backgrounds (see: Breman, 2007; Pattnaik, 
2009; Thorat and Jones, 2011). However, among my research participants, the empirics of these 
groups of labourers were the most synergistic. My observations showed these sites of labour were 
typically isolated from urban infrastructures and represent a conflation of work and residence 
therefore posing an omniscient sense of precariousness for this category of labour migrants.   
 
The migrants working in these precarious sites of labour are compelled to move for livelihood 
purposes and receive a relatively higher wage than they would ‘back home’ – though among 
construction workers the wages vary widely according to skill, gender and regional background. 
In light of this, many accept the trade-off that state entitlements, such as the ration card, will not 
figure in their urban lives. Despite requiring social protection and food security, lack of access to 
the PDS comprises just one aspect of a range of barriers faced by such groups.  
 
The barriers faced by this first group include a lack of access to basic healthcare, intensified in 
the hazardous and acutely resource-poor environments of construction site camps and brick kiln 
sites. In addition, my findings show that in some cases, access to education and child-care 
facilities are unavailable or restricted for those migrants compelled to bring their children with 
them, thus perpetuating potential risks of inter-generational vulnerabilities in migrant families 
(Prusty and Keshri, 2015). The spatialisation of this type of labour isolates migrant groups from 
urban resources and spaces where they can try to procure entitlements or develop social capital 
(Bordieu and Wacquant, 1992; Putnam, 2000).   The isolated settings also compound the 
vulnerabilities of women and children, who tend to be less empowered to mobilise and build 




Many of these migrants are from northern and eastern states such as Uttar Pradesh (UP) and Bihar 
– two of India’s poorest states with historically limited options for rural or urban livelihoods 
(McDowell and de Haan, 1997; de Haan, 2004; Keshri and Bhagat, 2012).17  Members of these 
groups explained that barriers to accessing the PDS do not only thwart food security, but also 
enact legal security and identity-based barriers for migrants who lack documentation. For 
example, both lone and family migrants from West Bengal articulated the heightened importance 
of ration cards – usually above other documents such as the Aadhaar card - to prove their national 
identities in the face of discrimination from authorities who confuse them with so-called ‘illegal’ 
migrants crossing porous borders with the neighbouring country of Bangladesh (Sadiq, 2008; 
Abbas, 2016).  
 
This group of labour migrants also reveals a sharp distinction in terms of the two states 
represented by the field-sites. At the time of my fieldwork, Nashik was rapidly urbanising, and it 
was relatively easier to overcome gatekeepers to construction sites which were rapidly 
proliferating at the time, through links with civil society organisations. As a relatively 
‘established’ city, Ahmedabad was more difficult to navigate in terms of gatekeepers and access 
to construction sites, implying construction workers here are more isolated not only from access 
to public resources but also support from civil society organisations.  
 
The second group of labour migrants – loosely categorised as casual or day labourers - occupy a 
middle space on the ‘spectrum’ and consist mainly of long-term and settled migrants. These 
migrants are both inter-state and intra-state. Many from the latter group originate from the most 
marginalised groups including Scheduled Tribe (ST) groups (also known as Adivasis) in both 
Maharashtra and Gujarat. These migrants gather and seek work at ‘nakas’ – roadside junctions 
where contractors employ labourers on daily or short-term bases, typically in semi- and unskilled 
                                                     
17 See Figure 1.1 for main internal migration flows and corridors within India. Historically, census data has shown 
that inter-state labour migrants typically flow from northern and eastern states to Maharashtra and Gujarat (Bhagat 




labour. They often jostle directly alongside their local counterparts to seek work. Migrant naka 
workers tend to live in urban slum settlements (on reclaimed private or public land), sharing 
spaces and resources (or limitations of) with local populations. 
 
Migrants in this second category are typically engaged in casual rather than contracted labour 
which potentially poses a specific form of temporal vulnerability. While the importance of 
temporality in shaping experiences of precariousness and enabling migrants to develop agency 
has been acknowledged for short-term migrants (Rogaly and Thieme, 2012), the long-term 
migrants I observed were paradoxically engaged in casual, short-term and in some cases, sporadic 
labour over prolonged durations. The findings also suggest that labourers engaged in casualised 
relationships had relatively more agency to mobilise access – by formal or informal means – to 
social entitlements and other resources. Strategies were also available to this group beyond sites 
of labour to improve their socio-economic standing.  Over time, naka migrants can accumulate 
both skills and thus wages; and social capital by forging local social networks within and beyond 
the neighbourhoods in which they settle. The findings show that this group of migrants face 
‘dhakkas’ even when seeking to follow official routes to accessing the PDS. However, learning 
from previous experiences of dhakkas either in their places of origin or in the city, and maintaining 
a lack of distrust in the state, many migrants pursue informal routes – such as informal agents – 
or draw upon their native social networks to overcome barriers to the PDS. 
 
The final category presented in my analysis consists of local labourers who can be positioned at 
the lowest end of the ‘spectrum.’  While the urban poor overall face both design and 
implementation barriers to the PDS, my evidence suggest that the latter form of barriers are more 
relevant. Overall, local participants are more readily able to identify and articulate state-specific 
grievances. They tend to be relatively empowered in terms of awareness and access to social and 
financial capital compared with migrants and can navigate both informal and formal routes of 




communities facing limitations in their social networks. Wages in semi-skilled and unskilled 
sectors also tend to be segmented according to gender, and less explicitly, caste lines, so these 
categories of identity also play an important role in shaping access to entitlement outcomes. In 
addition to caste, religion is also a prominent factor in erecting barriers to access. Religious 
identity seems to be more pronounced in the context of Ahmedabad than in Nashik, where 
ongoing tensions between Hindu and Muslim communities have resulted in widespread violence 
and the ghettoisation of certain communities. The same issues of identity also apply to labour 
migrants adding to the ‘hyper-precariousness’ (Lewis et al., 2014) of their situation. 
 
Local labourers face certain barriers of design. The PDS entitlement itself is designed in a way 
that is biased against children and women. It is assigned at the household rather than individual 
level and my findings show that it typically does not register female heads of household (such as 
widows or divorcees), or new family members by marriage or birth such as daughters-in-law or 
children. This design can therefore compound traditional patrilineal biases, for example in terms 
of provision of nutrition, against such household members (Dancer et al., 2008; Chinnakali et al., 
2014). Though there is an official process to update ration cards to include new household 
members, several participants recounted experiences of dhakkas when seeking to follow this 
process.  
 
In terms of barriers of implementation, local labourers experience dhakkas mostly in the form of 
misallocation or non-allocation of entitlements. For example, many households considered 
themselves as ‘below poverty line’ (BPL)18 according to their income - corroborated by my 
observations of their household, families and (lack of) assets - but were allocated ‘above poverty 
line’ (APL) entitlements and thus barred from adequate food rations. In response, local labourers 
can draw from their social networks to pursue informal routes to access – using agents in the 
informal sector – to procure ration cards or black-market provisions. 
                                                     
18 Socio-economic classification used in India for social protection targeting at the time of fieldwork. Those who are 




Finally, the local labourers observed are typically engaged in casual and often unreliable forms 
of employment in a competitive setting. Local labourers often indirectly, and sometimes 
explicitly, articulated nativist sentiments. In their perceptions the burdens they faced in terms of 
resources (such as PDS rations) and labour demand was attributed to migration. Migrants 
themselves are viewed as barriers to access by local communities, in line with the extant literature 
which highlight ‘nativist’ movements as driven by very presence of migrants themselves, rather 
than an endogenous aspect of local communities (Weiner, 1978).  
 
Overall the findings show that though there are highly nuanced and varied experiences among 
migrants and local labourers; a strong dichotomy does not exist between the two groups. Both 
migrants and local labourers who are poor face a range of barriers in accessing the PDS, and 
government resources overall. However, my findings confirm that different sets of access 
conditions exist for migrants and local labourers, and migrants face a set of challenges that are 
distinct from their local counterparts.  Labour migrants are not a homogenous category and 
nuanced differential experiences exist depending on duration of migration, type of migration, and 
even within such groups, social identities of caste, religion, ethnicity and gender. The barriers 
enacted in access structures can be attributed to contextual factors within local and national 
governance systems.  This thesis examines the spectrum of experiences among the urban poor, 
delineating the specific vulnerabilities faced by labour migrants when accessing the PDS, and 
how these have been shaped by the governance context at local and sub-national levels.  
 
Importantly, the findings also show that in addition to time spent away from ‘home’ and space 
travelled, the defining criteria of migration itself should be broadened to encompass the linkages 
between place of origin and destination. According to my findings from Nashik and Ahmedabad, 
multiple linkages between the place of destination and origin - kinship, economic, identity and 
emotional - are maintained by migrants but this does not necessarily correlate with length of time, 




to describe seasonal migrant livelihoods (Deshingkar and Farrington, 2009; Rogaly and Thieme, 
2012) and can be applied to my findings to describe strategies to overcome barriers to access and 
resources.  
 
Another notable contribution of the findings highlights the instrumental importance of ration 
cards beyond their official function. Ration cards serve multiple social and economic functions 
for citizens from socio-economically disadvantaged groups. The cards can help to address 
limitations in terms of rights linked to citizenship, experienced specifically among inter-state 
migrants, and to a lesser extent, intra-state migrant and local labourers (Jayal, 2009; Abbas, 2016). 
The combination of contemporary security concerns arising from recent terrorist attacks and 
historical prejudices against so-called ‘illegal’ international migrants from neighbouring countries 
such as Bangladesh (Sadiq, 2008) creates precarious conditions for migrants who are constantly 
subject to requests for citizenship verification by hostile authorities. In such cases, the value 
represented by ration cards is linked to identity, security and access to a range of social 
entitlements and services (such as financial services and mobile phone sim card purchases), that 
extend beyond their official remit of enabling access to food subsidies.  
 
 
1.2 Background to internal migration in India 
The Census of India (2001) defines an individual migrant as “a person who has moved from one 
politically defined area to another similar area. In the Indian context, these areas are generally a 
village in rural and a town in urban.”19 Migration is measured using information on last place of 
fixed residence and movement since place of birth. Data from the latest India census in 2011 on 
internal migration was not released at the time of writing this thesis, however the urbanisation 
data indicates an increase of 91 million in the urban population and this is projected to continue.20 
India’s urban population now stands at 377 million, of which a significant proportion are migrants 
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(Bhagat, 2011; Census of India, 2011). The urban share of India’s population grew from 27.7 
percent in 2001 to 31.1 percent in 2011 (Bhagat, 2011; Census of India, 2011). In 2001, the share 
of Gujarat’s population living in cities was 76 percent, and same figure for Maharashtra stood at 
80 percent (Bhagat and Mohanty, 2009). This growth is attributed to both a rise in rural-urban 
and urban-urban migration, and an increase in the number of towns and cities (Bhagat, 2011). 
National Sample Survey (NSS) data also confirms urban growth: the share of migrants in the 
urban population increased from 33 percent in 1999-2000, to 35 percent in 2007-2008 (NSSO, 
2007-2008). Figure 1.1 depicts major net migration flows between states in India, based on 2001 
Census data. The map depicts significant flows from northern and eastern states into the western 
states of Maharashtra and Gujarat. The main flows of migration depicted here represent sharp 
regional inequalities in India, with many migration corridors reflecting movements from the 
poorest to richest regions.   
Source: Bhagat and Mohanty (2009) based on 2001 Census data 
 




Internal migration in India is “multi-patterned” (Shah, 2010: 1) and internal migrants can be 
categorised along multiple temporal, spatial and directional lines.  
 
1. Temporal: short-term, long-term, lifetime (settled), circular/seasonal 
2. Returns: coping strategy or accumulation of assets 
3. Distance: short-distance, intra-state, inter-state, long-distance21 
4. Direction: rural-urban (r-u); rural-rural (r-r), urban-urban (u-u) 
 
The temporal and spatial categories intersect as those migrants who travel short-distances can 
move on a seasonal or circular basis, though such types of mobility are difficult to measure using 
macro-scale instruments such as the population census. The population census is limited in terms 
of data captured on short-term and seasonal migrants (Srivastava and Sasikumar, 2003). It is not 
well-designed to collect data on migration related to temporary employment, or secondary reasons 
for migration, such as marriage (ibid).  The available data on urban growth also obscures 
information on short-term, seasonal or circular migration. The labour migrants I observed are 
predominately rural to urban migrants, and in the case of older migrant individuals and/or 
households, there are some urban to urban migrants. They are also predominantly categorised as 
Scheduled Tribes (ST) and Scheduled Castes (SC).   
 
The NSS are large-scale sample household surveys conducted every five years. The format was 
adapted in the 55th Round (1999-2000) to capture estimates of short-term migration. For the first 
time, migrants who stayed away for 2-6 months of work were considered in the survey. However, 
this still fails to fully capture the scale of short-term mobility as seasonal migration cycles can 
vary from a few weeks to a few months (7-9 months) and can occur more than once per annum 
(Srivastava, 2011).  Data on migration have important policy implications. The design of a census 
design and interpretation of its results can influence policy attitudes and responses at the central 
and state levels. The popular ‘distress migration’ narrative for example, does not recognise the 
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volume of short-term or circular migrants and thus ignores the potential value of migration as a 
livelihood strategy (Deshingkar and Start, 2003).  
 
Some studies have established that the poorest of the poor do not tend to migrate (Skeldon, 2008; 
Keshri and Bhagat, 2012). Certain types of migration patterns – temporary, seasonal and short-
term – have been observed however, as typical of those belonging to the “lowest expenditure 
quintiles, rural areas and STs” (Keshri and Bhagat, 2012: 82).  From the outset, such migrant 
flows are dominated by poor and vulnerable demographic groups: scheduled caste and so-called 
‘backward caste’ members, landless individuals and households and those suffering multiple 
social and economic deprivations (Srivastava, 2011; Kusuma et al., 2014).  They are often 
employed in the informal economy engaging in precarious labour (Breman, 1996; Srivastava and 
Sasikumar, 2003). Those compelled to migrate also face risks in the form of job search hazards, 
lack of information about the labour market at places of destination, and possible exploitation 
from labour contractors. Whilst the Indian government has passed a plethora of labour laws 
designed to protect workers, recognition of the specific needs of migrants have been minimal and 
virtually ignored by employers (Breman, 1996; Lerche, 2012; Pattenden, 2012). The absence of 
access to social protections for socio-economically deprived labour migrants already operating in 
a void of legal protection can further exacerbate their precariousness.  
 
In terms of overall population distribution strategies, unlike China’s hukou22 system where rural 
to urban migrants face explicit exclusion from social protection (Chan and Zang, 1999), India has 
not pursued explicit movement controls and the freedom to move is a constitutional right. At the 
sub-national level however, this is contradicted by implementation practices that diverge from 
policy design, exclusionary urban development policies, described in Chapter Two, and access 
structures to social entitlements that are biased against migrants. Though historical and projected 
                                                     
22 A strict government registration system in mainland China where rural to urban migrants are denied access to state 
social benefits and services in cities, though this has loosened since the early 2000s. See: Wilczak, J. (2017) ‘Making 
the countryside more like the countryside? Rural planning and metropolitan visions in post-quake Chengdu’ 




to increase in the wake of rapid urbanisation (Census of India, 2001; Bhagat, 2011), migration 
within India continues to be a contested rather than accepted phenomenon. ‘Distress migration’ 
was a term commonly used in the Indian literature (and in some African contexts) to explain 
migration by the poor as a response to ecological or economic shocks (Reddy, 1990, Mukherji, 
2001) and continues to prevail in media and policy narratives. Internal migration is generally 
viewed as problematic and in need of reduction (Keshri and Bhagat, 2012). The pessimistic 
“distress migration” narrative (Mukherji, 2001; 2006) is both an attribute and outcome of the 
“hostile policy environment” for migrants (Deshingkar and Farrington, 2009). The work of 
Mukherji (2001) depicts internal migration outcomes as ‘distress’ and ‘urban decay’ and migrants 
are considered a source of potential crime and burden in urban areas.  
 
Despite the lack of data available on seasonal and short-term migration, which has prohibited the 
development of micro-level studies observing migration patterns on a granular scale (Keshri and 
Bhagat, 2012), a rich vein of qualitative studies exists (including Breman, 1996; Mosse et al., 
2002; Rogaly et al., 2002; de Haan, 2002; Parry, 2003; Shah, 2006; Waite, 2006; Deshingkar et 
al., 2008).  Building on the ‘new economics of migration’ approach, this body of qualitative 
studies suggest that migration has long been part of the “livelihood portfolio” for poor people in 
India (Mosse et al., 1997; de Haan and Rogaly, 2002; Deshingkar et al., 2008). A set of studies 
by Anh (2003) on internal migration in Bangladesh, China, Vietnam and the Philippines found 
that migration offered a route out of poverty and was also a driver of economic growth.  
 
These more ‘optimistic’ narratives counter the distress migration argument with empirical 
evidence that internal migration in India can serve as a livelihood strategy both for those who 
migrate, and their families left behind, offering a pathway to the accumulation of income and 
assets (Mosse et al., 1997; Deshingkar and Start, 2003; Mitra, 2010).  Taking this existing 
evidence as a starting point, this thesis presents findings on experiences of labour migrants in their 




social protection outcomes for urban migrants (Mitra, 2010; Routray, 2014; Abbas, 2016).  
 
1.3 The Public Distribution System 
The PDS, officially established in 194723, is arguably India’s oldest and largest social protection 
programme and a fixture of its expanding “welfare architecture” (Mehta, 2010).  The nationwide 
programme provides subsidised (below market price) food and cooking fuel to guarantee food 
security24 for poor and vulnerable households and also supports farmers through high procurement 
prices (Mooij, 1998). The PDS has never been a static programme and iteratively vacillated 
between universal and targeted coverage, a focus on pro-poor or pro-market mechanisms and 
private and public distributors. The programme’s scope has continually changed to reflect India’s 
shifting economy (Prasad, 1981; Mooij, 1998). The programme evolved into its recent form 
(relevant at the time of fieldwork) in 1997, as a targeted food security programme focusing on 
vulnerable populations and has evolved even further in this direction under the 2013 National 
Food Security Act (NFSA).  
 
PDS access is stratified according to socio-economic categories that vary across sub-national 
states but broadly correspond with ‘above poverty line’ (APL) and ‘below poverty line’ (BPL). 
Many states also include an access band for the most economically and socially vulnerable groups 
(including widows and those with disabilities) referred to as the ‘Antyodaya Anna Yojana’ (AAY) 
category. Once distributed, the subsidies are sold at retail points run by agencies which are not 
necessarily state-owned but expected to serve public goods; working in parallel with the free 
market (Prasad, 1981). Documents, referred to as ‘ration cards’, are used by PDS claimants to 
signify and procure household entitlements. At the time of fieldwork under the Targeted PDS 
system, BPL and AAY households were entitled to 35kg of grains and APL households were 
                                                     
23 The original iteration of the PDS emerged during World War Two when pre-Independence India faced acute food 
shortages and initiated a system of public food distribution under a specific Food Department. See: 
http://dfpd.nic.in/history.htm 
24 Food security is defined as a situation when “all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to 
sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life” 




entitled to 15kg in both Maharashtra and Gujarat.25 A wide variety of prices and amounts are 
reported by the local labourer participants in both of the states, and also by labour migrants in 
relation to their states of origin. This suggests the diversity of PDS allocations across different 
states (Khera, 2011) and also among households; as well as hinting at divergent perceptions and 
experiences of discretionary patterns of PDS access among vulnerable groups.  
 
Despite India’s shift to ‘lower middle income’ status,26 the country continues to perform poorly 
in nutrition indicators particularly among children and is currently ranked 97th of 118 countries 
in the Global Hunger Index (von Grebmer et al., 2016). The wide variations across the country in 
nutrition rates (Cavatorta et al., 2015) - with many migrant-sending states faring the worst - 
potentially reflects variations in PDS implementation and access (Bhalotra, 2002). While the PDS 
is flawed in terms of operational efficiency (Saxena, 2011), some studies have established the 
importance of the programme’s potential to ensure resource distribution in times of crisis, resolve 
food insecurity and reduce the vulnerability of poor households (Bhalotra, 2002; Jha et al., 2009). 
Social protection programmes such as the PDS can reduce vulnerability by alleviating income 
poverty, but this does not necessarily guarantee against other forms of vulnerability such as the 
risk of malnutrition (Gaiha and Imai, 2009). Taking on a multidimensional view of poverty, Jha 
et al. (2009) argue that nutrition and healthcare deprivation should also be integrated along with 
economic development into resource transfers, as part of a comprehensive approach.  
 
This comprehensive approach was taken up by the national ‘Right to Food’27 (RtF) advocacy 
movement, a grassroots network of activists calling for food security and access to nutrition under 
both constitutional and international human rights laws. Among RtF’s specific calls was one to 
enhance the role of the PDS in guaranteeing food security for India’s poor and vulnerable 
                                                     
25 Sources: http://mahafood.gov.in/website/english/PDS.aspx  and 
http://www.prsindia.org/administrator/uploads/general/1388728622~~TPDS%20Thematic%20Note.pdf 
26 See: World Bank Country and Lending Groups: 
https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-bank-country-and-lending-groups 




households, and they eventually mobilised legislative reform in the shape of the NFSA. The PDS 
is now a targeted scheme under law, where households are entitled to a specific amount of 
subsidised food and cooking fuel depending on their socio-economic category.28 However, labour 
migrants continue to be excluded and remain at a disadvantage when it comes to accessing the 
PDS.29 This furthers the ‘hostile policy environment’ surrounding labour migrants in India, even 
in the context of judicial reform to overcome social exclusion.  
 
Migrants face a double-pronged barrier when it comes to accessing the PDS: one in the 
programme design which stipulates the need for proof of local fixed address to initially apply for 
a ration card. The second is in terms of implementation: where access to the subsidies in any given 
location is tethered to a fixed rather than temporary proof of address, as observed in MacAuslan’s 
study on migrant access to the PDS in Delhi (2011). Quotas for food subsidies are often time-
bound which tends to preclude those on the move (MacAuslan, 2011). Additionally, the ration 
card is used as a general proof of identity, so migrants effectively lack recognised documents 
proving identity at their place of destination. As my findings show, barriers to access to the PDS 
are not only experienced by mobile populations. Both the urban poor who are sedentary, and in 
some cases the migrants in their ‘native’ locations recount challenging access conditions, further 
highlighting extant evidence on flawed PDS targeting systems (Balhotra, 2002).  
 
The programme’s overhaul in 2014 (following the NFSA) was partly driven by its reputation for 
being poorly managed and prone to corruption and resource leakages – the misallocation of ration 
cards being one example, where subsidies are diverted to “unintended beneficiaries” (Saxena, 
2011: 44).30 Many households are allocated the wrong category of ration card (Besley et al., 2007; 
                                                     
28 See: http://dfpd.nic.in/nfsa-act.htm 
29 A provision for enabling portable access to the PDS, to include migrants, was included in the original proposal for 
a Food Security Bill by RtF but this did not make it through to final legislation. Some prominent RtF advocates 
support the ‘distress migration’ narrative calling for more efforts to stem rural to urban migration (based on field 
interviews with RtF activists, Delhi, 2014). Also see: Khera, R. ‘Employment Guarantee and migration,’ The Hindu, 
13 July 2006: http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-opinion/employment-guarantee-and-
migration/article18464170.ece 
30 According to an evaluation from now disbanded Planning Commission: approximately 42% of subsidised grains 




Dreze and Khera, 2010). A World Bank study found the actual welfare impact of the PDS on the 
poor was minimal in many states, though certain states such as Tamil Nadu are exceptions. The 
minimal impact was attributed to poor participation and poor targeting of intended beneficiaries 
(Radhakrishna et al., 1997). Furthermore, at the level of implementation, a whole range of 
complex interactions exist between multiple actors, leading to a proliferation of barriers to access 
for the poor and vulnerable, particularly migrants (MacAuslan and Sabates-Wheeler, 2007; 
MacAuslan, 2011). 
 
In terms of how the PDS actually works in practice, it is a “huge machine” of a programme (Landy, 
2017: 113): managed jointly by central and state levels of government and enabling the internal 
allocation of food resources across the country. The dynamics and challenges linked to its 
operation mirror those of India’s federalised governance system itself. As a nationwide 
programme that is designed centrally, implemented sub-nationally and administered locally; 
access outcomes are differentiated along socio-economic and spatial axes lines. The spatial axis 
does not only refer to the programme’s urban bias (Mooij, 1998) but also in its favouring of 
sedentary over mobile populations. A deeper examination of how the PDS works illuminates both 
the vertical and horizontal lines of accountability between centre and state authorities; and the 
scope for bureaucrats and front-line agents to manipulate implementation processes,. These 
labyrinthine and populous processes of implementation are depicted in Appendix One. 
 
At the central level, the national Food Corporation of India (FCI) procures grains from producers 
at a ‘minimum support price’ and then allocates the grains according to estimated regional need 
(Tritah, 2003).  The task of distributing the subsidised food is delegated to individual states and 
implemented through a network of licenced local Fair Price Shops (FPS), known locally in Hindi 
as ‘dukaans’ (shopkeepers are referred to as ‘dukandaars’). Individual states are also responsible 
for classifying families according to socio-economic category and keeping FPS accountable – “an 





additional burden” on state-level bureaucracy.31 The ‘double-pronged’ barriers faced by migrants 
are illustrated in a Delhi-based case study by MacAuslan (2011). MacAuslan’s findings on the 
exclusionary attributes of this access system include: 
 
• Requirement for proof of permanent residence 
• Fixed quotas for poor and non-poor due to non-continuous deadlines for application 
• The necessity to reapply for a ration card with every change across FPS jurisdictions 
 
Despite its flaws, the PDS has remained a tool of political capital - the provision of food serving 
as a potent form of capturing votes in a large and unequal electorate (Mooij, 1998). The political 
relevance of the PDS is also marked in the RtF movement which culminated in legalising food 
security rights. Civil society groups were mobilised to pressure the government to take 
responsibility for national food security with a reformed and accountable PDS. Whilst the PDS 
has been subject to debates regarding universal and targeted social protection programmes and 
more recently, whether it would be more efficient to replace with cash transfers,32 it remains a 
powerful political tool though not yet one that has been able to provide for migrants on a national 
scale. 
 
1.4 Governance in India  
The federalised, and increasingly decentralised, system of India’s government can result in 
heterogenous processes and outcomes of national programmes such as the PDS across its 29 
states (Mundle, 2012; Chopra, 2015; Deshpande et al.,2017). The federal system also fractures 
access to social protections for migrants who cross administrative boundaries. As part of 
democratic reform under the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments in 1992, India introduced 
a three-tier decentralised government. New institutions were established to ensure the 
representation of historically marginalised groups such as Scheduled Caste and Scheduled 
                                                     
31 Reference from key informant interview with state level official in Gujarat’s Food and Civil Supplies Department 
(April, 2014).  





Tribes, and women overall. Village councils (gram panchayats) and ‘urban local bodies’ (ULBs) 
were set up to enable more direct citizen representation in governance (Norris, 2008).  
 
However, this stratified form of government has opened up space for ‘unruly practices’ (Fraser, 
1989; Gore, 1993, cited in Kabeer, 2000; Pellissery, 2010) where implementation factors 
affecting PDS access in general, such as corruption, political opportunism and accountability 
systems also vary from state to state. While the PDS has received criticism for corruption and 
inefficiency often at the cost of those most in need, certain states such as Tamil Nadu, Andhra 
Pradesh and recently, Chhattisgarh exemplify ‘model’ states with successful PDS operations and 
outcomes in terms of rooting out corruption, installing efficient distribution mechanisms and 
broadening coverage (Kattamuri, 2011; Tillin, Saxena and Sisodia 2015; Landy, 2017). 
 
In this thesis I present evidence of a system of institutional barriers experienced by migrants and 
local labourers in accessing social protection programmes, and on the ways in which they deploy 
strategies to mitigate or overcome these barriers. I attribute these barriers to ‘policy dissonances’ 
– the external and internal conceptual and behavioural paradoxes that characterise multiple 
dimensions of Indian governance, including policies that concern internal migration. At the local 
level, these dissonances are represented by discretionary practices such as rent-seeking, social 
discrimination and patronage, though they operate within, and in relation to, institutional bounds 
(North, 1990; Gore, 1993; Kabeer, 2000).  For example, barriers of implementation are mediated 
by local bureaucrats who can display their own subjectivities and either engage, mediate, yield 
(to bribery, nepotism and rent) or resist in encounters with the poor, and those with specific 
disadvantages, such as recent labour migrants. These behaviours create barriers and deny the very 
citizens targeted by social protection programmes. These divergences or ‘policy dissonances’ 
between programme design and the way they are implemented adversely affect both local and 





Divergences between policy and implementation have adversely affected (or led to the neglect 
of) labour migrants in numerous ways. Whilst migrant labour was recognised by national 
legislation in the Inter-State Migrant Workmen Act (1979),33 there is little evidence that 
employers abide by the regulations. Evidence from a study on labour migrants from Jharkhand to 
West Bengal shows such legislation is largely unobserved and migrants are thus unprotected 
(Rogaly et al., 2002). Migrants are delinked from access to social protection due in part to a 
dichotomy in governance attitudes.  Policies are fractured along one stance that promotes social 
protection and improved targeting of the poor, and another stance which either disfavours or 
neglects migrants and their social protection needs. Both policy patterns can overlap to compound 
the vulnerability of poor migrants.  
 
Regarding national policies for internal migrants, the findings from a key informant interview 
(KII) with a member of the Indian Cabinet Secretariat,34 show that both structural and political 
barriers prevent “portability of rights” (and access) for migrants overall. According to the Cabinet 
Secretariat representative, the government’s official aims regarding migration (at the time of 
fieldwork), at least in rhetoric, both adhere to and contradict conceptions of a “hostile policy 
environment” for migrants. They stated aims are to to a) prevent distress migration, b) relieve said 
distress for those who do migrate and c) “implement systems and technology to enable the 
portability of rights.” (KII with Cabinet representative, New Delhi, 2014). 
 
The latter point reflects national moves toward ‘e-governance’ and digitalisation of programme 
infrastructures in India (Sarkar, 2014; Masiero, 2016).  In 2009, the national Unique Identification 
(UID) programme - known as “Aadhaar” – was launched with the promise to facilitate portable 
and universal identification for all citizens, thus not only eliminating errors of exclusion and 
                                                     
33 The Inter-state Migrant Workmen Act (1979) stipulates: licencing and registration of migrant workers, advance 
payments and timely payments in accordance with the national minimum wage. Further information can be found 
here: http://clc.gov.in/clc/clcold/Acts/shtm/ismw.php 





inclusion but potentially improving access for migrants (Nilekani, 2008; Zelazny, 2012). In other 
words, the Aadhaar card was based on two principles which promised benefits for poor, working 
migrants. Such promises of inclusion clashed with the programme’s other rationale of national 
surveillance and rooting out terrorists and so-called illegal immigrants from neighbouring 
countries (Sadiq, 2008; Khera, 2011; 2017). Aadhaar is the most explicit example of India’s 
increasingly “biopolitical” (Corbridge et al. 2005) approach – literally combining individual 
biology and state-sanctioned identity through linking biometric data such as fingerprints and 
retina scans with an identity number.  
 
The unfolding of the Aadhaar programme since 2009 has been ridden with controversy and 
political, legal and operational challenges with no clear transformation of migrant rights yet 
evident (Ramanathan, 2010; Khera, 2011; 2017). Though the programme was in its incipient stage 
during the fieldwork for this thesis, it looms large in the research context and is referenced in 
descriptions of the findings. The evidence on federal governance in this thesis also speaks to wider 
contemporary debates on India’s heterogenous social policy outcomes across different states, and 
the role of ‘e-governance’ in attempting to further integrate, rather than spatially differentiate, 
governance outcomes (Sinha, 2015).   
 
The Aadhaar programme trajectory is a striking and notorious example of the gap between policy 
intentions and outcomes, even before the change of government in 2014. At the time of fieldwork, 
both public and political responses were mixed, and the level of uptake to the new centrally 
mandated programme varied from state to state. Khera (2011) warned that linking the Aadhaar to 
programmes such as the PDS did not safeguard against operational flaws and exclusionary 
outcomes. While some sub-national examples of concomitant technologised innovations have 
been launched - including the Centralised Online Real-time Electronic (CORE) PDS in 
Chhattisgarh, (Kattamuri, 2011) and electronic benefits transfer (EBT) initiative in Andhra 




state migrants.  Portability and universality of access therefore remain a gap in national social 
protection.  
 
In my interview with the Cabinet Secretariat (CS) representative in New Delhi, contemporary 
census measures for counting migrants were referred to as a “nightmare.”  Existing legislation 
such as the Inter-state Migrant Workmen Act (1979) was deemed outdated and unworkable, as it 
proved impractical for employers to follow the requirement of individually registering each labour 
migrant. The CS representative epitomised the main challenges regarding migration governance 
in the following statement: 
 
“Everyone recognises the problems linked with migration, but the 
Inter-state Act is not implementable. The focus should not just be on 
labour laws and enforcement, but on welfare. A methodology has to 
happen in order to enforce a law. The fact is we all need migrant 
labour – and any anti-migrant political attitudes for example, the Shiv 
Sena35 are simply ‘political posturing’” 
 
 
According to the CS representative, the state’s incapability to fully capture accurate numbers on 
migrants inhibited the development of any meaningful policy framework for internal migrants 
and improving access. Other challenges mentioned were the lack of political will at the individual 
state level to initiate and develop inter-state migrant access frameworks and the lack of inter-state 
dispute resolution mechanisms, further discouraging migrant-supportive policies. 
 
It should be noted that this research endeavour was conceived and designed in 2013, and the 
fieldwork was conducted in late 2013 through to the summer of 2014. The summer of 2014 also 
marked a crux in recent Indian political history - the landslide victory of Narendra Modi, leader 
of the Bharatiya Janata Party36 (BJP), after decades of Congress-led government. The BJP 
government had been critical of flagship welfare programmes such as the Mahatma Gandhi 
                                                     
35 A far-right anti-migrant political party founded in Maharashtra in the 1960s 
36 A major national party in government at the time of writing. The party has been closely associated with Hindu 




National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MNREGS) and their initial period of 
government generated concerns over the retrenchment of India’s decentralised welfare system 
(Tillin and Pereira, 2017). Such developments have changed the governance landscape and 
therefore, the findings of this research should therefore be considered within its specific pre-Modi 
time-frame. 
 
1.5 Introduction to field-sites 
The first four months of fieldwork were conducted in the city of Nashik, located in the state of 
Maharashtra (MH) - one of the highest migrant-receiving states in India. According to the 2001 
Census,37 the state receives India’s second highest level of net migration (2.3 million), and data 
from the latest Census show its level of urbanisation exceeds 42 percent (Census of India, 2001; 
Bhagat, 2011; Census of India, 2011).  The state appears to have a contradictory stance on 
migrants. On the one hand the local and dominant political party, Shiv Sena, is based on hostility 
toward inter-state migrants, however the state also has an active civil society and trade union 
sector which indirectly supports labourers including labour migrants.38  
 
The second site where I conducted a further four months of fieldwork was the city of Ahmedabad, 
in Gujarat (GJ). The state of Gujarat was ranked third highest among the top states for net 
migration according to the 2001 Census (0.68 million).39 The latest data indicates an increase of 
over 30 percent in the rate of urbanisation (Bhagat, 2011). Gujarat overall shows a higher than 
national average level of urbanisation - one of only 15 states to go against the nationwide trend 
of decreased urbanisation in the period 2001-2011 (ibid). Unlike Maharashtra, Gujarat is 
characterised by high seasonal and temporary migration40 (Jayaraman, 1979; Mosse et al., 2005; 
Bhagat, 2012). Gujarat hosts an active labour organisation movement and civil society (Spodek, 
                                                     
37 Drawn from 2011 Census Migration D Tables available here: 
http://censusindia.gov.in/Data_Products/Data_Highlights/Data_Highlights_link/data_highlights_D1D2D3.pdf 
38 Based on fieldwork observations and key informant interviews (2013) 
39 Drawn from 2001 Census D Migration Tables 
40 Based on 64th National Sample Survey 2007-08, unit level data as cited in Bhagat (2012). According to this data 




2011). Whilst the political context of Gujarat has not been overtly hostile to internal migration 
compared with Maharashtra, social tensions have mainly manifested among religious identity 
groups. In economic terms, neoliberal development rather than social protection for unorganised 
workers has been a state priority.41  
 
In addition to the shared characteristics described earlier in this chapter, at the state level there is 
also a broad case for comparing MH and GJ in terms of demographic composition and state 
interventions for migrants. Using broadly similar approaches, both state governments have 
attempted to improve inclusion for migrants through what I describe as ‘responsive policies’ 
specifically with regard to the PDS, though to limited success. Both Gujarat and Maharashtra 
governments established state-wide ‘temporary ration card’ schemes, motivated by the plight of 
deprived tribal migrants driven in large numbers by drought and deforestation. In Gujarat, the 
‘roaming ration card’ scheme was introduced in 2003 for intra-state migrants, though it concluded 
in 2004 due to challenges in implementation. In Maharashtra, the Temporary Ration Card (TRC) 
scheme was introduced, after a state-level Right to Food committee (RtF) ruling in 2001. 
However, awareness about the scheme amongst local officials, let alone eligible labour migrants 
was limited and the programme was poorly implemented.42  
 
The two states share broadly similar characteristics in comparison with the rest of India. Their 
origin stories are entwined (unified as one territory in the immediate aftermath of Independence 
but then splitting to become the contemporary states of Maharashtra and Gujarat in 1960)43 and 
fraternal motifs linking the two states have been invoked in media and political narratives.44 Both 
states are seen as pursuing similar paths of development though in differing political contexts.  
                                                     
41 Based on key informant interviews with local trade unions, labour organisers and the state government 
representatives 
42 Information on these responsive strategies drawn from key informant interviews with municipal and state-level 
officials in both field sites.  
43 For further information on the Maha Gujarat movement see: Bobbio, T. (2012) Making Gujarat Vibrant: Hindutva, 
development and the rise of sub-nationalism in India, Third World Quarterly, 33:4, 657-672 
44 The Indian Express. ‘Gujarat polls: Maharashtra, Gujarat brothers, says CM Devendra Fadnavis’ 28th November 





Gujarat was under the direct influence of religious-nationalist (BJP) politics, while regionalist 
(Shiv Sena) politics have been historically popular in the case of Maharashtra (though at the time 
of fieldwork a Congress government was in place at state level).45 Though broadly similar, Table 
1.3 below captures the main characteristics of each state and how they contrast with each other. 
While Maharashtra is larger in population size and receives more migrants overall, Gujarat 
reported higher economic growth. Conversely Gujarat also performs lower in terms of human 
development (non-economic) indicators and the high rate of intra-state temporary migration, 
highly represented by ST or Adivasi groups (Mosse et al., 2002) hints at stark rural-urban 
differentials within the state. While sectarian politics prevail in both states, in Maharashtra the 
divisions are more explicitly anti-migrant and ‘nativist’ (Weiner, 1978) whereas in Gujarat, 
religious, rather than regionalist, divisions are sharper and have resulted in widespread organised 
violence (Desai, 2010).  
 
Both states host active forms of civil society or non-state sectors which have mobilised both state 
and market actors to engage in social and worker protection reforms, but efforts have been 
curtailed by widespread practices of political patronage, rent-seeking and corruption (Berenschot, 
2010; Deshpande et al., 2017). In Maharashtra, an active trade union sector helped mobilise the 
state to enact sub-national mechanisms to support labourers in the informal economy, however 
these largely failed due to lack of political will, funds and accountability, and remained “political 
vehicles” rather than transformative initiatives (Deshpande et al., 2017: 101). In Gujarat, a vibrant 
NGO sector developed in the legacy of Gandhian anti-colonial resistance projects and in response 
to state negligence in the wake of social and ecological disasters (specifically: a series of periodic 
religious riots starting in the 1960s and continuing through to the present day; and the 2001 
earthquake in Gujarat) (Spodek, 2011).46 Practices such as patronage,  ‘political mediation’,  state-
sponsored discrimination and corporate malpractices are widespread in the state (Mahadevia, 
                                                     
45 Shiv Sena was not the ruling party in Maharashtra at the time of my fieldwork but is a dominant local party and 
was the fourth biggest majority in the state legislative assembly in the 2009-2014 period (during my fieldwork). 




2002; Berenschot, 2010). This contrast between the state’s advanced developmental trajectory 
and its failures of accountability is captured by Kohli’s descriptor of the Gujarati state as 
“omnipresent, but feeble” (1990: 6, as cited in Berenschot, 2010). Chatterjee’s indictment of the 
state’s failure to protect victims of religious pogroms and organised violence (2004) also 
highlights failures of state-citizens relations.  
 
In understanding the economic and political contexts of these states, we can see how policy 
dissonances – reflected in divergent economic interests, political motives and social concerns – 
as well as between policy rhetoric and implementation (or the lack of) work to continue the 
exclusion of labour migrants, and labourers overall from state protections at both central and sub-
national levels. Widespread networks of patronage in both states also help explain barriers of 
implementation related to the PDS. The contextualisation of each field-site can also illuminate 
the processes behind the failure of efforts to improve access structures for labour migrants through 






Table 1.3: Summary of state-level characteristics of field-sites 






Population growth rate 
2001-201148 
19.17% 15.99% 
Urban population 49 42.6% 
(increased from 37.4% in 
2001) 
45.23% 
(increased from 42.43% 
in 2001) 
 
Net State Domestic 
Product (NSDP) growth50 
16.27 % 14.22% 
Human Development 
Index (HDI) ranking 
within India51 
10th 5th 
Net migration52 0.6 million 2.3 million 






Roaming ration card 
scheme 
Temporary Ration Card 
scheme 
Political party (at time of 
fieldwork) 
BJP Indian National Congress 
(coalition) 
Main industry54 • Petrochemicals and 
chemicals  
• Pharmaceuticals 
• Gems and jewellery  
• Producer and  
exporter of cotton 
• IT and electronics 
• Sugarcane 








                                                     
47 Data source for Gujarat: http://www.gujaratindia.com/state-profile/demography.htm 
Data source for Maharashtra: http://censusindia.gov.in/2011-prov-results/data_files/maharastra/maha_at_aglance.pdf 
48 Data source for GJ: http://www.gujaratindia.com/state-profile/demography.htm 
Data source for MH: http://censusindia.gov.in/2011-prov-results/data_files/maharastra/maha_at_aglance.pdf 
49 Data source for GJ: http://www.gujaratindia.com/state-profile/demography.htm 
Data source for MH: http://censusindia.gov.in/2011-prov-results/data_files/maharastra/maha_at_aglance.pdf 
50 NSDP data for 2013-2014. Niti Aayog - National Institute for Transforming India (replacement for central 
government Planning Commission):  http://niti.gov.in/content/nsdp-current-prices-percent-growth-2004-05-2014-15 
51 From an index constructed by Mukherjee et al (2014) based on UN HDI indicators. Available at: 
http://www.nipfp.org.in/media/medialibrary/2014/06/WP_2014_139.pdf 
52 Census of India: 
http://censusindia.gov.in/Data_Products/Data_Highlights/Data_Highlights_link/data_highlights_D1D2D3.pdf 
53 64th National Sample Survey 2007-08, unit level data, as cited in Bhagat (2012) 
54 Source for GJ: Official Gujarat State Portal. http://www.gujaratindia.com/ 





At city level, both cities are beneficiaries of funding from the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban 
Renewal Mission (JNNURM) which was launched in 2005. The JNNURM intended to improve 
urban infrastructure and enable social inclusion in cities. However, the programme has failed in 
some ways to deliver in terms of social inclusion objectives and attempts to reduce urban poverty 
were largely “cosmetic” (Kundu, 2014: 615).  This failed to address inequalities generated by 
previous urban programmes aiming to ‘beautify’ cities by clearing slums and indirectly targeting 
migrants unwelcomed by urban residents, despite their role in constructing such cities (YUVA, 
2010; Kundu, A., 2014; Kundu, D., 2014). Table 1.4 below depicts available data on the 
demographics and industry at city level for Nashik and Ahmedabad; followed by a detailed 
summary of each field-site city.  
 
 
Table 1.4: Summary of characteristics of each city field-site 









Main industry57 • Construction 
• Denim 









                                                     
55 Source for both columns: Census of India A Tables for Class 1 (populations of 100,000 and above) - A -4 Towns 
And Urban Agglomerations Classified By Population Size Class In 2011 With Variation Since 1901. Available at: 
http://www.censusindia.gov.in/2011census/PCA/A4.html 
56 Ibid 
57 Source for Ahmedabad. Amdavad Municipal Corporation: https://ahmedabadcity.gov.in/portal/index.jsp 




1.5.1 Introduction to Ahmedabad 
The city of Ahmedabad, located in its eponymously named district in north-central Gujarat, 
reported a population of 6.35 million58 in the latest census (2011). Ahmedabad is India’s fifth 
largest city, and seventh largest metropolitan area (Census of India, 2011). The daily wage market 
for migrants in Ahmedabad (as reported in my findings) was similar to that of Nashik’s – 
approximately Rs, 300 per day for unskilled/semi-skilled labour (in many cases Rs, 200 for 
women in the same sector). Migrants in Ahmedabad work predominantly in the construction, 
brick kiln, engineering and gem industries (Hirway et al., 2014). As a populous ‘megacity’, 
Ahmedabad is larger than Nashik and hosts an established civil society. 
 
A ‘roaming ration card’ system had been introduced in 2003 at the state-level for intra-state 
migrants, but to little success, as discussed in Chapter Seven. According to an interview with a 
Gujarat state representative, the main reason for failure was the lack of technology involved. 
Information systems were managed on a district-wide basis and not shared with municipal 
administrations, therefore when a beneficiary moved internally within the state, authorities were 
not equipped to sufficiently verify identity (KII with Gujarat state official, May 2014). 
 
Any account of relationships between migrants and local communities within Ahmedabad must 
consider the intersections between religion, caste and class identity in the population. Ahmedabad 
has become a “patchwork of Hindu and Muslim localities with borders” (Desai, 2010: 111). The 
metaphor is appropriate in terms of the city’s core industries of textile production, in particular 
cotton and later, denim. In the first half of the 20th century, Ahmedabad (then under British 
colonial rule) was known as the ‘Manchester of India.’ Attracting migrants initially from 
surrounding rural areas and eventually inter-state migrants from elsewhere in the country, 
Ahmedabad became an industrial (and labour migration) hub (Desai, 2010). Work and housing 
was initially organised along caste and religious lines eventually leading to a segregation of 
                                                     




Hindus along so-called low and upper caste lines, and Muslims. These divisions became reified 
in the geographical landscape, with the city’s Sabarmati River physically dividing working-class 
areas consisting of Muslim and ‘low’-caste Hindu labourers and more prosperous middle-class 
areas dominated by ‘upper’-caste Hindu communities (Desai, 2010). Desai (2010) argues this 
reconfiguration of the urban landscape; resource allocation and commercial and industrial centres 
was the result of intersecting religious and class tensions. The city is notorious as a site of 
recurring and organised violence between Hindu and Muslim groups.  Large-scale riots took place 
in the 1960s, 1980s and most significantly in terms of human loss, scale and international 
attention, in 2002.   
 
The tensions between class, religion and caste revolve around the city’s industrial dynamics. As 
Breman argues, the unfolding of communal violence which has come to dominate the city’s 
reputation, represents the “changing political economy” of the city (2002:1), when the closure of 
textile mills replaced worker solidarity with growing communal tensions. According to 
Mahadevia (2002), existing exclusions rooted in the industrial sector were “expanded and 
deepened” under neoliberalism and these tensions were exploited by Hindu nationalist 
movements and led to the systematic targeting of Muslims (Desai, 2010: 104). The communal 
violence has resulted in a profound segregation’ of housing and businesses in the city (Desai, 
2010).  
 
Government intervention, or lack of, in local communal violence has been controversial.59 Chief 
Minister at the time, Narendra Modi, was internationally criticised for his lack of response in the 
immediate aftermath of the 2002 violence, let alone a pursuit for justice.  The most visceral 
manifestation of government neglect and urban tensions in Ahmedabad is the area of Juhapura – 
one of my fieldwork sites where many Muslim communities have been ‘ghettoised’, and as my 
                                                     
59 The following news articles (international and domestic) represent examples of tenor of feeling at the time and 





survey and interview findings showed, now attracts Muslim inter-state migrants in the city.  
 
1.5.2 Introduction to Nashik 
Just under 500 kilometres from Ahmedabad lies the city of Nashik. At district level, Nashik shows 
one of the highest growth rates in the state (22.3%) (Census of India, 2011).60 The metropolitan 
population stands at 1,56 million (ibid).61 While it is at a different demographic level to 
Ahmedabad, Table 1.4 shows that they are still broadly comparable in the sense that both cities 
have undergone rapid urbanisation and Nashik continues to do so. Nashik lies 200 kilometres 
from the state’s major cities, Mumbai and Pune and is Maharashtra’s fourth largest industrial 
city.62 The city is home to national and international industries including Glaxo, Bosch, and 
Mahindra (Nashik Municipal Cooperation, 2017).  Nashik is ranked in the country’s top ten cities 
with regard to growth rate (Lakshmana, 2014). The consultancy group McKinsey identified it as 
one of 49 ‘high performing metropolitan clusters’ across India in terms of infrastructure 
(McKinsey Global Institute, 2016).  
 
The city is located on the banks of the holy Godavari River, and is known as a religious site. In 
2015 the city hosted the ‘Kumbh Mela’ -  a large-scale Hindu festival - and in preparation, scaled 
up its logistical and transportation infrastructure at the time of my fieldwork, to cope with the 
thousands of expected visitors.63  The surrounding district of Nashik city is highly fertile, 
producing mainly onions, grapes and strawberries, and has recently gained attention for 
cultivating India’s largest wine production industry64 - providing a sharp element of contrast with 
the ‘dry city’ of Ahmedabad.  The city’s landscape is marked by the onset of a booming 
construction industry and rapid urbanisation, which has increased in-migration (Borhade. 2007; 
Bhamare, 2016). The rapid development in the city centre was visceral - with the arrival of major 
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superstores, shopping malls and cinema complexes all within the time-frame of my fieldwork. 
 
A ‘Maharashtra Social Watch’ report conducted by the NGO, YUVA, provided an overview of 
the implementation of accountability mechanisms across Maharashtra with a focus on Nashik. 
The report identified Nashik as a site of the “urbanisation of poverty” (YUVA, 2010: 7) and 
showed that the city specifically gave low priority to improving slums and addressing urban 
poverty. Instead the Nashik Municipal Corporation (NMC) favoured increased construction and 
regulation of land use - both moves which effectively increase demands for migrant labour and 
inhibit spaces for them to live in. The YUVA report findings also revealed that anti slum-
formation policies had been pursued in favour of preserving public gardens. The focus on land 
use and expansion reveals “ambitions of fast-paced urbanisation” (YUVA, 2010: 32). This series 
of clashes with JNNURM objectives and declared urban policies of urban poverty alleviation and 
facilitating ‘inclusive’ cities, reveals the ubiquity of internal conflicts within Nashik governance.  
 
As a smaller and ‘newer’ city compared with Ahmedabad, there is a smaller ethnographic and 
sociological literature on Nashik. The media has reported on how social tensions across 
Maharashtra as a result of Shiv Sena politics, growth and urbanisation, have played out in Nashik 
against the background of its status as a conservative and religious (largely Hindu) city. The ratio 
of the major religions in the city is higher than that of Ahmedabad - 85.21 percent of the Nashik’s 
population reported themselves as Hindu whereas 8.9 percent reported themselves as Muslims 
(Census of India, 2011). Ahmedabad in comparison has a slightly more diverse mix of mainstream 
religions: Hindus make up 81.56 percent, Muslims, 13.51 percent and Jains make up 3.62 percent 
(Census of India, 2011).   
 
Shiv Sena historically has a stronghold in cities such as Mumbai and Pune, but nativist politics 
came to the fore in Nashik in 2008 leading to targeted attacks against inter-state migrants from 




a repercussion of violent riots between splinter factions of the BJP and a local political party in 
UP. The party faction leader Raj Thackeray fomented violence against northern migrants in 
Maharashtra, deploying nativist rhetoric. Following Thackeray’s arrest on the charge of giving 
provocation to riot, northern migrants in Nashik were violently and systematically targeted. 
Migrants from Bihar and UP fled the city en masse. According to railway officials, the largest 
(outgoing) train passenger traffic was observed since the Kumbh Mela of 2003. A district official 
reported 15,000 migrant workers left the city in the aftermath of the violence and this led to the 
temporary closure of several key industrial sites.65 Such tensions contrast with attempts to promote 
migrant inclusion in Nashik, primarily led by local NGOs in partnership with the NMC, and at 
the state level across Maharashtra.  
 
1.6 Outline of chapters 
Following this introductory chapter, the thesis provides a review of the literature, a discussion of 
relevant theories and a proposed framework for the empirical findings.  The second part of the 
thesis is based on the analysis of empirical findings, starting with a discussion of the research 
methods and fieldwork before delving into the empirical findings. The conclusion forms the final 
part of this thesis, summarising the empirical findings from Nashik and Ahmedabad to answer 
the initial research questions and drawing the main comparisons between migrants and local 
labourers.  
 
• Review of literature and theoretical framework 
Informed by the research questions, this chapter reviews three thematic and overlapping groups 
of literature and assesses their contributions and limitations in relation to this thesis. Following 
the literature review, I outline two sets of theory: on structure and agency for labour migrants, as 
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framed by the literature on precariousness and dominant narratives in India; and on governance 
and institutions to inform my conceptual framework on the ways in which structural barriers 
impact access conditions for labour migrants.  
 
• Empirical section 
First, I detail the methodology used to answer the research questions. The subsequent three 
chapters address the first two research questions. The chapters present the findings according to 
three categories of labourers, as represented in the ‘spectrum’ and how they experience barriers 
to accessing the PDS; and whether these groups experience them distinctly from each other. The 
fourth chapter presents evidence in response to the final research question: how are labour 
migrants and non-migrants responding to such structures and patterns of access? How can states 
learn from these responses?   It focuses on the various strategies used by both local labourers and 
migrants, and the linkages maintained by migrants with their places of origin to help overcome 
barriers to access. The chapter also references how the states of Maharashtra and Gujarat adopted 
strategies to try and reduce barriers to access.  
 
• Conclusion 
This chapter returns to the main research questions and draws from the empirical findings to 
consolidate the answers to these questions. The chapter will then compare the findings on access 
for different types of migrants, compared with their local counterparts and reflect on the findings 
regarding governance context in each field-site. The chapter concludes with considerations for 




2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The overall scholarship on internal migration is limited in comparison to that of international 
migration (King et al., 2012). Further to this, enquiries into the linkages between migration and 
either citizenship or precariousness (or both) tend to prioritise international over internal 
migration (Rogaly and Thieme, 2012; Abbas, 2016). I aim to address these gaps by enriching 
understandings of internal migrants in India, and how they experience and navigate ‘hostile’ 
policies and barriers to social protection. The evidence from my fieldwork illustrates how 
migrants experience, and try to overcome, barriers to access in diverse ways connected with their 
demographic profiles; and in nuanced and distinct ways from their non-migrant counterparts. 
More broadly, my research also presents the impact of access structures on citizenship outcomes 
for migrants and highlights the role of the state in both enacting and mediating barriers to access.  
 
In this chapter, I engage with three thematic and inter-connected groups of literature. I first 
investigate theoretical debates on vulnerability and precariousness (and their distinctions) in 
relation to labour migrants and then review extant evidence from India that illustrates diverse 
forms of vulnerability and precariousness, in order to further understand the experiences, 
behaviours and conditions of labour migrants that emerge in my findings and to identify the 
limitations in this area. This approach encompasses ‘horizontal social relations’ and state-citizen 
relations to understand both vulnerability and precariousness, and the ways in which labourers 
use agency to respond to structural causes of this vulnerability (Carswell and de Neve, 2013). 
 
Second, I draw upon the literature specifically covering governance in India, which is often “not 
easily captured” in Western ontologies (Berenschot, 2010: 883) (though this scholarship is 
influenced by Foucauldian ideas of governmentality and other Western thinkers). I engage with 
this literature to help interpret and frame my findings on the role of the state, specifically in urban 
contexts, in determining access for labour migrants, and how this compares with local labourers. 




contextualise the empirical evidence I present on patterns of access to the PDS among labourers, 
both migrant and local.  
 
2.1. Vulnerability and precariousness 
Low-income labourers in India can be characterised by both vulnerability and precariousness.     
The early literature on vulnerability stems from attempts to broaden definitions of poverty beyond 
material deprivation and economic terms to include factors such as isolation and marginalisation; 
social stigma; powerlessness and physical weakness. This expansion of terms is realised in Sen’s 
‘capabilities' framework which outlines a series of ‘functionings’: for example, being nourished 
and sheltered, and more complex capabilities, such as participating in civic life, which enable the 
freedom to function in substantive ways (Sen, 2003). The approach acknowledges multiple 
dimensions of identity which may be susceptible to marginalisation and exclusion that are not 
necessarily mitigated by financial income. For example, a woman living in a non-poor household 
may still lack ‘functioning’ in terms of health access, and capabilities in terms of expressing voice 
and agency (Ghosh, 1998). Vulnerability can be linked to the number of available strategies to 
adapt and minimise risk (Chambers 1989; Heyer, 2012).  The provision of state social protection 
– such as the PDS – can help mitigate against vulnerability in its multiple forms, beyond economic 
poverty.  
 
Kabeer (2000) uses a ‘social exclusion’ approach to examine the institutionalisation of 
vulnerability. The “hybrid” of social and economic disadvantage experienced among vulnerable 
communities results in 'bivalent collectivities' (Fraser, 1997, as cited in Kabeer, 2000: 85) - a term 
which can be applied to labour migrants. The term conflates disadvantage that is both social and 
economic and when institutionalised, can lead to systematic social and economic exclusion.  Jayal 
also speaks of the “multiple and mutually compounding forms of disadvantage” that encompass 
social factors such as caste and gender, and economic factors which are bound up with 




on the idea of intersectionality – where multiple aspects of social identity and experience are 
examined in order to fully understand vulnerability and power dynamics (Crenshaw, 1991; 
Hancock, 2013).  
 
The terms ‘vulnerability’ and ‘precariousness’ (or ‘precarity’) have been used interchangeably in 
the labour and migration literatures to describe processes of poverty, exclusion and conditions of 
risk and uncertainty (Waite, 2009; Anderson, 2010; Ori and Sargeant, 2013). A subtle distinction 
can be drawn between the broader “structural production” and political and institutional context 
acknowledged in conceptions of precarity versus the relatively “individualised” focus of 
vulnerability (Waite 2009: 421). While preoccupations with illegality in the recent and Euro-
centric precariousness literature (Anderson, 2010; Paret and Gleeson, 2016) do not necessarily 
hold in the case of internal migration in India, precariousness provides a useful framework for 
understanding the lives and contexts of labour migrants, in conjunction with understandings of 
risk and uncertainty developed in the vulnerability scholarship and Kabeer’s work which bridges 
the two areas in many ways.  I draw from both literatures (themselves entwined and overlapping) 
to acknowledge the broader structural processes that influence conditions and experiences of 
labour migrants, but also to understand the ways in which they navigate, cope with or resist such 
barriers (Katz, 2004; Carswell and de Neve, 2013).  
 
Influential in the precariousness scholarship has been Standing’s work on contemporary labour 
regimes and ‘the precariat’ (2011).  The ‘precariat’ describes an international group whose 
experiences are distinct from ‘proletarian’ styles of labour relations; their lives and labour are 
characterised by uncertainty and instability as a result of failings from both state and capital 
(Standing, 2011). Neoliberal policies of globalisation and flexible labour are identified as the 
drivers of increased and systematic insecurity for workers. While this offers a useful starting point 
for understanding contemporary labour regimes and resonates with much of the existing evidence 




all low-income labourers and it falls short of recognising the full range of implications caused by 
the conflation of migration and precarious labour. No connection is made between Standing’s 
critique of ‘denizenship’ in China’s hukou system and the Indian state, though the latter is indicted 
for providing a “parallel social protection system” for overseas migrants in Gulf states while 
ignoring the poorest populations who remain home (Standing, 2011: 130). In addition, temporal 
subjectivities of the precariat as understood by Standing, where the precariat are defined by a 
denial of long-term future aspirations do not align with my findings on the teleological aspirations 
of labour migrants working in precarious sectors, across all age ranges.  
 
Lewis et al. (2014) unpack the term further to argue that precariousness should be measured on a 
spectrum. Lewis et al. (2014) link precarious labour to the ‘stratified citizenship’ of labour 
migrants, both mediated by and resulting in ‘hyper-precarity’ in the contexts of globalisation and 
neoliberalism.  This refers to the confluence of precarities resulting from both “neoliberal labour 
markets and highly restrictive immigration regimes” (ibid: 3), broadening out Srivastava and 
Sasikumar’s (2003) observation of the ‘double disadvantage’ faced by labour migrants and 
recognition of ‘migrant-intensified’ vulnerabilities in the social protection literature (Sabates-
Wheeler and Waite, 2003). Kabeer’s use of ‘bivalent collectivities’ (Fraser, 1997) is a useful 
appendage to these ideas to describe the collective aspects of compound precarities. 
Precariousness for migrants is also dynamic, as they become more or less vulnerable at different 
stages of the migration process depending on temporal and spatial factors (Lewis et al., 2014).  
Paret and Gleeson also acknowledge the multiple precarities of labour migrants which wield 
“intersecting and mutually reinforcing” effects (2016: 287), originating from both state hostilities 
(such as deportation and criminalisation) and negligence (such as the failure to recognise the need 
for social services). 
 
Both the precariousness and vulnerability literatures acknowledge the space for agency, in various 




The decision-making of poor households in risk-management and income diversification, for 
example through migration, is covered in the economic and vulnerability literature (Chambers, 
1989; Taylor, 1999; Choudhury, 2003). Paret and Gleeson assert that “honest” (2016: 278) 
accounts of precariousness among labour migrants must also account for moments of agency and 
struggle in the face of structural conditions and constraints – a rich body of evidence for which 
exists in the literature on India (Rogaly et al., 2002; 2004; Mosse et al., 2002; Deshingkar et al., 
2008). 
 
2.1.1 Diverse evidence from the field 
I turn now to empirical evidence from India and assess how paradigms of vulnerability and 
precariousness apply to examples from India. Breman’s work on labour migration in southern 
Gujarat started in the 1960s (see: Breman, 1978; 1996) and illustrates in detail the precariousness 
of migrants working in specific rural and urban sectors such as sugar-cane cutting, or diamond 
cutting. Breman’s scholarship traces labour market transitions from systems of bondage and 
patronage to modes of capitalist production and increased informalisation, in response to 
globalised market demand (1978; 1996). The exploitative recruitment conditions of labourers who 
are compelled to move due to economic and social deprivation are highlighted, as well as their 
continued experience of vulnerabilities in places of destination. According to Breman’s analysis, 
structural forces displace scope for agency among exploited labour migrant 'gangs' (2013). More 
recently, Breman argues that informalised labour conditions constitute a deliberate state strategy 
in India, explaining why conditions of precariousness persist for labour migrants in the 
contemporary age of urbanisation (2013). The confluence of informalised labour structures and 
the vacuum of legal protection for labourers is cited as a major factor perpetuating employers’ 
preference for migrant workers as a “cheap and flexible labour source” (Deshingkar and Start, 
2009: 261; Breman, 2013). Breman paints a stark picture of the urban milieus in which migrants 
exist, skewing images of 'urban jungles' to present cities as untamed hotbeds of exploitation, 






Mukherji’s (2001; 2006) highly subjective accounts of ‘low quality’ urban migration also 
illustrates the squalid conditions and severe lack of resources experienced by migrants working 
in “low grade and low waged” sectors, ‘eking’ out “wretched socio-economic conditions” (2001: 
3). The conclusions are drawn from rigid interpretations of econometric modelling of data, and 
do not allow for the nuances and complexities of motivations behind migration, nor do they 
adequately account for underlying structural conditions which create such “wretched” conditions 
in cities. Such accounts, presented in a vacuum of structural factors and empirical understandings 
of migrant lives and decisions, fuel ‘distress migration’ narratives which dominate Indian media 
and policy discourse, and civil society attitudes66 on labour migration within India.   
 
In ‘distress’ narratives, driven by ‘migration pessimists’ - as referred to by de Haas (2008) - 
migrants end up in worse situations in their destinations and are seen as a source of crime, social 
ills and burden in cities.  Mainstream public attitudes towards migrants are not helped by limited 
census data on short-term and seasonal migration and the failure to recognise this as a possible 
source of poverty alleviation (Srivastava and Sasikumar, 2003). Focusing on the degradation 
effects of urban migration and slum creation in urban environments obscures the livelihood 
potential of migration (Deshingkar and Start, 2000; Shah, 2010). Distress narratives also fail to 
accept urbanisation as an inclusive project or pathway for ‘right to the city’ based on the 
constitutional right for Indian citizens to work and live anywhere in the country (Balbo, 2008; 
Bhagat, 2011).  
 
Anti-migrant norms are also reinforced by the lack of effective policy frameworks to address the 
precarities experienced by labourers overall, and ‘hyper-precarity’ experienced in labour 
migration (Breman, 1996; Srivastava and Sasikumar, 2003). Despite India’s various labour laws, 
                                                     




employers eschew the cost and burden of compliance in favour of the informal economy and 
casualised labour (Breman, 2013). Contractors or ‘middlemen’ are the main channel of informal 
labour recruitment thus enabling employers and contractors to sidestep legislations and exploit 
labourers. In doing so, informal employers deny the potential for improved livelihoods (Breman, 
1996; Mitra, 2010). Positive government interventions, for example, reservations for scheduled 
castes and tribes, are restricted to the formal economy thus excluding migrant workers engaged 
in the informal economy (Breman, 1996). The role of the state in actively, or indirectly, 
maintaining conditions that impose and perpetuate vulnerability, is highlighted here and 
precariousness is a useful way of accounting for these broader structural factors shaping labour 
migrant experiences.  
 
The experiences of labour migrants are not solely restricted to ‘distress’ and uniform 
precariousness: they are highly diverse, and the degrees and characteristics of precariousness and 
types of vulnerability themselves are variegated (see: Deshingkar and Start, 2003; Mosse et al., 
2005; Waite, 2009). In India, the labour migrant population is heterogeneous, and their motives 
can be mapped out on a continuum ranging from survival to subsistence to accumulation of assets 
(Deshingkar and Start, 2003). The poorest of migrants, often moving within rural areas and on 
temporary bases (Harriss-White, 1992; Bhagat, 2012) are vulnerable to debt-migration cycles, 
where earnings from migration are used to pay off debts incurred either at the place of origin or 
destination. In the narrowest sense this can be considered an example of agency - a strategy of 
survival to prevent a further backslide into poverty (Deshingkar and Start, 2003). Migrants who 
are relatively new to the process have little or no skills, limited knowledge about the urban labour 
market and are more vulnerable to search hazards and the risk of being cheated by employers and 
middlemen but can become resilient to these risks over time (Srivastava and Sasikumar, 2003). 
Migration can become an accumulative livelihood strategy in both rural and urban contexts 
(Deshingkar and Start, 2003; Mitra, 2010). Social factors such as caste, regional background or 




trades and skills can be utilised to find job stability and networks. These social markers can 
sometimes be negotiated and manipulated in the process of migration to help migrants gain social 
leverage in labour relations in their new contexts (de Haan, 2004; Rogaly et al., 2004).  
 
De Haan draws from field research in Bihar to illustrate how migration has historically been 
utilised as a strategy for diversifying livelihoods (2002). The evidence highlights the role of 
remittances from migrants on poor households.  Remittances, which have dominated debates on 
‘migration and development’ can be used not only as informal social protection to diversify risks 
and increase investment capital but can also generate multiplier effects in places of migrant origin 
(Oberai and Singh, 1980; Kapur, 2004). In India, the domestic remittance market is significant 
(Thorat and Jones, 2011), estimated to be worth USD 10 billion in the year 2007-08 (Tumbe, 
2011); 60 percent of these consisted of inter-state transfers and 80 percent were directed towards 
rural households (ibid). These estimates support the argument that migration can serve as a 
livelihood option for poor and vulnerable groups and that this option can be maximised in the 
absence of hostile policy barriers.  
 
Mosse et al. (2002) describe diverse outcomes for labour migrants and acknowledge both the 
roles of structure and agency in these outcomes (2002: 60). While some migrants are forced to 
move, Mosse’s et al ’s (2002) study of Adivasi migrant movement in western India shows that 
these movements originate from a complex set of motives including debt-management and social 
dependencies as well as limited options for rural livelihoods (bought on by crop failure or 
drought). In other cases, predominately among lone male migrants who originate from households 
with relative food security, migration can generate opportunities to “save, accumulate capital and 
invest in assets” (2002: 60).  
 
Rogaly et al., (2002) provide an illuminating account of the relationship between state and market 




sense of wellbeing) and its opposite, ‘illfare.’ Migrants can make some choices in the market 
regarding labour and can use their remittances to reduce poverty in their home villages though 
they remain excluded in terms of state policies and market conditions (ibid). Interestingly 
however, Rogaly et al., (2001) observe instances of positive state influence, contrasting with 
prevailing evidence on the “hostile policy environment” (Deshingkar and Farrington, 2009: 25) 
which labourers face. In the case of West Bengal (at the time of Rogaly et al’s study), many local 
level institutions were populated with elected representatives of the state’s ruling party, the 
Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI-M) who “positively influenced” (2002: 102) income 
flows for labour migrants by ensuring wage disputes were settled in favour of labourers, paid 
timely and as per agreements. The combination of party politics and state governance created 
conditions for a ‘subjective state’ (North, 1990; Kabeer, 2000) that favoured labour migrants, 
highlighting the prominence of state influence in shaping and mediating precariousness 
experienced by labour migrants.   
 
Much of the literature on migration patterns within India seek to understand the outcomes of 
migration. The overall consensus confirms that the initial socio-economic backgrounds of 
migrants influence their eventual migration outcomes (de Haan, 2002; Mosse et al., 2002; 
Deshingkar and Start, 2003; Deshingkar et al., 2008; Thorat and Jones, 2011; Pattenden, 2012). 
Household migrants seems to fare less well than lone male migrants (female-headed households 
are generally more vulnerable from the outset) (Deshingkar et al.,2008; Pattanaik, 2009; Thorat 
and Jones, 2011).  In construction work, evidence from Pattanaik in Chhattisgarh (2009), Thorat 
and Jones (2011) and Pattenden (2012) shows that relatively well-resourced migrants (in terms of 
land and assets) are more likely to engage in construction work and in many cases, receive higher 
wages with which to exercise agency that goes beyond survival and coping strategies. My findings 
also suggest that the destination, scale of construction site and skill level of workers in this sector 





As the premise of this thesis illustrates, and as confirmed in the literature (Deshingkar and 
Farrington, 2009; Rogaly et al., 2002; Heyer, 2012; Pattenden, 2012) social protection is difficult 
to access for labour migrants, including those working on construction sites. While there is 
evidence to show that such migrants are not among the most socio-economically vulnerable 
labour migrants (Pattanik, 2009; Srivastava and Sutradhar, 2016), they still earn low wages 
(generally under the poverty line in my findings) differentiated according to skill level and gender; 
and work in hazardous and unprotected settings - all compounded by the absence, or ‘hostilities’ 
of the state. This is illustrated in the evidence I present on their lack of access to the PDS in urban 
contexts, in either a continuation of similar experiences faced in their home locations, or in 
contrast (in which case the ‘double disadvantage’ faced exclusively by labour migrants is even 
more pronounced).  
 
In a broader sense, my findings also highlight state failures in terms of implementing existing 
federal and state laws to protect labourers, including specific legislations for construction 
workers67 and offering adequate healthcare services (Rogaly et al., 2002, Unnithan, 2004). Lack 
of access to healthcare overall is a significant failure of the state in addressing the needs of 
disadvantaged communities, and particularly in precarious sites of labour (Mobile Crèches, 2008 
(and KIIs with Mobile Crèches, 2014); Pattenden, 2012; Betancourt et al., 2013). These are 
among the main governance factors which increase the vulnerabilities and precariousness faced 
by migrants in this sector (Pattenden, 2012; Betancourt et al., 2013). The evidence gathered in 
this thesis also emphasises the physical precariousness involved in certain forms of migrant labour 
and how this intensifies individual risks and vulnerabilities. Invoking the concept of 
precariousness offers a useful and pluralist way of configuring and situating multiple factors 
related to vulnerability within their broader structural context.  
 
The need to make nuanced and variegated observations of the “varieties of unfreedom” 
                                                     





(Barrientos et al., 2013: 1038) involved in the most precarious forms of labour has been advocated 
by scholars in response to the ILO’s (2005) previously limited conception of ‘forced labour’ 
(Lewis et al.,2014).  As a result, more open interpretations of exploitative labour describe brick 
kiln work in India as a form of ‘forced’ or ‘unfree’ labour where migrants enter into contracts that 
potentially lock them into debt, and highly precarious and dangerous forms of labour (Breman, 
2007; Lerche, 2007; ILO, 2009; Anti-Slavery International, 2015). That these groups are among 
the most precarious, in terms of risk; physical hazard; modes of recruitment; income and access 
to the state, is not contested here. However, in addition to active and highly necessary civil society 
movements against the worst forms of exploitation in brick kilns, it should be acknowledged that 
a “range of possible outcomes” exist in such labour settings (Morgan and Olsen, 2015: 184). For 
example, Shah’s (2006) account of young migrant workers in Jharkand illustrate how brick kilns 
can present opportunities for ‘temporary freedom’ – which resonated with my findings of young 
male brick kiln workers from Rajasthan. The situation in brick kiln sites, differed for household 
and lone migrants, and according to socio-economic, generational and regional backgrounds, as 
well as age and gender – this internal diversity recurs throughout each assemblage of labourers in 
my ‘spectrum’ of analysis.  
 
Overall, the theoretical and empirical literature on vulnerability and precariousness offer useful 
ways to consider my evidence on the diverse range of experiences represented by the research 
participants. While variations in outcomes and drivers of labour migration are underscored 
throughout the literature, my findings offer an additional dimension of analysis with the 
comparison against local labourers, contributing further to existing insights into migrant and local 
labourer access to livelihoods and social networks in urban slums. The inclusion of local labourers 
serves to both illustrate whether they represent a counterfactual experience for labour migrants in 
accessing the PDS, and probes existing insights into the temporal and spatial variations in 




2.2. A 'hostile policy environment' - the governance context 
The role of the state is a recurrent theme in the literatures covered in the previous section. The 
state is presented either in collusion with markets or political parties (Mooij, 1998; Rogaly et al., 
2002; Breman, 2013) or prone to manipulation and mediation through rent-seeking and corruption 
among local bureaucrats (North, 1990; Kabeer, 2000; Deshingkar and Farrington, 2009). The 
urgent need for social protection (Heyer, 2012) and legal regulation (Breman, 1996; 2013; Rogaly 
et al., 2002) is highlighted in the empirical experiences of labour migrants across different states 
in India.  
 
The term governance as used in this thesis refers to “the prevailing patterns by which public power 
is exercised in a given social context” (Jenkins, 2002: 485). This is a sweeping term that expands 
further when used to describe the vast territory and population ‘governed’ – though to mixed 
extents – in India. India’s diverse and complex federal governance system. embodies both the 
attributes of a democratic system and variations in terms of accountability, political commitments 
and administration at the different levels of government (Sadanandan, 2012; Chopra, 2015). This 
results in unequal outcomes, adversely affecting the poor and marginalised, and affects migrants 
when they move across different states. The work of North (1990) is useful for understanding the 
tension between “culturally derived” informal rules and formal rules (ibid: 45) prevalent 
throughout Indian governance, that can create barriers for poor and marginalised communities in 
accessing the state. In this chapter I engage with the literature on two specific aspects of 
governance in India that enact ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ rules for labour migrants and the urban 
poor overall – state-citizen interactions among the poor, and urban governance – in order to see 
how they are or can potentially be, linked with understandings of internal migration.  
 
2.2.1 Unequal citizens and partial sightings of the state 
The interface between the state and citizens belonging to poor and vulnerable groups in India has 




literature on the processes through which the poor engage with the state in rural India” (Pur and 
Moore, 2010: 620). The study draws from relevant literatures exploring everyday encounters or 
“sightings” of state representatives, which substitute formal instruments of civic engagement and 
entitlements (such as identity documents, ration cards, BPL status, voter registration) for poor and 
marginalised citizens. Corbridge et al. (2005) reverse Scott’s (1998) gaze through the eyes of the 
state (to understand forms of government control) toward the state to understand how different 
people ‘see’ the state. The ocular tropes convey both limited access where the poor are afforded 
brief and periodic ‘glimpses’ of power structures; and when considered as a purposeful verb, 
‘sightings’ can embody opportunities for agency and accountability within narrow remits.  The 
‘sighting’ metaphor can also be used as a way to understand the ways in which poor and 
vulnerable communities, such as labour migrants, can navigate and perceive the state. 
 
Corbridge et al. (2005) draw from Foucault’s meta-framework of governmentality (1978) and 
‘biopolitics’ - referring to the ways in which the state maintains order and control by assembling 
bodies of knowledge about their subjects - and apply it to the case of the rural poor. The authors 
also build on Chatterjee’s (2004) work in this vein - highlighting how governmental classification 
of populations (for example counting specific types of migrants in the census) has changed the 
character of government to administrative rather than political, and the resulting proliferation of 
groups require multiple forms of governance. While Corbridge et al. (2005) are primarily 
concerned with the rural poor, the question of how different members of the poor view the state 
can be useful in examining the “lesser citizenship status” of urban labour migrants (Abbas, 2016: 
150). According to the logic of the literatures reviewed so far, if the poor have only partial 
sightings of the state, labour migrants would have even smaller sightings. The evidence I present 
shows that these encounters depend on the type of labour migration – those in the most precarious 
and remotely situated forms of labour (in the first group on the spectrum) ‘see’ the state in Nashik 
and Ahmedabad less than those who have settled in their respective cities for longer.  Sightings 




dhakkas – experienced by both local and labour migrants.  
 
Based on my empirical findings, I interpret ‘seeing the state’ in two ways: referring to physical 
and intentioned encounters with the state to lobby for access or resolve barriers to access to the 
PDS and other entitlements; and second as (mis)perceptions of the state and its functions that 
develop in the imaginations of groups such as labour migrants, precisely because they cannot and 
do not ‘see’ the state. This is most clearly represented in the distorted and indirect flow of 
information between the state and the poor, who are often illiterate (also due to structural barriers), 
and in the widespread confusion among labourers regarding formal and informal routes of 
accountability and access, heightened for new migrants who may not speak local languages.  
 
To further understand the state-citizen relations among the poor and vulnerable, including labour 
migrants, I now turn to processes driving unequal citizenship outcomes for migrants as explored 
in Abbas (2016)’s analysis of citizenship among internal migrants within India. Abbas (2016) 
explores the divergence between India’s constitutional right (under Article 19) for citizens to 
move, work and settle anywhere within national borders, and citizenship outcomes. Her study 
examines how legality, identity and access – contestations of citizenship usually associated with 
international migrants - are compromised by state policies and processes of implementation which 
result in differential ‘citizenship outcomes’ for migrants. Abbas undertakes a regional analysis of 
citizenship in India – contending that differential citizenship outcomes arise in different sub-
national locations. Taking into account wider regional developments in South Asia during the 
1970s and 1980s, Abbas (2016) attributes the dilution of Article 19 to “anti-immigration 
agitation” (2016: 158) concerning refugees and displaced persons driven by conflict and famine 
in neighbouring countries of Bangladesh (formed in 1971) and Sri Lanka. Given the shared ethno-
linguistic characteristics of these international migrants with Indian citizens, policies targeting 
international migrants blur the distinction with certain communities of internal migrants, 




The quality of citizenship experienced by internal migrants is also explored by Jayal (2009) who 
refers to the need for ‘substantive citizenship’ to address vulnerabilities arising from the 
intersection of both class and identity-based inequalities. Various groups are burdened with both 
social and economic deprivations in spite of legal and social protections and platforms for voice 
and accountability (Jayal, 2009) - "migrants are required as workers not citizens" (Breman, 2013: 
82). They are alienated upon arrival in cities both officially and socially (Breman, 2013).  
Furthering these negations of citizenship, migrants also often face barriers to the most direct form 
of civic participation – voting in elections (Carswell and de Neve, 2014). Postal voting in India is 
only available to a privileged few such as military personnel (Kumar, 2010; Abbas, 2016) and 
voting rights, as with the PDS, are attached to fixed and local proof of residence. 
 
The dual function of the ration card as an identity document as well as a social entitlement 
emerged in my findings from Nashik and Ahmedabad.  Documents form a conduit through which 
“citizenship outcomes” (Abbas, 2016) can play out. Citizenship in India is formally determined 
in one of four ways: birth, descent, registration or naturalisation all of which are evidenced 
through documents (Citizenship Act, 1995, as cited in Gauba and Singh, 2017).  My findings 
showed that migrant precariousness was positioned in relation to how scarce their ‘bundle of 
documents’ (pachan patra) was, among other factors. This is linked to ‘numerical citizenship’ 
(Routray, 2014) - based on the idea that number of years at a place of destination is commensurate 
to access to entitlements and documents: as one’s pachan patra accumulates, the more 
‘substantive’ one’s citizenship becomes. Documents are necessary in the process of becoming a 
‘person’ in the eyes of the state (Sadiq, 2008: 81), resonating with Scott’s conceptions of 
measuring populations (1998) and Foucauldian ideas of biopolitics cited in Corbridge et al. 
(2005). 
 
Documents in India are bound up with citizenship – in the sense that they ‘prove’ it but also in 




example, the ration card is linked with access that is legally guaranteed to all citizens. Ration 
cards are also informally used as other forms of identification, although this is not authorised by 
the central government (MacAuslan, 2011) and thus the lack of access to ration cards can signify 
a loss of political voice for migrants as well as deprivation of entitlements. Given the context of 
India’s vaunted democracy – precisely because it is “unlikely” as a large, populous and highly 
diverse nation (Sen, 1999: 6) – the negation of citizenship outcomes for labour migrants within 
India underscores the weakness of prevailing governance systems. This warrants further analyses 
of exclusion, vulnerability and precariousness to consider the role of governance. The framework 
of ‘sightings’ developed by Corbridge et al. helps explain the limited access available to labour 
migrants who are poor and vulnerable and how core citizenship rights are denied in both formal 
and informal platforms.  
 
Applications of citizenship studies and governance theory to the situation of internal migrants is 
limited however (Abbas, 2016), and this area remains under-theorised in the overall internal 
migration scholarship in India (and beyond). By presenting evidence on access conditions, this 
thesis contributes to insights on aspects of legality and identity among internal migrants (Sadiq, 
2008; Routray, 2014; Abbas, 2016). These insights also highlight that dichotomies between 
citizens and ‘non-citizens’ in the precariousness literature do not always hold - instead a 
citizenship outcomes can be conceptualised as a continuum. “Unequal citizenship” (Jayal, 2009) 
experienced by labour migrants contest ‘formal’ models of citizenship (see: Holston and 
Appadurai, 1996) related to homogenous nationalism in the sense described by Weber or 
Andersen (1946; 1991). The divisions invoked in Jayal’s ideas of citizenship and Abbas’s 
evidence of citizenship outcomes show how governance processes fracture citizenship between 
sedentary and internal migrant populations. The literatures on citizenship signify how a lack of 
access to the PDS is perpetuated and magnified by the lack of civic capability to formally address 





2.2.2 Urban governance 
In this sub-section, I briefly outline the evidence on direct and indirect ways in which the state - 
in ‘collusion’ with the market (Breman, 2013) - and other social actors, serves to exclude labour 
migrants from their ‘right to the city’ (Harvey, 2003; Balbo, 2008; Bhagat, 2011). These practices 
of exclusionary urbanisation (Kundu and Saraswati, 2012) mutually reinforce ‘distress migration’ 
narratives, subvert the outcomes of welfare and social protection policies and further fracture and 
spatialise Indian citizenship. The literature reviewed in this section serves to contextualise and 
explain certain patterns and structures of access in the cities of Nashik and Ahmedabad that 
emerged in my findings.  
 
The vulnerabilities faced by labour migrants in the cities of Nashik and Ahmedabad, including 
those related to access structures, are shaped by the ongoing project of urbanisation taking place 
across India’s cities. Cities have become domains of overt capitalist accumulation, investment 
and interests (Breman, 2013; Bhagat, 2017); and spaces to project utopian visions (Datta, A. 
2015). However, they remain exclusionary spaces for labour migrants, despite their direct role in 
constructing such spaces (Bhagat, 2017) – yet another iteration of policies that exacerbate migrant 
vulnerabilities.  
 
Economic, gender-based, ethnic, religious and nativist or regionalist tensions are bought to the 
fore in contexts of urban diversity. As shown by historic and contemporary social tensions in 
Ahmedabad – referenced in Chapter One – competition for space, resources and labour markets 
in proximate spaces can exacerbate existing tensions, particularly in the absence of equal access 
to the state. Certain risks linked to urban life and to migration are compounded in city contexts to 
create further ‘hyper-precariousness’ for urban migrants (Lewis et al., 2014). For example, the 
transportation risks faced by migrants have been described in Rogaly et al.’s (2002) account of 
migrants in West Bengal and these are heightened and (further) gendered in city contexts, further 




Unlike explicitly divided urban environments - such as China’s hukou system - mechanisms of 
urban exclusion in India are implicit and masked by policy discourse and rhetoric. The Jawaharlal 
Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM) was launched in 200568 with the intention 
of improving urban infrastructure, addressing urban poverty and enabling social inclusion in cities 
(both Ahmedabad and Nashik are beneficiaries of JNNURM funding). However, the programme 
objectives and implementation resulted in increasing the vulnerability of those living on informal 
settlements, where migrants typically reside, despite their role in constructing such cities (Kundu 
and Saraswati, 2012) and positive impacts on urban poverty are yet to be seen (Mitra, 2010). On 
the other hand, both the governments of Gujarat and Maharashtra have attempted to improve 
inclusion for migrants, specifically with regard to the PDS, though to limited success, as detailed 
further in Chapter Seven.  
 
Direct actions against migrants, though masked under the rhetoric of ‘urban improvement’, 
include urban planning programmes which mandate slum clearance in mega cities such as Delhi, 
through its ‘Master Plans’ and in Mumbai, designed to deter migrants, and in accordance with the 
interests of elites in the very land on which such slums are constructed (Deshingkar and Grimm, 
2005; Kundu, 2014). Mega-cities such as Mumbai and Delhi have historically used urban renewal 
programmes as part of a set of indirect measures against rural-urban migration, officially 
attributed to efforts to improve infrastructure and encourage foreign investment (Kundu, 2014). 
Overall, these strategies serve to exclude migrants from their ‘right to the city’ (Harvey, 2003): 
sharing in the economic growth and employment prospects of cities despite the contribution of 
migrant labour to such levels of growth (Kundu, A., 2014; Kundu, D.,2014).  
 
Many city planners and politicians see migrants as a threat (Burra, 2005). Migrants are seen to 
lack capacity for paying for amenities or municipal taxes, thereby creating a perceived burden on 
the finances of receiving cities (Satterthwaite 2008; UN Habitat, 2008). Narratives surrounding 
                                                     




urban migrants also link them with problems of law and order, regard them as threats to local and 
national security and the source of outbreak of epidemics and incidence of disease such as 
HIV/AIDS (Ellerman, 2003). Middle-class urban communities tend to want to “keep the poor 
out” and this typically targets poor labour migrants living in slum settlements (Weiner, 1978: 
277). Policies of “exclusionary urban growth” designed to ‘screen’ out poorer migrants thus 
exacerbate rural-urban inequalities as well as intra-urban divisions (Kundu and Saraswati, 2012: 
226).  
 
Inaction can be interpreted as a form of anti-migrant bias in urban governance and is observed in 
urban policies regarding employment and housing for migrants. Mitra’s (2010) findings on well-
being among urban migrants in four cities across India shows that the rural bias of state poverty 
programmes, such as the promotion of the MNREGS, needs to be recalibrated to include urban 
sites in order to address the lack of access to formal employment, and consequently social 
mobility, faced by urban migrants.  
 
In terms of more subtle and small-scale anti-migrant urban actions, access structures in urban 
contexts – already inaccessible to the local urban poor as shown in my findings – are even more 
restrictive for poor migrants. MacAuslan’s study in 2011 of PDS access in Delhi invokes the 
concepts of ‘rules’ and ‘queues’ to illustrate barriers of design and implementation respectively – 
exacerbated in a context of intense competition over resources in a densely populated locale. Even 
for those in possession of a ration card, food subsidy quotas were highly restricted and time-
bound, thus putting labourers and labour migrants at a disadvantage. Ration cards were initially 
denied to residents of informal slum settlements until reforms in the early 1990s changed this 
(MacAuslan, 2011), further highlighting historic anti-migrant attitudes embedded within urban 
social protection targeting. ‘Queues’ (that delay and potentially bar access) are also enacted by 
discretionary state actors (North, 1990; Kabeer, 2000) in Mumbai, as illustrated in the case of a 




discriminatory tactics were deployed by officials to avoid accurate BPL ration card designations 
for eligible migrant households (Abbas, 2016). 
 
Hostilities toward migrants also stem from ‘horizontal’ social discrimination (Carswell and de 
Neve, 2013) as well as institutional and policy structures. In parallel to barriers of governance, 
tensions between migrants and ‘native’ populations emerge out of either a lack of access to social 
mobility or spatial mobility (Weiner, 1978: 293; Rajan et al., 2011). The tensions can also stoke 
political movements such as Shiv Sena in Maharashtra, including in Nashik, as mentioned in 
Chapter One. Political parties such as Shiv Sena, promote “sons of the soil” ideologies which 
foment occasional violence against migrants and foster nativist attitudes among local electorates 
(Bhagat, 2017).  The conditions often necessary for the phenomenon of ‘nativism’ – systematic 
and targeted discrimination of migrants and a concerted political effort to stem in-migration – are 
outlined in Weiner’s seminal 1978 work on internal migrant social dynamics in India. Nativist 
theory remains relevant in illustrating how state context can influence inter-relationships between 
migrants and locals. Weiner describes how the existence of perceived cultural difference with 
migrants (arising from matters as small as food preference, through to religion); immobility of a 
‘native’ population and local employment rates and labour markets are crucial factors in 
determining the level of nativism in a given state. For example, in areas with high out-migration 
such as Punjab, a higher tolerance for in-migration is observed (Weiner, 1978). Competitive urban 
labour markets where labour demand has been unable to absorb an increasingly educated local 
labour supply can foster resentment among urban local – often middle-class - ‘native’ 
communities (ibid).  
 
The large literature on slum politics and movements led by civil society – or ‘political society’ as 
Chatterjee (2004) refers to it – offers rich insights into agency among the urban poor (Acharya 
and Parikh, 2002; Sassen, 2006; Kundu, 2011;  Datta, 2016) and while a detailed analysis falls 




exercised in urban governance contexts. Elite capture driven by middle-class groups in urban 
contexts at the cost of slum communities has been observed in multiple Indian states (Harris, 
2010; Chattopadhyay, 2015; Mehta, 2016). As a result, the urban poor are forced to rely upon 
‘mediation’ through and with local officials and political leaders to gain access to entitlements 
and services (Berenschot, 2010; Chattopadhyay, 2015).   For example, a study of housing 
struggles among the urban poor and migrants in Delhi shows how they are forced to engage in 
“subversions of urban legalities” in order to consolidate urban citizenship – enacting “small public 
actions” to access protection measures (Mahadevia, 2010: 52-53). 
 
The evidence on direct and indirect biases against urban migrants from both state and societal 
sources contextualises the findings I draw from Ahmedabad and Nashik on migrant-local 
relations. Nativist tensions among local labourers come into play when considering resource 
limitations represented by the ‘black market’ for grains and fuel in the absence of PDS access for 
migrants. While there are various contributing factors behind this market dynamic, the perception 
of local residents – central to fuelling nativist feelings – influences how migrant communities are 
‘received’ in local contexts regardless of their duration of stay, according to my empirical 
findings. The state-led biases against urban migrants further exacerbate and mediate the barriers 
to access faced by migrants, though in many cases the vulnerabilities generated by these power 
biases formed a continuity from the rural source locations of such migrants. This finding, as 
contextualised in the urban exclusion literature, highlights the importance of understanding the 
role of regional background in shaping migrant experiences, and the spatial (rural or urban) 
specificities of particular barriers to access (Lewis et al., 2014).  
 
2.3 Social protection for the poor and migrants 
While the legislation and design of formal social protections such as the PDS implies a strong 
state commitment to addressing vulnerabilities and precariousness among marginalised citizens, 




seeking and social discrimination at the local level of government (Corbridge et al., 2005; Abbas,  
Kabeer, 2010, Ruparelia, 2013; Deshpande et al., 2017) In the case of India, the divergences 
between policy design and implementation that occur within and between different levels of 
government administration hamper implementation outcomes, and personalises institutional 
processes that structure access. This is illustrated in the case of the ‘rights-based approach’ (RBA) 
which was undertaken by the previous UPA Indian government to improve social protections. 
This section first briefly outlines the debates on social protection before reviewing the literature 
on the RBA and concludes by linking these debates with the evidence presented in this thesis.  
 
Social protection emerged as a widespread ‘corrective’ for the aggregate impact of failed 
neoliberal policies: economic crises, structural adjustment policies and the processes of 
globalisation.  Critics of the international rise of “neoliberal orthodoxy” (Harvey, 2005: 29) argue 
that greater economic openness has exposed vulnerable groups to greater economic risks (Rodrik, 
1997; Barrientos and Hulme, 2008; Tillin and Duckett, 2017). In response, a similarly rapid rise 
of both discourse and policy on social protection was seen on developing country agendas. In this 
final part of the literature review section, I engage with debates on social protection – a thematic 
area which intersects with both governance and ideas of vulnerability and precariousness.  
 
In India, a series of neoliberal economic reforms was launched in the early 1990s to remedy the 
“Hindu rate of growth.”69 While this led to unprecedented economic growth, the subsequent 
retrenchment of social subsidies70 harmed the most poor and vulnerable groups and triggered an 
increase in absolute poverty (Ghosh, 1998). Ironically, the reversal of policies which protect 
labourers from exploitation, was counterbalanced with an expansion of India’s ‘welfare 
architecture’ (Mehta, 2010) in the 1990s and 2000s (Barrientos and Hulme, 2008; Heyer 2012). 
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70Indian government opened up economy to foreign markets and borrowed structural adjustment loans from the IMF 





Existing state interventions in social protection such as the PDS were transformed from universal 
to targeted programmes. In 1995, the Indian government introduced the National Social 
Assistance Programme (NASP) – a portfolio of social protection programmes financed wholly at 
the central level, with state-level supplements (Pellissery, 2010).  
 
Social protection can be defined as a set of risks, needs or rights that reflect various development 
agendas (Barrientos and Hulme, 2008). The development of social protection frameworks can 
include an assessment of risk and vulnerability; reliability of incomes and the capacity to absorb 
shocks (Deshingkar and Farrington, 2009). When applied to the case of poor labour migrants in 
India, all three measures would indicate their eligibility for formal social protections. The World 
Bank defines social protection as a set of risk management strategies designed to protect the poor 
from economic volatility, so they are free to ‘invest and accumulate’ (Devereux and Sabates-
Wheeler, 2004: 1). In this view, social protection is embedded within a social risk management 
framework (‘SRM’) (Holzmann and Jorgensen, 2000).  
 
The work of Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler (2004) challenges these prior conceptions of social 
protection embedded within neoliberal systems and advocate a shift from the World Bank’s 
limited ‘social safety nets’ approach to a socially ‘transformative’ and holistic approach. This 
marks a discursive evolution in social protection reflecting broader changes in expanding 
definitions of poverty to include multidimensional criteria. Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler (2004) 
favour an inclusive ‘transformative’ approach which focuses on social aspects such as education 
and health, in addition to economic safety nets, highlighting the need to address both economic 
and social vulnerabilities which require extending beyond resource transfers. 
 
As part of this transformative approach, social protection can extend beyond risk-management 
strategies: as preventative, promotive, protective and transformative programmes, all of which 




form of social protection – preventing food insecurity and protecting from risks of further 
deprivation. In line with this holistic approach to ‘transformative’ social protection, Devereux 
(2013) highlights the discursive impacts of using language such as ‘beneficiary’ and ‘client’ to 
describe the recipients of social protection, rendering them as either passive or commodified. The 
term ‘claimant’ is identified as more accurate as it explicitly specifies the function of governments 
in providing social protections to citizens. The language of ‘claimant’ emphasises the 
enforceability and accountability structures of social protections not only in terms of access but 
in terms of service delivery (ibid). 
 
In India, Pellissery’s 2010 case study on access to National Social Assistance Programme (NSAP) 
benefits in Maharashtrian villages exposes the “process deficits” involved in implementing social 
protection policies. High barriers to access for the poor overall, and even more so for migrants, 
are in place: a triple pre-requisite system is used for determining beneficiary access (the need for 
proof of age, residence and income or property). As awareness of bureaucratic procedures - both 
formal and informal - can be limited among the poor and vulnerable (Corbridge et al., 2005), 
brokers are often used to obtain such certificates and documents of proof (Pellissery, 2010). In 
response to specific disadvantages faced by migrants, of the type described by Pellissery (2010) 
and MacAuslan (2011); social protection can be tailored to address migrant needs by making 
access and rights portable across administrative borders (Sabates-Wheeler and Feldman, 2011: 
21). 
 
The literatures covered thus far confirm labour migrants can be viewed as a vulnerable group - 
characterised by a set of risks and deprivations that both compel them to move in the first place 
and are compounded by movement. In addition to ‘hyper-precarity’ generated by exploitative 
labour regimes (Lewis et al., 2014), migrants are also excluded, or limited, from access to social 
protection programmes. As a result, migrants often experience a greater or distinct set of 




creates a ‘double disadvantage' – they are poor and further disadvantaged by exclusion from social 
protections available to those in the same socio-economic demographic but with a 'fixed place of 
residence' (Srivastava and Sasikumar, 2003; MacAuslan, 2011). As migrants are often directly or 
indirectly excluded from social protection regimes, their engagement with the state tends to be 
strategic or negotiable rather than based on a straightforward articulation of citizens’ rights and 
entitlements.  
 
2.3.1 Rights based approach 
The rights-based approach (RBA) to social protection has become prominent in recent 
development agendas (Barrientos and Hulme, 2008), and frames social and state entitlements as 
human rights. The early to mid-2000s marked a burgeoning rights-based movement within India’s 
social policy landscape. These include including the Right to Information in 2005; Right to 
Employment, enabled under the landmark Mahatma Gandhi Rural Employment Guarantee Act 
(MNREGA) in 2005 and the culmination of the Right to Food movement in 2013.  Indeed, the 
rights-based approach to policy-making became popular across international development 
academics and advocates (Cornwall and Nyamu-Musembi, 2004; Barrientos and Hulme, 2008). 
The approach was considered effective in identifying and highlighting challenges faced 
specifically by vulnerable groups (Kabeer, 2000).  The ‘Right to Food’ (RtF) campaign in India 
which culminated in the National Food Security Act to guarantee universal food security, placed 
emphasis on vulnerable groups and the need to maintain the PDS as a food distribution instrument. 
RtF is an example of taking a rights-based approach to legalising social protection.  
 
India’s vast set of constitutional rights alone, as well as the RBA, proved to be insufficient 
however against a system lacking accountability. The RBA overreached in its attempt to exceed 
the role of the welfare state in transforming the “everyday workings of the state” (Aiyar and 
Walton, 2014: 56) and state-citizen interactions, ultimately introducing further bureaucracy and 




The implementation of the RBA was in part sabotaged by a largely resistant and inactive ‘front-
line’ bureaucracy who ran on a “different logic” (Aiyar and Walton, 2014: 6). 
 
The rights-based movement surrounding the PDS typifies the challenges of its implementation as 
outlined by Aiyar and Walton (2014).  Criteria for inclusion and exclusion, formed the crux of 
the RtF movement. The identification of claimants entails a process that is technical, complex and 
divisive (both in politics and the literature), which can serve to create further opportunities for 
discretionary governance (Besley et al., 2012; Aiyar and Walton, 2014). Examples of effective 
FSA (and PDS) implementation are seen however, in individual sub-national cases rather than as 
a matter of national standards.  Innovations in PDS access, including easing barriers for intra-
state migrants, have occurred in individual states such as Andhra Pradesh and Chhattisgarh. In 
Chhattisgarh, a state-level Food Security Bill was passed and introduced specific rights as part of 
a broader state reform programme (Kattamuri, 2011) and was catalysed in large part by “reformist 
bureaucrats” (Aiyar and Walton, 2014: 39). These cases of effectiveness show the bulk of “real 
action” in rights-based policy reforms and transformation of state-citizen relations (including 
those of migrants albeit only at the intra-state level) take place at the sub-national level rather than 
through national laws and programmes (Aiyar and Walton, 2014: 48). State-level programmes 
that depart from national norms highlight the role of state-level policy actors in influencing rights 
and rules for citizens. 
 
Two main insights can be drawn from the literature on social protection, and specifically on the 
RBA trajectory in India. The first is that even socially-mobilised reform that is both substantive 
and institutionalised continues to exclude the distinct and intensified vulnerabilities of migrants 
(Sabates-Wheeler and Waite, 2003). Having outlined the ‘transformative’ potential of social 
protection systems and the promising direction in which Indian social policy was heading – 
though still in thrall to neoliberal systems which arguably invoke the need for such programmes 




perpetuating inequalities and exclusion. That migrants are excluded from social protection 
regimes is acknowledged in the labour migration and precariousness literature (Sabates-Wheeler 
and Waite, 2003); however, when concerted, legitimated – and widely celebrated – efforts in India 
also fall short of internal migrant rights, it underscores the deeply entrenched and widespread 
nature of access barriers. The second insight is into the processes behind policy dissonance 
illustrated in the RBA trajectory where centrally-set policy intentions were both mobilised and 
distorted by the subjectivities of individual actors – ‘reformist bureaucrats’ representing the 
former and ‘unruly’ practitioners motivated by self-gain, the latter (Aiyar and Walton, 2014).  
Sub-national variations in how some of the key RBA programmes (such as the PDS and 
MNREGS) have performed also highlight how policy implementation is internally varied and 
subjective according to political, regional and bureaucratic contexts.  
 
2.4 Theoretical Framework 
In this section, I engage further with theories connected to the themes covered in the literature 
review in order to interpret, understand and frame my evidence. I draw upon two main bodies of 
theory through which my research questions can be answered and understood. First, I look at the 
relevant work on structure and agency, developed by Giddens (1984); and revisited by Jessop 
(2001), Katz (2004), Coe and Jordhus-Lier (2010) and de Haas (2011). I then engage with theories 
of governance and institutions to interpret and develop the findings on governance context and to 
further understand the processes behind the structural barriers to access that migrants contend 
with.  
 
2.4.1. Degrees of structure and agency in internal migration  
In this thesis I present evidence of a system of institutional barriers experienced by migrants, and 
local labourers, in accessing social protection programmes, and on the ways in which they deploy 
strategies to mitigate or overcome these barriers. Some of the barriers are more rigid and deeply 
embedded within structures – institutions, legal systems, market forces, social and labour relations 




different ways and to different degrees – examples of which are presented in Chapter Seven. In 
the face of barriers of design, and implementation as represented in dhakkas and practices of 
corruption and rent-seeking, labourers and labour migrants occupy unequal positions in the power 
balance but as the literature – and my empirical evidence – illustrates, migrants can wield agency 
in different ways. This relationship between structure and agency can be considered the core of 
tensions between calls for “social order” and individual “autonomy” that characterise the “meta 
problem of modern governance” (Dubnik and Yang, 2009: 22).  
 
Giddens attempts to resolve these ‘tensions’ by conceptualising structure and agency as mutually 
reciprocal interactions – a process described as ‘structuration’ (1984). Giddens argues that 
structural changes are induced by repeated acts of agency, and social structures are generated 
through repeated acts of agents (ibid). This framework acknowledges structures embedded within 
society and institutions, but also that they are subject to change when people ignore, replace and 
reproduce actions. Giddens theorises structure as dualistic - both a product and medium of social 
actions (ibid). While limitations to this dichotomous framework have been observed (cf. Jessop, 
2001; Bakewell, 2010), it provides a helpful entryway into understanding the link between 
behavioural and institutional processes that take place between vulnerable groups, such as 
migrants and the state. As discussed in the preceding section, the literature acknowledges that 
most “migration may index neither transforming social mobility, nor the erosion of rural ways of 
living” (Mosse et al., 2002: 3026). Instead, a ‘middle ground’ approach can be more effective for 
understanding empirics. My findings show that migrant lives involve a set of decisions that enable 
livelihoods, and depending on the set of barriers faced, can lead to differential outcomes.  
 
Useful approaches to acknowledging these differential outcomes and modes of both structure and 
agency are developed in the work of Jessop (2001) and Katz (2004), as cited in Coe and Jordhus-
Lier (2010). Jessop (2001) expands Giddens’ binary approach to propose that structure and 




characteristics - though applied in different ways – are taken on in actions which are ‘oriented’ 
within existing structures. This offers a useful way of conceptualising the relationship between 
the strategies undertaken by migrants to overcome barriers (Jessop, 2001:1223). As de Haas puts 
it, “structures can simultaneously constrain and facilitate agency” and both aspects can represent 
“negative and positive freedoms” for individuals and communities (2011: 22). For example, the 
decision to migrate within India itself can be seen as a form of agency – a freedom (facilitated by 
structures represented by constitutional law) that can become negative or restrictive once a 
migrant enters into segmented or exploitative labour markets (de Haas, 2011). Likewise, the 
access structures represented by the PDS can sometimes carve out spaces for mediation and 
opportunity allowing for labour migrants, and the urban poor overall, to strategically navigate the 
‘maze’ of barriers to access.  
 
Coe and Jordhus-Lier (2010) look to Katz’s (2004) continuum of differential forms of agency, 
contingent upon the structural constraints within which they operate. Katz’s framework 
distinguishes between ‘resilience’ – small-scale coping strategies that do not change social 
relations; ‘reworking’ strategies to leverage better terms of work or living conditions (they 
‘recalibrate’ and ‘redistribute’ structural imbalances rather than undo them) and finally resistance 
– rare in contemporary labour regimes – which represents direct challenges to capitalist regimes 
and attempts to regain control over means of production (Katz, 2004). This framework is a 
valuable tool for understanding and analysing the different degrees to which labour migrants and 
their local counterparts exercise agency (Carswell and de Neve, 2013). As the empirical findings 
presented in Chapter Seven show, local labourers and long-term migrants are more likely to 
engage in or attempt practices of ‘reworking’, for example by using collective voice and agency 
to demand access from government officials or strategically employing agents to circumvent 
barriers. Certain sectors are also predilected towards taking industrial action - such as the brick 
kiln labourers observed in Ahmedabad, where participants hinted at adopting these types of 




can be categorised as ‘resilience’ and coping strategies, also described in several empirical 
accounts of Indian internal migration (for example: Rogaly et al., 2002; Deshingkar and Start, 
2003; Mosse et al., 2005). 
 
Agency is expressed in the multi-locational trajectories of migrants and responsive sub-national 
policies – such as the temporary ration cards schemes in my field-sites, hint at the “the limited 
but real capacity of individuals to overcome constraints and potentially reshape the structural 
context” (de Haas, 2008: 34). Migration, and migrants, have historically been defined in 
restrictive terms and generally remain so in contemporary state apparatus for measuring migration 
in India (Srivastava and Sasikumar, 2003). While empirical evidence shows that multi-locational 
livelihoods are practiced by seasonal and short-term and among certain long-distance migrants 
(Deshingkar and Farrington, 2009; Rogaly and Thieme, 2012), and the discourse has evolved 
beyond focus on linear migration patterns to include more fluid understandings of mobility and 
transnational forms of international movement; the Indian state is still restricted in its definition 
of migration, as explained in Chapter One.  
 
Existing instruments of measurement also fail to capture the reciprocities of migrant spaces 
(places of origin and destination) and this is replicated in the failure of policies such as those 
governing the PDS to make entitlements portable across spaces. Evidence in the literature 
eliminates the ‘false dichotomies’ of rural versus urban livelihoods (Mosse et al., 2002). The 
reciprocal social and economic effects of rural and urban migration is observed in Mosse et al. 
(2002)’s account of Adivasi rural to urban migrants in Gujarat, whereby social networks and 
structures, such as rural hierarchies of power, to some extent determine decisions to migrate and 
these in turn influence dynamics within households at source locations. My own findings also 
show how migrants, across the continuum of temporalities (long-term as well as short-term) 
strategically maintain ongoing and reciprocal linkages between their places of origin and 




strategies (Katz, 2004).  
 
In the way that sites of (urban) destination are contested spaces for migrants – due to nativist 
resentments and unsettled “overlapping” identities, the idea of native ‘home’ also becomes 
complicated for migrants over time, and as they travel over long distances (Parry, 2003). The idea 
of home as a fluid and multi-locational entity is presented in the empirical migration literature 
(Ahmed, 1999; Walsh, 2006; Brickell and Datta, 2011). However, while these theoretical frames 
can be applied to the empirical practices of migrants in my research sample, their psychological 
and aspirational narratives convey fixed and readily familiar notions of home as anchored in their 
place of origin, signified in the tethering of identity documents exclusively to the ‘home’ (such 
as village of birth, family household or parental home) rather than to mobile individuals. 
 
2.4.2 Institutionalised hostilities – ‘dhakkas’, mediation and unruly practices as governance 
Following on from theorisations of structure and agency I turn now to institutional manifestations 
of both. According to my observations, the ‘hostile’ governance context in India can be 
characterised by the gaps between constitutional laws, policy and implementation. These gaps are 
‘process deficits’ (Pellissery, 2010) and allow for “unruly practices” (Fraser, 1989; Gore, 1993) 
which ultimately work against the poor and vulnerable, and particularly for migrants. The gaps 
can be especially apparent in the migration sector as represented in various international contexts 
(Czaika and de Haas, 2013). The strong association between ‘policy gaps’ and migration is 
explored by Czaika and de Haas (2013) who construct a typology of such gaps: discursive, 
implementation and efficacy – representing a “wide gulf” (Czaika and de Haas, 2013: 494) 
between discourse, policy and practice.  This ‘gulf’ becomes configured as a fractal of gaps across 
multiple layers of the Indian state bureaucracy and policy-making machinery. The mixed 
intentions, interests and “discursive” commitments among state, (sedentary) citizens and market 





In this sub-section, I seek to further develop theories that explain and exemplify the gaps between 
legislation, policy and implementation within India and how they affect access structures for 
labour migrants, and fracture identity and citizenship between migrant and sedentary populations 
in India. As mentioned in the preceding chapters, highly diverse political pluralism is 
characteristic of India’s federalised and increasingly decentralised system of governance (Norris, 
2008; Mundle, 2012; Chopra, 2015; Deshpande et al.,2017). It can contribute, and in some cases, 
be instrumental to institutional processes such as patronage that perpetuate social exclusion and 
vulnerability (Sadanandan, 2012; Deshpande et al., 2017) while in some cases the availability of 
agents and mediation opportunities can also help open spaces for agency among certain migrants 
and members of the urban poor.  
 
The policy gaps are most apparent in the paradox of excluding internal migrants who are citizens 
and share the same national origins as policy makers and ‘anti-migrant’ elites – from national 
regimes. Policy dissonances in governance of labour migrants in India are reified at different 
levels and in various forms. This starts with the contradiction between constitutional rights for 
Indian citizens in system of liberal democracy and policies concerning migrants; to dissonances 
between policy rhetoric and drives (including the use of technology) toward social inclusion and 
universal access to programmes and the continued exclusion of migrants, by viewing labour 
migration as a disruption external to policy interventions rather than as a ‘normal’ livelihood 
activity (Deshingkar and Start, 2009); to imbalances between policy apparatus and legal 
frameworks available for international labour migrants in the Gulf (Standing, 2011) and those for 
internal migrants (Sasikumar and Srivastava, 2003). These dissonances give rise to hostile 
processes of implementation (or mis-implementaton) of policies such as ‘dhakkas’ and other 
informal rules practiced by local bureaucrats that run counter to central government logic or are 
manipulated by political patronage and other rent-seeking actors (North, 1990; Farrington and 
Deshingkar, 2009; Aiyar and Walton, 2014). A matrix of dissonances arising from both structure 




and can harm labour migrants in distinct ways, due to the contradictory citizenship status they 
inhabit.  
 
The different ways in which policy ‘gaps’ can affect the lives, conditions and outcomes of labour 
migrants can be understood by focusing on encounters between the state and citizens and how 
they blur boundaries, as explored by Corbridge et al. (2005) and Berenschot (2010). Corbridge et 
al. (2005) explore the everyday encounters or ‘sightings’ between the poor and local government 
officials which substitute formal instruments of civic engagement and entitlements for those who 
not only lack awareness or formal access but must navigate these structures as a migrant 
experiencing ‘unequal citizenship.’ Migrants, and the urban poor in general, are compelled to 
navigate patterns of access due to disproportionate encounters with ‘state scarcity’ - as referred 
to by Corbridge et al. (2005). These state ‘scarcities’ can be attributed to social (and political) 
hostility toward migrants according to Weiner’s analysis of migrant and identity politics (1978). 
The delivery of public goods therefore becomes skewed toward those in power and can limit 
access to resources. The poor, as a result, are subject to the whim and discrimination of elite local 
groups (Weiner, 1978; Corbridge et al., 2005). As disempowered and ‘non’ substantive citizens 
(to invert Jayal’s term, 2005), they become a ‘nuisance’ and experience dhakkas on a continual 
basis in their sightings of the state. 
 
Focusing on the social exclusion of certain groups can help identify both the processes behind 
exclusion and specific challenges faced by vulnerable groups.  Kabeer argues this approach 
prioritises the role of social interaction in producing disadvantages rather than the “anonymous” 
processes of marginalisation or impoverishment (2000: 84).  Patterns of inclusion and exclusion 
are created not only by institutional mechanisms but by the individual actors they are populated 
with (Kabeer, 2000). As Mehta argues, "[l]ike states, institutions are not homogenous entities: 
they are composed of conflicting views and interests vying for the distribution of power and 




through practices of policy dissonance: resources are allocated through various mechanisms, such 
as the PDS, which systematically deny particular groups of people “resources and recognition 
which would allow them to participate fully in the life of that society” (Kabeer, 2000: 86). 
 
These practices take place in the gap between rules and their implementation across all 
institutional domains (North, 1990). The gap provides a space for social determination processes 
which serve to deny or limit access to those entitled either through corrupt agency, information 
asymmetries, technical incompetence or lack of capacity, or through operational errors. This gap 
is also present between entitlements and access when it comes to social protection programmes. 
Schemes can be derailed not only by flawed design but by the processes of implementing access 
structures. According to Corbridge et al. “[i]nconsistencies are bound to open up between the 
‘vision’ and the ‘reality’ of state interventions and this creates a space for actors other than 
bureaucrats” (2005: 193). The ‘unruly practices’ which such spaces accommodate are exemplified 
in the widespread use of actors who both circumvent and substitute for the state, to enable 
informal access for the urban poor, including migrants, where formal access is denied. These 
practices of mediation become normalised and embedded within practices of governance to the 
extent they are more efficient than formal ‘rules’ (North, 1990; Berenschot, 2010). 
 
Normative understandings of patronage as ‘aberrations’ from Weberian standards of bureaucracy 
have been unpacked and problematised in the literature (Berenschot, 2010; Hicken, 2011; 
Piliavsky, 2014). Berenschot (2010) argues that in different contexts, such practices are crucial 
norms that enable the day-to-day functioning of local administrations in their contexts. The poor 
and vulnerable are given de facto access and ‘sightings’ of the state in these very spaces of 
‘policy’. Accounts of barriers and dhakkas from state officials in my findings resonate with those 
described in Berenschot’s ethnography of public service delivery in urban Gujarat, which 
contends that political mediation is both a norm for the poor and tool for empowerment. 




officials demand ‘speed-money’ to process a request, and people are often told to come back the 
next day” (2010:889). In the absence of formal options and ‘sightings of the state’, the study cites 
the primacy of agents, who are referred to as ‘roadside bureaucrats’ (Berenschot, 2010) for the 
urban poor. These mediating actors are better placed to perform administrative functions as they 
within ‘sight’ of the poor and often embedded within community networks (ibid.).  
 
Berenschot (2010) identifies three forms of mediation crucial in enabling and empowering poor 
communities to overcome barriers to accessing formal rights and entitlements: brokering 
information, political patronage and “particularisation” where formal entitlements are procured 
through bribes. While all the first and third forms are present in my empirical findings, only 
allusions are made to the second implying this has more resonance for non-migrant communities. 
Though often characterised by dhakkas, these everyday encounters between the state, informal 
agents and poor and vulnerable citizens substitute formal instruments of civic engagement and 
entitlement (such as identity documents, ration cards, BPL status, voter registration) for those 
who otherwise lack awareness or formal access (Corbridge et al., 2005). 
 
In summary, linking theorisations of institutional aberrations – interpreted as policy dissonance 
in my findings - and structuration can be a useful way of understanding Indian governance.  Indian 
institutions and structures tend to be influenced by subjective and cultural dynamics (North, 1990; 
Kabeer, 2000) that shape and determine social actions and dynamics. Such properties make it 
possible for similar social practices to exist on a broader scale and become systematic (Giddens, 
1984; Jessop, 2001). Considering the reciprocal relations between structure and agency is a 
helpful way of explaining iterations of experiences of the state among the poor overall, and 
particularly for labour migrants. Their labour experiences and patterns of access to social 
programmes such as the PDS are structured by the state but these same spaces of experience also 
enable strategic responses to barriers to viable livelihoods (by way of migration) and to state 




Carswell and de Neve, 2013). The role of governance is therefore highly influential in shaping 







To answer the research questions behind this thesis, a mix of predominantly qualitative methods 
were used across three field sites, supplemented by one quantitative method.  This mixed 
approach to sampling and data collection was adopted to address the lack of robust official data 
on internal migration in my main field-sites, particularly that of seasonal and short-distance 
migration. Labourers working in the informal economy and are not typically registered by a state 
entity thus making it difficult to obtain official data on the number of migrant workers at any 
given place. Using both survey and interview methods allowed me to try and understand the socio-
economic status of participants as I could not gain access to updated municipal level socio-
economic data, and migrants are usually not included in such data. In place of official information 
in this area, I used survey methods to develop a sampling frame, from which I purposively 
selected participants for my qualitative research.   
 
The findings were gathered over a period of nine months (2013-2014) of fieldwork in two primary 
research sites. The first site was the city of Nashik in Maharashtra state, and second, the city of 
Ahmedabad in the neighbouring state of Gujarat. A brief phase of research took place in an 
appending third site: India’s capital city of New Delhi. Four months were spent at each of the key 
sites and one month in New Delhi. The research design followed a comparative template to assess 
the similarities and differences between the experiences of migrant and local labourers. The 
research also aimed to account for the governance context of each main field-site. The methods 
are based on a sequential multi-method design with an emphasis on qualitative methods in both 
data collection and analysis. The specific data collection methods consisted of (in order of 
importance): semi-structured interviews; survey for sampling frame; key informant interviews 
and observation. I used NVIVO software to identify the main themes in the qualitative research, 





This chapter will start by outlining the rationale behind the methodological approach undertaken 
and explain how it is linked with the overall research purpose. The next section will detail the 
research methods used and the research sites themselves, before turning to a discussion of 
reflexivity and the ethics involved in fieldwork, particularly in reference to studying post-colonial 
contexts and groups that are historically marginalised and poor in India.  With these reflections 
in mind, the chapter concludes with a reflection on the specific experiences and challenges 
involved in the fieldwork itself and how these may have further shaped the final outcomes and 
findings.  
 
3.1 Multiple methods – a rationale 
The methodology took guidance from previous empirical research on migrants, labourers and the 
poor in India and spanning a range of disciplines including (Breman, 1996; Mosse et al., 2002; 
Rogaly et al.,2002; Shah, 2006; Deshingkar et al., 2008). Though taking different disciplinary 
approaches, these studies are all either mixed-method or qualitative, richly detailed and capture 
data on migrant lives at both origin and destination despite the practical difficulties in tracking 
migrant lives. For the sampling survey design, I drew from existing official tools of data collection 
such as the Indian Census and the socio-economic components of the National Family Health 
Survey (NFHS).71  
 
An initial consideration when preparing my research design was the lack of robust data on 
migration overall (international and national), which has been critiqued throughout the decades 
(Skeldon, 2012; Beauchemin, 2014). The data on internal migration is even weaker, particularly 
in many Asian countries (Deshingkar and Grimm, 2005). In addition, it is difficult for typical 
survey methods to capture the “complex, multifaceted, and often contradictory lives of migrants” 
(Bose, 2012: 608), echoing Massey’s conceptualisation of migration as a process rather than a 
quantitatively observable event (1987). Breman’s fieldwork on labour migrants in Gujarat 
                                                     




informed his observation that the “migrant scale is fluid rather than fixed" (2013: 67) and thus 
difficult to capture using conventional survey measures. In light of this, I designed a composite 
methodology consisting of data collection and participant selection methods that gather both 
nuanced and basic data regarding migrant experiences  
 
My research design was guided by both ethnographic methods and the rubric of ‘ethnosurveys’, 
pioneered by Massey (1987) which have become more prevalent in developing countries 
(Riosmena, 2016). The tools were developed to address gaps in existing data on migration, as 
well as gaps in the data collection methods themselves.  Ethnosurveys seek to address the 
challenge in measuring a complex process involving “ambiguous” socially constructed 
geographical concepts such as settlement, residence and a ‘sense of place.’ (Massey, 1987: 1498).  
Ethnosurveys bring together quantitative and qualitative approaches. I adopted this approach to 
some extent in my own research design, in developing my sampling frame to identify migrants 
who would be relevant to my research. I took note of how representative multi-site sampling was 
used to select sites according to specific criteria to enable comparisons between different cluster 
groups.  
 
For the data collection itself, I drew inspiration from ethnographic work in post-colonial country 
contexts. Interviews and observations are powerful tools for gathering detailed information on the 
“complex agency of actors” (Mosse 2005: 6). It is also deemed as a way of constantly re-
evaluating both prior assumptions at the outset, and research findings at the end of the process. 
An iterative approach was taken in my interviews in order to understand processes, behaviours, 
experiences and ideas as far as possible from the research participants’ perspectives. The 
importance of “building up relationships rather than making a single visit, and spending time in 
ordinary conversation and interaction” (Shaw, 2007: 188) informed my approach to interviews. 
It was necessary to build trust with the research community and develop a close understanding of 




of the state’ (Corbridge et al., 2005).   
 
In order to fully address my research questions, I also spoke with institutional actors in order to 
conduct an analysis of structural barriers and gain further insights into the “operation of rules and 
distribution of resources” as well with migrants (and local labourers) themselves to understand 
their “strategic” actions (Bakewell, 2010: 1697). This approach is influenced by Giddens’ theory 
of structuration (Goss and Lindquist, 1995). Interviews with ‘key informants’ (KIs) such as policy 
makers also helped address the challenge in gathering data on labourers working in the informal 
economy: a lack of access to official data due to the lack of compliance with official regulations, 
and in some cases, the lack of regulation. As labourers operated in the ‘shadow’ of informal 
economy, my research relied upon observation and self-reporting. The literature on migrant 
workers in the region served as a guide as did the KIIs in order to help corroborate and provide 
context and broad perspective to largely self-reported individual data, for example average daily 
incomes in a given sector. KIIs with policy actors also enabled me to gather data on policy 
histories and further insights into the main factors behind the failure of responsive governance 
strategies such as the temporary ration card scheme launched in Maharashtra.  
 
Holy (1984) describes the ‘observing participant’ which shaped my approach to observations of 
spatial and institutional environments and social interactions between my participants. Holy’s 
description contrasts with the ‘participant observer’ type, who attempts to ‘blend in’ with the field 
setting and community and thus eliminates overtly self-referential actions such as asking 
questions and conducting interviews. Holy highlights that participation in any form is a medium 
for data collection methods rather than an intrinsic method (ibid). Both positionings can be 
regarded as paradoxical in the sense that researchers are always observers by default: the desire 
to yield data, however open-ended, gives precedence to the ‘observational’ aspect of the practice.  
 




the informal economy: a survey-based preliminary sampling frame was considered the most 
appropriate way to guide the selection of participants for the qualitative research based on in-
depth interview and observation techniques designed to try and capture the ‘complex lives’ of 
migrants. At the time of fieldwork (2013-2014), there was no relevant sample frame to guide the 
selection process. The most recent population census at the time of writing was published in 2011 
but the specific disaggregation of migrant data had not yet been released. The most recent 
disaggregated data on migrants available at the time was therefore from 2001.  In light of this gap, 
a survey was designed to try and capture demographic, residential and socio-economic data on 
participants. As migrants are not self-evident individuals, the survey was used as a sampling tool 
for the qualitative component – the first phase in a sequential and explanatory design – but also a 
source of basic data from which some broad inferences could be made regarding each sample as 
shown in Appendix Three. Overall, by being “multi-positioned and multi-sited” (Mosse, 2005), 
and as open as possible, I sought to design research methods that could be flexed to address the 
different research questions in this project. I aimed to design a study which allows for a composite 
analysis of the interaction between the state and poor migrants by using multiple but linked 
methods. 
 
3.2. Description of fieldwork methods 
The research universe consisted of a sample of migrants, non-migrants and local government 
officials. At the end of the fieldwork I had surveyed a total of 376 participants (see Appendix 
Three for cluster breakdown) and from this surveyed sample, I purposively selected 53 
participants with whom I conducted in-depth semi-structured interviews. This was supplemented 
with eight key informant interviews with ‘policy actors’ in Nashik, Ahmedabad and New Delhi 
and informal interviews with NGOs. In Nashik, I surveyed 178 participants (21 percent of whom 
were non-migrants) and I interviewed 29 participants (8 of whom were non-migrants). In 
Ahmedabad, I surveyed 198 participants (19 percent of whom were non-migrants) and I 




households (represented as one survey participant) and individuals.  
 
All the participants were sampled according to their poverty status in accordance with labourer 
status, income and vulnerability. The criteria were based on state-wise urban BPL wage rates and 
listing of assets, amenities, caste status and household size. In addition, the skill level of labour, 
daily wage rates and number of days’ work per month on average was taken into account. The 
impact of PDS access was compared between the following types of migrants: inter-state and 
intra-state, individual and family and short-term/seasonal and long-term. While the final sample 
proved to be highly diverse and not all groups are directly comparable, the core of the sample 
enables a comparison while the diversity of migrants illustrate various scenarios in which migrant 
workers can find themselves, and situations regarding access structures.  I supplemented this study 
with ‘elite’ and key informant interviews with district, state and central level government 
representatives regarding PDS policy, and with NGOs, academics and organisations working with 
migrants.  
 
3.2.1 Sampling and Site Selection  
In this section, I describe the iterative process of sampling and site selection in each of the main 
field sites, as related to the contextual and structural factors of each site. While I presented my 
rationale for site selection based on their shared characteristics in Chapter One; certain contextual 
details and temporal factors rendered my experience in each site unique, though I used broadly 
the same strategy. As with the data collection, the sampling and site selection process followed a 
multi-method framework. In order to strengthen the internal validity of my study, my research 
design included multiple sites of fieldwork - an approach used often in migration research 
(Massey, 1987). In the absence of an existing sample frame for the informal settlements I selected, 
I used a non-proportional stratified sampling strategy (Kemper et al., 2002: 279), where the 
research population in both main field sites were separated into different strata according to 




fold and combined both probabilistic and purposive sampling techniques.  In the first phase, the 
individual localities formed the basis of clusters from which participants for the survey component 
were randomly selected, referred to as multi-state cluster sampling (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 
2003). In the second phase, purposive selection was used to recruit interview participants to fit 
the following criteria: 
 
• representative of the different types of migrant categories (both 
spatial and temporal); 
• a representation of poverty status, in terms of wages and type of 
labour to ensure validity (engagement in formal labour; higher than 
BPL wages and ownership of pukka housing on private land were 
exclusion criteria); 
• availability in terms of timing and location – the former involved 
both time of day when free from work and time of season for intra-
state migrants, to determine whether they would be in the city or not. 
The latter involved risk assessments to determine whether it would 
be safe for myself and an assistant to visit (at certain times of day); 
• consent from the participant themselves to participate in further, 
more in-depth research 
 
The official data collection instruments for socio-economic and census information are described 
in Chapter One.  These include the official ‘Below Poverty Line’ census, the methodology for 
which has changed over time and under each new government. The BPL census at the time of 
fieldwork was critiqued for various flaws including lack of data on migrants, and for being prone 
to error and corruption (Pellissery, 2010). The actual methods (scoring criteria) which are used to 
assign citizens below the poverty line (BPL) in India have also been critiqued either for the 
divisive or deprivational effects of inclusion and exclusion errors (Dreze and Khera, 2010, Besley 
et al., 2007). As a result, the main concerns in dealing with poverty measures when researching 
communities working in the informal economy lay in authenticating self-reported data on incomes 
and other dimensions of poverty, such as educational status and health when conducting surveys 




change. I therefore used informal interviews with thekedars and local NGOs for reference, and 
labourers themselves for collective information on the so-called average wage market. The most 
common variant of response to questions about wage or number of days of employment was ‘It’s 
hard to say, it’s not fixed’, further highlighting the vulnerabilities faced by such labourers. 
Information on living conditions and the very fact that the participants were working or had 
migrated to work in precarious labour conditions such as construction sites and nakas were all 
taken into account as authentication and validity. 
 
In the original research design, I intended to use the survey to capture migrants according to my 
original definition which excluded ‘settled’ migrants who had resided at their place of destination 
for ten years or longer. I intended to capture migrants who had moved (or circulated) to the place 
of destination less than a decade before. Those who were native-born and those who had lived 
and settled in Nashik or Ahmedabad would therefore be considered ‘non-migrants.’ In the field 
itself however, my initial findings unsettled these fixed definitions. Many migrants, particularly 
inter-state migrants, who had lived in Nashik and Ahmedabad for over ten years, still considered 
themselves as migrants and continued to split their time, households and assets between ‘home’ 
and the city. This led me to revise my definition to include all migrants (non-native born) 
participants within the migrant category.  
 
I experienced similar complications when it came to defining non-migrants – some participants 
born in Ahmedabad or Nashik were generational migrants and considered themselves as 
belonging to the regional identity of their parents or even further back in their heritage. For 
example, many second, third or fourth generation migrants whose family had originally moved 
from Rajasthan to Ahmedabad considered themselves as Rajasthani, thus I had to rethink the way 
in which I explained my terms to participants. The definitional challenge generated interesting 
findings in terms of the way in which migration itself is conceptualised and these will be presented 




In each city, I began the data collection process with a participant-led and key informant-assisted 
approach to identify locations where labourers – both migrant and non-migrant – were likely to 
be found. I used opportunistic and snowball methods here - respondents identified in these places 
were then in turn asked to recommend places where fellow labourers were likely to be found. I 
adopted the same snowball and opportunistic methods in the sampling phase – I encountered new 
potential participants such as a neighbour overhearing my conversation with an existing 
participant, an inquisitive passer-by interacting and engaging with us or someone who looks a 
particular way with an approachable stance. The type of sites approached were those where 
labourers (predominantly migrants) were likely to gather, following consultation with the local 
NGOs, academics and key informants and referencing previous literature on urban migration in 
India. These sites are listed in full in Appendix Three and mainly consist of: construction sites, 
slum settlements and nakas. The ‘naka’ was recommended as a prime location for identifying 
labour migrants, and their local counterparts. Labourers, usually residing in the vicinity or in 
adjacent slum settlements, usually gathered at nakas in the mornings to find work either directly 
from employers or through contractors and sub-contractors.  
 
In Appendix 3, Tables 9.1 and 9.2 list the specific ‘cluster sites’ identified within each overall 
field-site. Below in Table 3.1, I include the broad characteristics of the qualitative research 
participants. Most of the interviews were conducted with households – both men and women – 
and sometimes with different generations of family members. The exceptions are noted in the 








Table 3.1: Aggregate characteristics of interviewed participants 












Total 53 14 3 7 
 
3.2.2. Sampling survey 
I conducted the survey at the sites selected via the process described in the previous sub-section: 
mainly construction sites and their adjacent labour camps; nakas dispersed throughout each city 
and slum settlements. In addition, I also surveyed labourers working in small-scale enterprises, 
such as a garments warehouse in Ahmedabad, where low-skilled labourers (both local and 
migrant) are employed. The main purpose of the survey was to provide a sampling frame for 
qualitative interviews by dividing the sample into migrant and non-migrant categories. The 
questions were closed but with some elements of ‘openness’ for example, the ‘other’ category 
was included in many of the questions to cover any missed categories or aspects in the survey 
design.  
 
The survey was a structured questionnaire designed to capture data on both migrants and non-
migrants, with specific questions to filter out migrants determined by duration of stay at the place 
of destination, linkages with the place of origin, as well as distance and reason for migration. The 
survey template used in each research site is shown in Appendix Two. Questions on socio-
economic background formed the second part of the survey.  Here the questions were guided by 
multidimensional definitions of poverty which also incorporated vulnerability and thus included 
questions on stability of income, household size, food security and assets and amenities to gain 
as full as understanding as possible of the socio-economic situation of the participants.   
 
While the nature of the selection process is broadly purposive – where migrants, and a smaller 




parameters within these migrant status and socio-economic categories were set, the proportion of 
participants selected by gender, specific migrant category and household type were not 
purposively selected, so there is a randomised aspect within the sample. The original aim in the 
research design was for migrants to constitute roughly 60 percent of the sample and non-migrants 
for 40 percent. The final sample however in Nashik was approximately 21 percent non-migrants, 
and 79 percent migrants. In Ahmedabad, the final split was approximately 25 percent non-
migrants, and 75 percent migrants. The larger sample of participants classified as ‘migrants’ is 
highly heterogeneous in terms of household type and category of migrant (temporal, distance 
travelled and nature of migration) and also includes long-term or ‘permanent’ migrants. 
 
The gender composition in the findings is a result of both research design and the mix of research 
sites. The male bias can be attributed to sampling techniques – the most balanced gender ratio is 
found in the local population and this is because the survey was conducted on a door-to-door 
household basis in addition to the site of employment. While many women were encountered and 
observed in the construction sites and in certain nakas, they occupied specific spaces and were 
not forthcoming during the survey period. With the above criteria in mind, it was decided that 
aiming for a specific gender-based quota in the sample would be a difficult undertaking and 
further complicate the sample-identification process. The sample consisted of individuals 
encountered mainly at construction sites and nakas where the proportion of male labourers was 
higher than that of women. When the questionnaire was conducted in slum settings, it was more 
common to encounter women participants. 
 
The demographic data was kept minimal for ease of analysis and the second section serves as 
filtering tool for categorising those who are migrants and those who would be categorised as ‘non-
migrants.’ Questions 7-13 would thus not be asked to those who reported themselves as local-
born and bought up in the place of destination. Questions on the frequency of visits home; the 




assess the degree of linkage the place of origin and account for whether the migrant was seasonal, 
circular or settled. Finally, census-style questions on spatial aspects such as last place of residence 
and place of birth were included in the ‘residential status’ section of the survey. 
 
Finally, the ‘poverty assessment’ section of the survey included questions on income, assets and 
educational status, in accordance with multi-dimensional definitions of poverty. Questions on 
shelter, access to basic amenities, ownership of durable assets were included in addition to 
questions on income in terms of both average quantity (per household) as well as frequency and 
stability of income – particularly relevant in the informal sector. Questions on ration card 
ownership – directly related to the main research questions - were included in this section. 
Questions related to previous experiences or alternative residences such as previous income and 
documentation status also included options for migrant-status participants. Due to the self-
reported nature of the instrument, several questions were included broadly to capture and confirm 
the same kinds of data. 
 
3.2.3 Qualitative research methods  
The next component of my data collection process was based on the semi-structured interview 
method. This was the most important component of the entire data collection process and provides 
the main source of data for developing this thesis. A set of open-ended questions were prepared 
in advance but served mainly as a guideline, the main structure being the time-frame. Many 
participants could only offer an hour of their time on any given day and thus interviews took place 
over multiple visits. The survey findings from both sites provided a highly diverse sample of 
migrants and non-migrants and I purposively selected participants to interview according to 
poverty level and to provide a balance in terms of migrant type, labour sector and gender. 
However, the logistical reality of availability and access to participants also affected the final 





In Nashik, I interviewed 29 participants over a period of three months and in Ahmedabad I 
conducted semi-structured interviews with 24 participants over the same length of time. During 
each survey in the initial period I explained to participants that they may be selected for a longer 
interview and asked if they were willing to share contact details. I also had between two and three 
hours per day, at mornings and lunchtimes, to conduct the survey when the labourers themselves 
had availability and when my interpreters were available. This meant I was required to visit the 
selected sites multiple times for rounds of surveys and I was able to build up familiarity with 
participant communities to prepare for the interview sessions. 
 
The interviews themselves took place in various sites, both at work and at home and in three 
instances, a public place (a tea stall), depending on the time agreed by the participant. For 
example, migrant construction workers lived on-site, and the interviews could be conducted at 
the place of work or in very close proximity. Most of the interviews with local communities, and 
long-term migrants took place in their homes in slum settlements. If it was a working day, 
interviews took place in the late afternoon or evening, and if the participant was not working, the 
interviews would take place in the daytime.  
 
While the single participants (representing a household if they were living in one) who had 
answered the survey questions were the point of contact, often during the interview process the 
household would participate as a whole – both husbands and wives, teenaged or adult children, 
or elders. Neighbours and extended family members who may be in vicinity would also participate 
at some points in the interview. Overall interviews were a fluid process, with participants from 
the household drifting in and out, sometimes the female head of household would procure 
refreshments while we continued talking with her husband or sometimes one spouse or household 
member would have to leave for work and we would continue the interview with those remaining.   
 




interpreter), an explanation of the research purpose and request for consent to the interview and 
data collection process (as per the ethical review guidelines). The interviews were mainly open-
ended and conversational with a question guide serving as tool for ensuring key information was 
covered. The questions were designed to capture the “complex, multifaceted” lives of the 
participants, particularly migrants (Bose, 2012). Though each interview was different in content 
and nature, there was a broad pattern of themes discussed and questions asked. They usually 
started with reiterative questions on demographic and socio-economic characteristics to reinforce 
the data captured in surveys. In the case of migrants, participants were asked to describe their 
experiences and motivations for moving, and what their relationships are with both the places of 
destination and origin, this included information on household breakdown and family history. 
Finally, questions relating to access structures and how they were perceived, navigated and 
understood by participants, in relation to the ration card. More general questions about the 
experience with the PDS and state representatives were discussed and the experience with 
documents and in the case of migrants, mobility. The interviews were also an opportunity to try 
and identify whether migrants experienced any discrimination in the city, and how local 
communities felt about migrants.  
 
Observational techniques, both on specific visits and during interviews and surveys, and also in 
passing, ran throughout the course of the fieldwork, documented on a daily basis in fieldnotes 
though they were not a significant part of the research design. This element of the research design 
is almost entirely open-ended. I borrowed from the anthropological epistemology and formed part 
of what can be referred to as an ‘institutional ethnography.’ I reflect upon my positionality in the 
following section but highlight here my aim in this part of the qualitative component was to take 
upon an outsider role, external of the phenomena I was observing in order to maintain distance. 
However, an explanation of my presence and at least a broad sketch of my purpose as an observer 
were required in order to gain access. This may have resulted in ‘front-stage’ behaviour (Goffman, 




This form of reactivity – my influence as an observer on the events and behaviour of those being 
observed would ideally have been mitigated over time however due to access challenges and time 
constraints, my main observation exercises took place on one-off visits.  
 
3.3. Positionality, reflexivity and responsibility  
The way in which researchers position themselves spatially and socially is a crucial consideration, 
in social research (Harris, 2003; Sultana, 2007). The very terms used to describe those who are 
researched - ‘informant’, ‘subject’, ‘respondent’ or ‘participant’ – signify the range of positions 
researchers can take and how they align with different theoretical approaches, and shapes both 
the process of data collection and the analyses of findings. I adopt the term ‘participant’ to reflect 
the qualitative engagement with lives and experiences of the labour migrant and local labourers 
and to highlight the constructivist approach of the research. Another consideration is reflexivity 
– recognising and reflecting on how one’s own identity and positionality can affect the research 
process itself (see:  Giddens, 1984; Bordieu and Waquant, 1992).  
 
Carling et al. (2014) offer a useful framework for research on migration which addresses both 
considerations. The framework eschews the relational construction of so-called ‘insider/outside’ 
divides in migration research. It is premised on the argument that meanings that can be mutually 
assigned by both researcher and participant are complicated by the various types of affinities that 
can occur between and within migrant or diaspora groups, in both origin and destination countries. 
Positionalities can transition across a continuum in migration research rather than lock into static 
binaries of insider versus outsider. In the case of social science, there is no “well-established 
notion” of what a researcher “does” (Carling et al., 2014: 36) therefore leaving interpretation wide 
open to the ‘inventory’ of social categories research participants are familiar with. While many 
of the empirical examples underpinning Carling et al.’s framework are not relevant to my 
fieldwork experience – the idea of insider/outsider positions is complicated by the fact I am 




reflexivity in my research context.  
 
Positionality is also important for understanding power relations and ethics of social research that 
takes place among historically disadvantaged communities in post-colonial contexts such as India.  
While qualitative processes can allow for the development of a relationship between participant 
and researcher in order to strengthen validity and recognise the “power gradients” (Scheyvens 
and Leslie, 2000) as far as possible, the literature cautions against an overly close tightening of 
the relationship or distance. Mosse (2005) highlights the potential for unintended consequences 
which bear significant ethical considerations when working with poor and vulnerable 
communities. When exposing grievances - for example, experiences of barriers to accessing the 
PDS - there is a danger of raising expectations among research subjects which have not been 
accounted for in planning and cannot be met when conducting field research (Corbridge et al., 
2005). Whilst conducting village studies in eastern India, Corbridge et al. discovered the time and 
complexity of in-depth questionnaires which can levy a “tax” on the participants (Corbridge et 
al., 2005: 226) and thus create expectations for payment of some form or whether ‘something’ 
can be done to meet a positive or tangible end (Ferguson, 1994). Questions arise surrounding the 
researcher’s social responsibility in such contexts where it becomes “virtually impossible to 
sustain long-term participant observation in the absence of making a practical contribution” 
(Grammig, 2002; and Harper, 2002, as cited in Mosse, 2005: 12). With this in mind, I 
endeavoured to design my research in a way that would alleviate time constraints for the research 
participants. 
 
Considerations of power and positionality in research were also articulated in a formal ethical 
review of my research design, approved by the University of Sussex Ethics Committee prior to 
my fieldwork. I designed the research with the review requirements and literature above in mind 
-   the locations of observations were recorded in detail in order to enable similar, if not replicable, 




or semi-literate participants: recorded oral) consent for participation, recording and dissemination 
of appropriate findings, was incorporated as a compulsory component in all aspects of the field 
research methodology. I targeted only adult members in my sampling frame and I worked with 
local translators and in the initial phases, local NGOs, to develop the most appropriate and clear 
ways to convey fully my research purposes to participants.   
 
3.3.1 Diasporic reflexivities – insider and outsider roles 
I turn now to an interrogation of my own identity and positionality as a researcher and reflexively 
engage with how this may have shaped my insider and outsider positions. Importantly, my use of 
interpreters in the field is also explored to consider how this may have impacted research 
positionality and helped construct my relations with participants.  I am a British South Asian born 
and raised in the UK; a Muslim by heritage and geographically I identify myself foremost as a 
Londoner – though throughout my life I have lived in various international locations. My mother 
is from Murshidibad, in the state of West Bengal, India. My father hailed from Bangladesh. While 
they shared a religion, language and many typical Bengali cultural traits; they descend from 
different countries with a complex and entwined, yet tense, relationship.  My parents arrived in 
the post-war wave of Commonwealth migration to the UK and settled there permanently, 
eventually naturalising as British citizens. My extended family is dispersed across both countries, 
as well as in Western countries. As the child of international migrants who arrived in the place of 
destination for separate reasons, my linkage with ‘place of (generational) origin’ is complex and 
more tenuous than those of my research participants.  
 
Debates surrounding the “power gradients” between researchers from the global North and the 
post-colonial contexts they research (Schuyvens and Leslie, 2000) are complicated when 
diasporic identity comes into play, particularly in my case where the internal social divisions and 
variations within India let alone between the two countries of my parents’ origin, obfuscate any 




(or plurality) of identities shared by those of multiple nationalities is to some extent captured by 
Juluri: we “share the burden and privilege of certain kinds of colonized and racialized 
subjectivities that allow us to speak as both insiders and outsiders, as transnational intellectuals 
and as representatives of specific national and/or local constituencies” (1998: 86).  While I cannot 
claim to comfortably “speak as both insider and outsider” in fieldwork interactions, Juluri’s 
elimination of binary divisions aptly captures some of the complexities involved in diasporic 
research in post-colonial contexts. My own ‘multiple identities’ are borne as much out of my 
heritage as growing up in an ethnically diverse community in London and eventually living and 
working in various international settings, which served to shape my positionality in certain ways 
that were amenable to my ‘insiderness’ but in others placed me firmly as an outsider. The blurring 
of insider/outside boundaries among diasporic members researching in the field is examined 
in depth by Henry (2003) and Sultana (2007), whose experiences of eliciting multiple 
questionings and confusion over their diasporic identity among research participants align 
closely with some aspects of my own fieldwork experiences. 
 
The malleability of identities (Crenshawe, 1991; Levitt, 2009) is as dependent on the participant 
as well as the context, and the ways I was pulled between insider and outsider identities were 
often beyond my control. I could downplay or exaggerate certain aspects of my identity according 
to the situation, such as my student status, and though pragmatic, this potentially raises ethical 
concerns. Gender, age and ethnicity are generally (more) static identities that were interpreted, 
and harnessed, in different ways. In addition, another layer of relational constructions with 
participants was generated by my interpreters who would bring their own set of identity markers.  
For example, my religious identity was more a point of interest in Ahmedabad than in Nashik, 
and together with my Muslim interpreter, I emphasised this part of my identity, peppering my 
conversations with traditional Islamic (Arabic) greetings and phrases and using Muslim social 
and cultural codes in my engagement with Muslim participants, particularly in areas such as 




women – my Ahmedabad interpreter, Nusrat72 and I both have Arabic names and Nusrat 
sometimes wore a hijab – I was warned of the risks in areas of historically Hindu areas where 
ethnic tensions and violence were rife. This perceived threat was generated not by my own 
experience in the locality itself but by warnings from Nusrat and other well-intentioned 
informants and contacts.  
 
In the field, I was an outsider in terms of my citizenship and the Western (British) culture I belong 
to and in terms of being an ‘urbanite’ growing up in a cosmopolitan and ethnically diverse part of 
London.  The Indian Bengali culture itself is also vastly different to that of Gujarat’s or 
Maharashtra’s. Particular social markers linked with Britishness and the Bengali identity were 
often affixed when speaking with key informants, community members and elites. Most 
importantly, my need for an interpreter in many situations immediately placed, and continually 
reinforced, my identity in the outsider category. Henry’s accounts of conducting fieldwork in 
India as a member of the diaspora and the ‘double consciousness’ it involves resonate closely 
with my own experiences of positionality among research participants (2003: 235).  
 
In addition to language; my posture, clothing style, accent and way of speaking singled me out as 
an outsider; a Westerner, or even an ‘urbanite’ from cosmopolitan Mumbai or Delhi. However, 
my ‘insiderness’ was enabled by access to a wealth of cultural and social capital in India thanks 
to a widespread network of contacts from different diaspora groups originating in India, as well 
as my familiarity with the country. Cultural competence – the shared interpretation of codes and 
behavioural norms of a given cultural context - can serve as a “subtle but powerful marker of 
positioning” and according to Carling et al., can draw outsiders across the divide (2014: 47). I 
shared some cultural competence in terms of my identity and ethnicity, previous experience and 
access to social capital. Such markers included food preference, acknowledgement of festivals 
and awareness of cultural norms regarding wedding festivities and clothing aesthetics. I also 
                                                     
72 As per ethical guidelines, throughout this thesis all names of research participants and assistants have been changed 




gained ‘insider’ appeal when I came across migrants from West Bengal as not only were we able 
to speak directly without the use of an interpreter, I was able to reference cultural markers and 
develop affinities with my participants.  
 
3.3.2. Gender and class 
In terms of gender, I was seen as ‘less threatening’ in certain situations but in others, the gendered 
risks for myself may have been heightened. The interpreters who assisted me throughout the 
course of the fieldwork inflected my gendered positionality in various ways – subtly pulling me 
either ‘inside’ or ‘outside’. In terms of gender, I could clearly see the difference between using a 
male and female interpreter in the different field sites. Working with a man enabled easier access 
to typically male-dominant areas such as certain areas of construction sites and ‘nakas.’ The 
perceived hierarchy of male authority in many communities also eased encounters with certain 
gatekeepers such as construction site owners, security guards, and labour contractors in nakas, 
but did not guarantee the building of trust necessary to conducting interviews. Yet gender 
perceptions would sometimes affect how I was seen when working with a male interpreter: an 
unmarried Western woman with a male colleague.  This is not to subscribe to dominant narratives 
of innate and “stringent” gender segregation in contemporary Indian society and work, but rather 
an observance of the norm of maintaining “real or decorous distance” between men and women 
(Altorki and Fawzi E-Solh, 1988: 5).  Working with an experienced woman interpreter allowed 
access to both men and women however, as I saw in my fieldwork, including to those in 
particularly sheltered and marginalised positions. For example, we developed a close relationship 
with a pregnant woman in Ahmedabad who was engaged in piece-rate garments work from home. 
Her condition (in accordance with social norms) and employment reinforced the domestic bounds 
of her daily routines, but through our engagement and congenial relationship we were also able 
to develop a close relationship with her husband and neighbours. 
 




of caste. Whilst I was somewhat ‘neutral’ in the aspect of caste (though not of class), due to my 
status first as a Western outsider and second, when divulged, as a Muslim, the status of my 
interpreters was an influence on my positionality.  In total I used three interpreters in all of the 
same field sites, working officially in that capacity (being made ‘official’ through remuneration) 
– two Hindu interpreters in Nashik, and one Muslim interpreter in Ahmedabad. One of the local 
interpreters I used in Nashik, was Roshni, an English teacher in her fifties. Roshni belonged to 
the Brahmin caste and in our own conversations, it seemed to be an important part of her identity. 
Whilst, as instructed, she did not volunteer this aspect of her identity when we worked in the field, 
in one case she answered a direct question about her caste status by a participant and the attitude 
of the participant shifted perceptibly from one of congeniality to deference. In the cases of the 
other Hindu interpreter, caste identity, when divulged, served as a key to ‘insiderness’ with certain 
participants. The multiple social identity markers represented by the different interpreters I used 
further enriched my insights into how social interactions and experiences can be filtered through 
different categories of gender, class and religion among my participants.  
 
3.4. Reflections on fieldwork process 
I turn now to the empirical ways in which my positionality and the externalities of the research 
process itself may have influenced the findings and I address any impacts this may have had on 
validity. I argue that employing multi-method and multi-sited approach enabled me to address 
such concerns and facilitated an iterative learning process. I start with the experience of 
researching in each primary field-site, Nashik and Ahmedabad before concluding with overall 
reflections concerning the fieldwork.  
 
3.4.1 Reflections on Nashik 
Objectively, Nashik as a research site can be seen as a challenge for an outsider hoping to conduct 
qualitative research. Though rapid urbanisation was one of the criteria for selecting the city, the 




and it lacked a large civil society or prior research presence. Subjectively however, there were 
many benefits: I had direct professional contacts based in or linked to the city who could assist 
me in the process of mapping and research. While the overall civil society presence in Nashik is 
marginal and hard to access, one of the organisations that exist there is the Disha Foundation.   
This is a local NGO founded by an academic and works specifically with seasonal migrants and 
became known to me through academic contacts.  
 
At the time of fieldwork, the Disha Foundation had been established for 11 years and at its 
headquarters employed between 10 and 15 members of staff. The NGO ran and had concluded 
several projects and programmes including those focused on Aadhaar card enrolment and 
temporary ration cards for migrants, both within the city and in rural areas of the surrounding 
district. Disha Foundation had also forged strong links with the city’s District Collector at the 
time of my fieldwork. For the initial two months of my fieldwork, I resided in an annex of the 
NGOs office based in the outskirts of the city. Five members of the team took turns to assist me 
in the initial phase of mapping and site selection, piloting and developing the survey. In addition 
to providing shelter and transport, they were crucial informants in my research, providing local 
knowledge of the city and suggesting potential research sites.   
 
The Disha Foundation introduced me to six of the 15 cluster sites listed in Appendix Three. They 
ran or had concluded interventions in four of these sites, potentially introducing issues of bias. 
The remaining sites were identified through snowball techniques and upon the advice of local 
informants. The identification of sites was iterative and continued beyond my introductory phase 
with the Disha Foundation. As the initial sites became saturated, new sites were identified and as 
my confidence and familiarity with Nashik grew, I was able to identify sites independently. I 
gathered information on nakas, informal slum settlements where local labourers might live, and 
smaller construction sites from the participants I engaged with in my first round of visits. I 




where they lived. 
 
In the sites selected through the NGO, the participants were familiar to the NGO and initially 
selected deterministically rather than randomly. The participants themselves may also have been 
conditioned through their sensitisation to particular issues and aspects that NGO project 
engagement would involve – such as selectively sharing information regarding socio-economic 
status in order to benefit from a programme.  The risk of saturation is already present when a 
community has been researched or approached by NGOs regularly and I proceeded to map sites 
independently after the initial four sites were introduced to me as I became more familiar with the 
city. After my initial phase with assistance from the NGO, I employed two interpreters – varying 
in skill, experience and professionalism - who also acted as local assistants and advised me of 
locations they knew which might be suitable for the study.  
 
The social context and institutional infrastructure of Nashik posed particular logistical challenges 
at the time of fieldwork: initially I could not find a suitable interpreter once my introductory phase 
with the NGO had ended. As a developing city with many peri-urban parts, there are few 
Westerners and expatriates integrated into the city, thus highlighting my ‘outsiderness’ further 
creating implications in terms of reflexivity and risk. There were occasions where I was made to 
feel unsafe or the risky underside of the city revealed itself to me. Travelling with a contractor on 
the way to a research site where he asked probing questions about my personal life and invited 
me to dinner (though introduced to me via known contacts and in the day time hours) was one 
such incident that prevented me from making a return visit to that particular site.  
 
3.4.2 Reflections on Ahmedabad 
My positionality as a researcher had evolved by the time I arrived in Ahmedabad, since I had 
accumulated confidence, experience and practical awareness of empirical issues. The sequential 




whilst still maintaining a consistency of practices, sampling and data collection strategies across 
both field-sites. In Ahmedabad, I lacked the initial support from a direct NGO contact that I 
benefitted from in Nashik, with the Disha Foundation.  I therefore gathered a set of initial contacts 
working with local NGOs in the city through my existing social capital (a dimension of my 
‘insiderness’) -  a network of personal and professional contacts, and from reaching out directly 
to organisations and individuals.  Through this process I was able to procure a reliable and 
experienced interpreter who had previously worked with NGOs and was familiar with working 
in low-income communities in Ahmedabad.  
 
In the process of independently reaching out to a range of contacts in Ahmedabad, I was able to 
conduct a series of KIIs with local activists, NGOS and academics. I initiated my mapping process 
by meeting with the largest local NGOs working directly with migrants, the urban poor and food 
security in the city: the local branch of Rajasthan-based NGO Aajeevika Bureau, PRAYAS and 
the Human Development and Research Centre. My timing in Ahmedabad was also fortuitous as 
it coincided with the fifth annual Convention on the Right to Food, held approximately 26 
kilometres away from the city of Ahmedabad. I was able to attend the convention and liaise further 
with local activists and NGOs working on the issue of PDS access, including the issue of food 
security for brick kiln labourers (a group dominated if not entirely populated by seasonal 
migrants).  
 
I adopted a strategy similar to the one used in Nashik and targeted construction sites, nakas and 
slum settlements for recruiting participants. In this case, I had access to a more diverse network 
of informants to initiate and guide the fieldwork process as well for providing contextual 
information. I forged links with the PRAYAS Centre for Labour Research and Action, focused 
on labour rights in the informal economy (‘unorganised economy’ in Indian parlance) - many of 
whom are migrants. Similarly to the Disha Foundation in Nashik, PRAYAS helped me gain a 




staff members from the organisation took turns to assist me in the initial site selection and 
snowballing process. The organisation introduced me to two brick kiln sites close to the city, in 
one of which they had links with labour migrants. The NGO also advised of other potential areas 
and research sites in the city. In addition to these two sites, the NGO also introduced me to a large 
construction site, ‘Site Two’73, where they were attempting to forge links with the labourers but 
had not been able officially launch an intervention. The other 12 cluster sites were selected 
through a combination of my interpreter’s local knowledge and prior experience, direct 
observation while travelling through the city and snowballing at nakas with local informants.  
 
In some ways my access to data and participants was made easier than in Nashik due to an 
established civil society presence in the city, and my personal situation was in relatively more 
comfortable in terms of logistics, due to Ahmedabad’s relatively more developed status. 
However, during my time in Ahmedabad, the threat of potential risks (or at least the lurking sense 
of them) were generated by a mix of well-intentioned cautions and fear-mongering shared by key 
informants and personal contacts. This was perhaps heightened in the tense pre-election period of 
spring 2014. I was advised by one contact that I should hide my Muslim identity when seeking 
accommodation and when speaking in everyday circumstances. Though this sense of threat was 
unsubstantiated by any direct empirical experiences in my own fieldwork, it is important to 
reflexively acknowledge the influence it may have had in further highlighting specific social and 
cultural issues in the city of Ahmedabad.  
 
3.4.3. Fieldwork considerations and challenges 
Overall in both sites I consulted local NGOs and organisations to help identify my sampling sites, 
seek, or act as, interpreters during the initial scoping phase and to establish a foothold in the local 
‘field’ context. While there were variations in the degree of access and level of independence I 
had in each site these are explained by the iterative and sequential nature of the fieldwork and 
                                                     




highlight the differing contextual factors in each site. The sampling process was also characterised 
to some degree by opportunism (though by and large within purposive limits). By this I mean I 
tried not to ignore any opportunities to engage with migrant communities when I came across 
them due to time and logistical constraints and not knowing if such a chance arise again. The most 
significant example of this is the community of brick kiln workers I engaged with over four 
months in Ahmedabad. The specific precarities of brick kiln workers, often categorised as 
‘bonded labourers’ (ILO, 2009; Bremen, 2010) are the subject of various literatures and advocacy 
movements. They are distinct from other semi-skilled and unskilled labourers represented in my 
fieldwork. The research design allowed for a heterogeneity of participant categories in order to 
understand the different degrees to which migrants interact with access structures, and enables 
comparison with other types of migrants, outside of geographical contexts. 
 
The gender breakdown of my sample is uneven, with more male participants in both the migrant 
and non-migrant categories. This can be attributed to both the sampling strategy and empirics. A 
more gender-balanced picture emerges in the qualitative phase where most interviews were held 
in the household or place of residence (attached to the place of work in the case of the construction 
sites and brick kilns). Overall, the proportion of female participants is higher among the non-
migrant category which can be attributed to the relative ease of accessing women in their homes 
rather than at labour sites or labour markets. At certain nakas, the women would be outnumbered 
by men and usually concentrated in one area of the naka to avoid hassle and verbal abuse from 
men. Those who were willing to speak with us at nakas were mainly engaged in domestic work, 
such as cleaning, and some in the construction sector as helpers and unskilled workers. The lack 
of trust and confidence was visible, compared with the male participants at nakas. 
 
Access to male participants was generally easier in construction sites and brick kilns. The women 
and girls typically migrated as households, and usually volunteered the male members of their 




Women contributed in the surveys and interviews in such settings, but the primary participants’ 
name was recorded hence the bias toward male participants in the quantitative phase. In these 
cases, I relied more heavily upon direct observations and unstructured and brief engagements 
gathered over time in order to improve my understanding of the gendered dynamics in spaces of 
labour and domesticity. The findings broadly fit with the macro-level data on a high number of 
male migrants and family migrants, and smaller number of female lone migrants (Bhagat, 2012) 
– the latter category of participant, usually widows or separated from their husbands, were 
observed in the local labourer category.  
 
As mentioned in Chapter One, the fieldwork took place in the months leading up to a historically 
significant national election, of particular relevance in the state of Gujarat as its Chief Minister 
was running for national government. I kept in mind, when discussing attitudes, experiences and 
wishes regarding the state and social programmes, the politicking and electioneering activities of 
local leaders particularly in large slums which often serve as ‘vote banks’ (Chatterjee, 2004; Boo, 
2012).  Another consideration relates to information and awareness. Though lack of awareness 
on policies is identified as a major theme in my qualitative findings (among both bureaucrats and 
communities), I myself as researcher was also limited by a lack of awareness regarding 
programmes and recent changes in government programmes – both official and unofficial. The 
mix of methods and key informant interviews helped to counter such shortcomings by allowing 
me to draw from a diverse range of institutional and individual sources.   
 
The implications involved in constructing selfhood (Reissman, 1990) are particularly resonant in 
analysing self-reported narratives. This lends itself to the constructivist nature of the enquiry as 
well as the methods themselves. Omission and exaggeration are also significant considerations in 
self-reported findings where participants can exaggerate or underline their deprivations as far as 
possible to gain attention, a platform for their voice to be heard or at best inclusion into whatever 




or modify income amounts for sympathy or attention. In situations where I first approached a 
slum settlement space and spoke with participants (pre-arranged with them individually at their 
place of work), attraction would be generated through gossip and hearsay. The mention of ration 
cards as the subject of my research would then mutate into new stories of how my interpreter and 
I came from an agency – either government or charity – providing ration cards for the community. 
Passers-by and neighbours would gather and, in most cases, enrich the interviews I conducted, 
with additional insights and anecdotes. The informal ‘participants’ would also act as additional 
interpreters, explaining or clarifying certain terms that may not be familiar or providing practical 
information – such as the address of a local ration shop, both providing a sense of the wider 
community context and amplifying the findings. However, in certain cases, such ‘participants’ 
would disrupt or distort the interview process, compromising the validity of the process but at the 
same providing a new insight into the ways in which community members lives’ are entwined.  
 
In order to mitigate the spread of misinformation among communities that I researched, it proved 
an effective strategy to use multiple methods and visits, and in some cases, corroboration with 
gatekeepers and other community members to ensure clarity of information. The most important 
strategy was taking time to explain clearly what my purpose and identity as a researcher was to 
avoid confusion; and to be precise about what I could and could not offer, taking cues from 
Mosse’s findings on ethnographic work with disadvantaged communities in India (2005).  
Accounting for these potential challenges to validity and process can help reveal some of the 
complexities involved in the empirical findings and also enable understandings of how local and 





4. BARRIERS TO ACCESS IN SITES OF PRECARIOUS LABOUR 
 
In this chapter, I present the evidence regarding the loose category of labour migrants at the higher 
end of the ‘spectrum’ I introduce in Chapter One. This category consists of generally semi- and 
unskilled labour labourers working in precarious sites of labour such as construction sites and 
brick kilns. These sites represent precariousness in multiple ways: in a bodily sense in terms of 
physical injury hazards and the risk of poor health outcomes; in terms of lack of state protection 
either though enforced laws or programmes like the PDS; their remoteness (in terms of 
connectivity) from city centres, and resources and services; and also at an individual level, they 
are sites of labour that is precarious in an existential sense (Giddens, 1991; Ettlinger, 2007). 
 
Overall, the labourers, both migrant and local, across the spectrum based on my findings, face 
two important types of barriers to the PDS. As outlined in Chapter One, the first type of barrier is 
mainly structural and operates at the level of programme design. The second, more insidious, type 
of barrier operates at the level of implementation and can be characterised as both social and 
structural. In the process of implementation, policies set at central or state level are manipulated 
by local arbiters to deny access to social protection claimants. These gatekeepers include local 
governance actors and their co-opted agents both official (Fair Price Shop owners, or 
‘dukandaars'), and unofficial (brokers and agents). Both migrants and local communities 
described repeated encounters with hostile or indifferent gatekeepers revealing how barriers exist 
even for those with official access, such as a valid ration card. However, as migrants are 
vulnerable to both barriers, they face a ‘double disadvantage.’ This initial empirical chapter 
focuses on labour migrants in Ahmedabad and Nashik that experience barriers in some of the 
most intensive forms, and thus can be considered among the most vulnerable groups in my overall 






Table 4.1: Typical characteristics of migrants in precarious sites 
Characteristic Migrants - Precarious sites of labour 
Age 18-30 years (70%)  
Gender Male (78%) Female (21.9%) 
Religion Hindu (83.3%) Muslim (14.6%) 
Migrant duration Less than 1 year (39.6%)  1-4 years (36.5%) 
Frequency of visits 4 times a year (80%) 
Type of migrant Inter-state (66.7%) 
Reason for migration Livelihood (55%) Family (24%) 
Marital Status Married (70.8%) Single (24%) 
Education Dropout from primary school (26%) 
Illiterate (22.9%) 
Average income per month More than INR 5000 (67%) 
Average days of work per month 25 days plus (65%) 
Ration card possession Yes (74%) 
 
As Table 4.1 shows, the migrants in precarious sites are typically in the youngest age bracket; 
male; Hindu and recent arrivals in the city (less than one year, or 1-4 years). Among the groups 
of migrants represented on my ‘spectrum’ of findings – the highest proportion of recent migrants 
(in the city for less than one year) are found in this category: working in construction sites and 
brick kilns. They typically earn in the highest income bracket, are predominantly inter-state 
migrants and in terms of education, mainly illiterate or have completed up to primary school 
education. Migrants in ‘precarious sites’ usually have their place of work and residence conflated, 
and such labourers are usually bound to seasonal contracts. In the case of brick kilns, payment is 
linked to specific productivity targets. These conditions of contract labour mean the work is 
comparatively ‘stable’ in terms of availability and in this sense the nature of precariousness is 
different compared with more casualised forms of labour where the number of days available is 
not reliable.  
 
4.1. Barriers by design and implementation  




errors arise from flawed BPL census measures as well as discretionary implementation behaviours 
thus creating “maps of inclusion and exclusion” (Corbridge et al., 2005: 27).  The PDS targets 
households rather than individuals, typically obscuring the “stories” and needs of women who 
typically head households (ibid). As observed in Nashik and Ahmedabad, gendered and 
exclusionary design flaws are compounded by implementation barriers which affect processes for 
recording household additions, either through marriage or birth. Despite recurring debates on 
whether social protection approaches are best targeted or universal, the findings show both can 
yield unintended exclusionary results (Dreze and Khera, 2010; de Haan, 2011). 
 
The barriers of design also lock out migrants due to the need for proof of local residence 
(MacAuslan, 2011). When labour migrants arrive at their destination they require numerous 
documents to prove their identity in the absence of a fixed place of address. The same rule 
generally applies for other rights, benefits and resources including voting in elections; enrolling 
children in schools and proving nationality. Despite the introduction of nationwide programme 
innovations intended to improve the portability of social protection, such as the Aadhaar card and 
state-wide initiatives introduced in Gujarat and Maharashtra, barriers of design continue to 
exclude migrants.  
 
The migrants described in this chapter include inter-state, and intra-state migrants (the latter 
typically hailing from drought-stricken regions in western Gujarat and central Maharashtra). They 
are compelled to move for livelihood purposes and receive a relatively higher wage than they 
would ‘back home.’ In light of this, many seem resigned to the fact that state entitlements, such 
as the ration card, will not figure in their urban lives. Instead, those who have rural ration cards 
strategically retain them for use by sedentary household members such as children and elder 
relatives. Despite being among those in need of social protection, a lack of access to the PDS 
constitutes just one of a range of barriers faced by such vulnerable groups. In certain precarious 




thekedars (with whom most labourers interact in place of direct relations with employers) are 
referred to as family members. Thekedars are often part of local networks from the place of origin 
and embedded deeply within community or family networks (Gupta, 2003). The nature of such 
labour relations becomes more informalised and consequently the bargaining power of labourers 
can become inversely weaker. Wages become conflated with debts accrued by taking advance 
loans, and become blurred in the language of the labourers themselves, highlighting a deficit of 
awareness among such groups, who are usually illiterate. 
 
The labourers in this category work and live in acutely resource-poor settings, hazardous 
conditions and in many cases, lack basic infrastructure such as sewage systems. The locations of 
the most vulnerable among these workers are in large sprawling microcosms of precariousness, 
remote from the resources and infrastructure available in city centres. Most significantly, their 
vulnerabilities include a lack of access to basic healthcare, potentially intensifying the long-term 
effects of poor or inadequate nutrition in the absence of PDS access. Other services such as 
education and child-care facilities can be limited for household migrants despite legal stipulations 
to provide on-site crèche facilities for construction workers (Betancourt et al., 2013). The nature 
of labour isolates migrant groups from developed urban resources, infrastructure and spaces 
where they can try to procure entitlements, even those such as the state-wide mobile ration 
schemes established in Gujarat and Maharashtra. The isolated settings also compound the 
vulnerabilities of women and children, who tend to be less empowered to be mobile and build 
awareness of their broader surroundings.  
 
A large proportion of construction workers on the sites I observed were inter-state migrants, a 
finding that aligns with evidence from elsewhere in India (Mitra, 2010; Hirway et al., 2014). 
Among large concentrations of inter-state migrants, experiences of security and identity-based 
barriers due to a lack of valid documentation are common, reported mostly by lone male migrants 




migrants from West Bengal articulated the heightened importance of ration cards and similar 
documents to prove their national identities in the face of discrimination from authorities’ hostile 
to Bangladeshi so-called ‘illegal’ migrants (described by Sadiq, 2008; Abbas, 2016). In the 
context of Maharashtra’s nativist politics, and recent violence targeting Muslim migrants from 
the UP and Bihar in Nashik, these barriers illustrate nuanced differences with the type of social 
tensions that pervade Ahmedabad, no less ridden with social hostilities but less overtly nativist 
and anti-migrant.  
 
Opportunistic methods allowed me to observe migrant workers in brick kiln sites on the outskirts 
of the city in Ahmedabad. Brick kilns in India have been named as sites of ‘modern-day slavery’ 
and debt-bondage (ILO, 2009; Breman, 2010), experienced mainly by inter-state migrant 
workers. Wages in this sector are low and often do not provide accumulative livelihood options. 
Working conditions are highly hazardous and isolated from urban services and resources but a 
diversity of experiences, and vulnerabilities, can be observed. Labourers were situated along 
regional lines, similar to the layout of labour in construction sites and nakas. The experiences of 
migrant brick-kiln workers varied according their state of origin, social identities and generational 
forms of labour – all themselves interconnected factors. As such, the strategies and level of agency 
deployed to overcome deeply entrenched barriers and access resources were linked to these 
factors.  
 
4.1.1 Relations in precarious sites of labour 
Construction is the second biggest industrial sector in India after agriculture, employing 50 
million in the year 2011-2012 (Soundararajan, 2013, cited in Srivastava and Sutradhar, 2016). 
According to trade union estimates cited by Betancourt et al. (2013), there are 40 million inter-
state migrants working in the construction sector.  Labour is often procured by thekedars on a 
seasonal or long-term basis. Many of the construction projects observed in Ahmedabad and 




cases, as with younger and unskilled migrants, there are advance payment agreements where 
expenses (kharcha) are paid instead of wages to help pay off the debt accrued by the advance. 
Construction workers borrow advance loans from their thekedars or family members to finance 
their initial move. The high wage differential is not the only factor instigating both individual and 
household migrants to enter construction work, but for many, it offers a viable, relatively stable 
temporary livelihood option in the absence of such options in drought-stricken villages. As 
described in Chapter One, the extant literature suggests that migrants in construction are relatively 
less poor and vulnerable than other groups of labour migrants – many are small-holders and will 
have had access to assets, often sold to fund the initial migration (Pattenden, 2012) and wages in 
this sector are relatively high. These findings hold in my own observations of construction 
workers but various forms of vulnerability beyond economic terms are highlighted, and also show 
that different levels of skills afford differentiated wages. Among the youngest and lowest-skilled 
migrant workers (the latter predominately from tribal groups), wages are low and comparable 
with other forms of migrant labour in the informal sector. In addition, many small-holders could 
not derive crops for subsistence or accumulation from their land due to drought or lack of access 
to irrigation systems. 
 
In the brick kiln sector, my observations showed that contractual arrangements are usually based 
on a hefty advance payment, paid off through labour. Receiving kharcha instead of regular wages 
is sometimes practiced and operates as a modality for deceiving labourers out of the wages they 
are entitled to in this sector (based on interviews with labour organisation, PRAYAS).  Overall, 
the brick kiln sector in South Asia has been labelled as a model of debt bondage (ILO, 2009), 
often inter-generational and is considered among the most vulnerable and precarious forms of 
labour, along all axes of definition. My findings however show a spectrum experiences of 
vulnerability and barriers faced by migrants working in the brick kilns.  
 




surveys with migrants, and observations of their environments. The evidence gathered illustrates 
experiences with various types of barriers, within specific labour-market and spatial settings in 
Nashik and Ahmedabad. Starting off with construction workers in Nashik, and then Ahmedabad, 
the chapter then presents the findings from two brick kiln sites in Ahmedabad. The chapter 
concludes by comparing the experiences of migrants in this ‘precarious sites of labour’ category 
in each city, examining how a confluence of factors interact with institutional barriers situates 
these migrants at the higher end of my spectrum-based assemblage of empirical findings.  
 
4.2. Locked out from the city in Site One, Nashik  
In Nashik, the construction workers I engaged with were overwhelmingly recent migrant workers 
(44% of the sample) who had arrived in the previous 12 months. Most of the migrant workers 
were inter-state migrants (57% of the subset) and predominantly worked over 20 days in an 
average. They were paid the highest and second highest bracket of daily wages (55% and 34% 
respectively). As an expanding city, construction sites, on individual, small and large scales were 
a common sight across Nashik I visited a handful of micro-scale construction sites across Nashik 
but the main construction site I observed in Nashik was ‘Site One74’.   
 
The sites observed in Nashik were members of the Confederation of Real Estate Developers’ 
Associations of India (CREDAI) board – an industrial group whose aims include ensuring 
minimum standards of health and safety on private construction sites.75 They are also subject to 
both state and federal laws on the protection of construction workers’ welfare, namely the 
Maharashtra Building and Other Construction Workers (Regulation of Employment and 
Conditions of Service) Rules, established in 2007, under the national Building and Other 
Construction Workers Act (1996).76  However various contraventions of such laws and principles 
were both directly observed and reported by participants. This suggests migrant workers on 
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construction sites in Maharashtra face a specific range of disadvantages in that they lack effective 
protection both at state and federal levels.  
 
Site One is a mega-sized residential development project owned by a local construction company. 
The construction site is based in the south-west of Nashik city in a rapidly developing area at the 
time of my visit in 2013. The development had been launched in December 2011 and according 
to the proposal, was projected to cover 59,522 square metres and cost over Rs, 82 crores77 
resulting in a building of 287 flats.78 The planning permission documents stipulated that all 
sanitary and hygienic measures for construction workers should be in place before work 
commenced. The provision also required housing for construction workers to be provided onsite 
with adequate amenities and facilities such as infrastructure for cooking, toilets; safe drinking 
water; healthcare and crèche facilities, as stated in the State of Maharashtra environmental 
clearance for the project.   However, empirical observations and findings from interviews and 
surveys showed divergences from these stipulations.  
 
The migrant construction workers at Site One reside in a ‘labour camp’. The camp is adjacent to 
the construction site itself and at the time of my visit consisted of approximately over 500 resident 
workers. The workers were predominantly inter-state migrants mainly from UP, Bihar and West 
Bengal, and intra-state migrants from drought-stricken regions in Maharashtra such as Beed and 
Washim. They represent a mix of both household migrants and lone male migrants. The migrants 
were typically engaged in fixed-contract labour arrangement lasting approximately twelve 
months. However, the reported wages varied, possibly depending on individual contracted 
agreements.  
 
In my initial visits, the site appeared to represent a microcosm of a select few resources, provided 
mainly by local NGO, the Disha Foundation. The site was officially overseen by two safety 
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officers and at the time of my observation, the NGO had provided support in terms of an on-site 
crèche (anganwadi) for labourers’ children and safety training and medical service interventions. 
Disha Foundation also mentioned they had covered the medical costs of workers who sustained 
injuries on site, at the time of my visit. However, without strong corporate backing from the 
construction company itself and state commitment, these interventions were limited and 
occasional. The anganwadi itself, a vital resource in the ‘community’ of the construction site 
faced difficulties in accessing resources and in sustainability. 
 
Figure 4.1: Site One construction site, labourer camp (Credit: Nabeela Ahmed, October 2013) 
 
 
The camp appears to be organised in a series of rows of cramped shelters constructed from canvas 
and corrugated metal, as depicted in Figure 4.1. Water and sanitation facilities were not visible 
on my multiple visits over four months. The rows seem to be arranged in terms of migrants’ 
origin, so there was a row of inter-state migrants from Bihar, and those who were from 
Maharashtra would be located in different rows in a separate part of the camp. I observed that the 




to the construction work itself, the anganwadi and the main road outside of Site One. The lanes 
where mostly lone male migrants lived were relatively more cramped and less sanitary. Lone male 
migrants would band together to share shelter (and living costs) in the way a family household 
would. The anganwadi was roughly 20 square metres across and made from corrugated metal and 
would also occasionally serve as a meeting place and medical clinic.  The lanes provide an 
important source of informal ‘protection’ and were seen to encourage a sense of communality at 
the ‘intra-lane’ level that evokes the descriptions of similar construction sites in Delhi (Betancourt 
et al., 2013).  
 
Nima79 is one of the inhabitants of the Site One site. She and her husband Atif migrated to Nashik 
from their hometown of Garri in Bihar and they had no access to rations in both Bihar, and in 
Nashik. Their son of around ten years of age had migrated with them whilst their younger daughter 
remained at home with Nima’s mother; an example of the ‘split household’ migration that seems 
to be common among migrants from Northern states (de Haan, 2004). At the time of our meeting, 
Nima and her husband had been in Site One for approximately seven months. Prior to this they 
were based in Mumbai where Atif engaged in construction work. The household lacked a ration 
card due to a combination of family dynamics and institutional barriers. Nima’s mother-in-law 
passed on the family ration card to her side of the family – her brothers – rather than her children, 
after becoming widowed. As a result, Atif and Nima’s names were absent from the ration card 
linked to their Bihar home. Though they were eager to acquire a ration card in Nashik, they were 
not sure of the procedures.  
“Household costs are much more without the ration card, [but] there 
is no-one to ask about the ration card here - after we came here we 
never asked about it. […] In the village, my ration card name is 
cancelled.  I left it and did not try because I am always away from the 
village and don't have time to go through all this.  I have not asked 
how to get it here in Nashik but in Bihar I know you have to go the 
gram panchayat to get the ration card […] In Bihar, the cost of food 
is much less, but the standard of living here is higher” (Atif, Bihar).  
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When probed about what was meant about the ‘standard of living’ Atif explained the wages were 
higher than in his home town. Atif seemed aware of the processes involved in Bihar and did not 
explain why he had not made enquiries in Nashik, though he seemed to have at least a vague idea 
of the location of the relevant municipal offices – known locally as the ‘CBS’ (central bus stand) 
court’ (due to the Nashik Municipal Corporation’s proximity to the CBS). The trade-off he accepts 
between higher wages and higher food prices appears to be common among rural-urban migrants 
(Varshney, 1995).  
 
Nima’s and Atif’s son attended the anganwadi along with the youngest daughter of Reema and 
her husband. Reema is in her early thirties when we met, and originates from West Bengal. With 
her husband, she first moved to Goa for construction work and eventually to Nashik. Reema 
claimed she and her husband have acquired separate ration cards linked to their home in West 
Bengal, but only possessed a photocopy - or ‘xerox’ as it is colloquially known - version with 
them in Nashik. The ration card’s main use in Nashik is as proof of identity when necessary, for 
example when opening a bank account. Like Nima and Atif, Reema was cognisant but accepting 
of the food price differential in Nashik, despite the lack of access to rations. “I buy my groceries 
from the open market - what can I do? It’s more expensive but we have to eat.” Overall, Reema 
displayed a resigned attitude to the lack of ration card in Nashik and claimed not to know where 
the ’CBS court’ was, or indeed much of her surroundings beyond Site One.  
 
Aasif is a lone male migrant from Bihar and had been based in Nashik for two years when we 
met. His wife and baby daughter live in his home village. Aasif was previously based in Mumbai, 
and prior to that in Khandala, a hill station in the Pune district. His situation, like many others at 
Site One, aligns with the stereotypical Bihari migrant profile as outlined by de Haan: “a single 
male migrant who has left his family behind to take care of his generally small property” (2004: 
205).  Though Aasif’s wife and child had previously lived with him in a rental home when he was 




home. Aasif claimed the rent and maintenance costs of keeping his wife and family with him 
added a further Rs, 4000-5000 to his monthly expenditure - money that would go further in Bihar 
when sent as remittances.  
 
For Aasif, it appears that rent is more of a financial concern than food, even without access to a 
ration card.  The difference in food costs between his home in Bihar and Nashik was 
approximately Rs, 8 per kilogram of rice according to Aasif’s estimates. Though some of Aasif’s 
natal family members from home used a ration card, some family members’ names, including his 
own, are not on the card.  Aasif described various barriers to access in his home village - including 
those posed by a corrupt and nepotistic gram panchayat (village council) leader or ‘sarpanch’ 
and lack of knowledge among his family members of how to correctly acquire or update a ration 
card. His wife and family relied upon his remittances for help with household costs including food 
expenditure.  
 
Zaarib, a lone male migrant from West Bengal, first left his home town in 2004 and had been 
based in Nashik (at the Site One site) for one year. Zaarib’s wife and young children also remained 
in his home village. The ration card linked to his native household was being used by his widowed 
and non-working mother and the rations were distributed amongst the labourers who worked on 
her small-hold. Previously Zaarib was based Dombivli, Mumbai for five years.  Like Reema, 
Zaarib also displayed an air of resignation regarding the lack of ration card access in Nashik. He 
purchased food from the open market, which was considered expensive but there was “no other 
option.” Zaarib recounted other barriers by design experienced by inter-state migrants working in 
construction in lacking a ration card. 
 
“If we apply for a ration card we have to submit documents: 
electricity bill, light bill, room number, residential permit address.  
There is no fixed address, so I did not apply for ration card. We asked 
the local people [about what the requirements were]. We have not 
approached any agent, or office basically. Even when we apply for 




therefore for ration card we will need to do this.”  
 
According to what Zaarib had heard from fellow labourers, it would cost between Rs, 200-400 to 
access a ration card - though in actuality it is a free entitlement -   from an agent. In place of a 
ration card, Zaarib relied upon his maddan card as proof of identity – a document of heightened 
value for migrants, particularly from West Bengal who often are suspected of being ‘illegal’ 
Bangladeshi immigrants (Sadiq, 2008; Abbas, 2016).  
 
“We have an election card here only whenever we migrate to a place, 
when we arrive, people always ask, are you from Bangladesh or 
India? In these cases, the identity card - the election card - is very 
necessary.” (Zaarib) 
 
Migrants from West Bengal commonly face extensive questioning and screening from hostile 
authorities. Others in the same ‘West Bengal’ lane at Site One echoed the tensions expressed by 
Zaarib experienced at the hands of authorities. Initially they were reticent in speaking about their 
place of origin and what documents they owned, but eventually revealed this was due to an 
ongoing sense of fear and insecurity.  
 
In a separate lane on the other side of the camp, a similar lack of awareness regarding how to 
acquire a ration card in Nashik was displayed by those who are from within Maharashtra. The 
state-wide temporary ration card (TRC) project, introduced in Chapter One, was unheard of 
among inter-district migrants such as Kavita and Manish.  They hailed from Washim, a drought-
stricken region of Maharashtra and first arrived three years ago with their three young children. 
According to Kavita, they never left the Site One grounds when in Nashik, apart from occasional 
visits to the Civil Hospital, a local government hospital in the city centre. Though the hospital is 
actually located close to the NMC offices (which deals with ration card processing) this was not 
known to Kavita and Manish. Kavita explained they were able to employ strategies to overcome 




in their native household, managed by Manish’s parents – “it is better for the elders to make use 
of it” (Kavita). This way the couple could diversify household income, mitigate overall household 
costs and address their elder household members’ needs while earning for themselves in Nashik.  
 
Barriers to ration access are faced both in migrant places of origin as well as in Nashik. When 
describing the situation in her home village, Kavita described how their local dukandaar in their 
home village withholds items they are entitled to such as sugar and lentils. This exemplifies 
barriers to ration amounts even at the front-line of PDS implementation. Overall, experiences of 
ration card access among inter-state migrants interviewed were mixed and many reported issues 
of institutional barriers to accessing actual PDS subsidies, rather than the ration card. Migrants 
from Bihar reported institutional barriers such as problems with corruption within their local gram 
panchayats and lack of access to representatives. In these circumstances, bribes are paid to 
procure ration cards that accurately reflect needs according to socio-economic category - a form 
of sabotage where households may have been granted the wrong ration cards and asked to pay 
bribes in order to correct this. As Atif explained: “The sarpanch and other leaders [at the block 
level] they scratch our names [from entitlement lists] and give it to someone else when we try and 
get the ration card.”  Atif’s wife, Nima, also detailed the bribery demanded by agents acting on 
behalf of gram panchayat representatives and posing local barriers to access for Nima’s ‘native’ 
household. Whilst labourers such as Nima and Atif have limited access to social networks in 
Nashik that go beyond Site One, they possess similarly low social capital in their hometown, at 
least with regard to accessing social entitlements.  
 
Barriers to PDS access can also exist within households. Institutional processes can exclude 
married women i.e. ‘daughters-in-law’, from inter-generational household ration cards. Parents 
and ration card holders can confer ration card rights at their discretion. In the case of Nima, her 
mother-in-law decided to leave her ration cards with her brothers (Atif’s uncles) rather than her 




Bengal, who claimed her household had access to two ration cards, both her husband’s and the 
card inherited from her own parents. In my fieldwork it was unusual to hear such open and 
confident declarations of owning duplicate ration cards and suggests there are varying levels of 
awareness regarding formal rules.  
 
The use of agents to acquire ration cards signifies institutional failings and barriers in ‘native’ 
contexts for migrants (as well as strategic agency on the part of migrants, as discussed in Chapter 
Seven). Bhaskar, a labourer from Washim conflated reference to agents and brokers with 
government officials in order to procure a ration card in his home village. He explained how he 
acquired his ration card for a nominal fee (Rs, 50) from a local ‘dealer’ and also referred to him 
as a government official in the same conversation. This conflation represents the blurring of state 
and non-state lines in the perception of the poor, and is exploited by those in relative power. Such 
misrepresentations of the state are “actively produced through current patterns of social 
exclusion” (Corbridge et al., 2005: 112). 
 
Though some hostilities were faced by ration card holders in terms of treatment by ‘semi-
institutional’ actors such as dukandaars and in terms of the management of rations themselves; 
most of the Site One workers interviewed reported favourable experiences with dukandaars in 
their native towns. They were described as generally cooperative and explained transparently 
when supplies of grains fell short. Rehaan is 25 years old and unmarried at the time of our meeting. 
He hailed from the Purnia district in Bihar and previously worked in Mumbai before migrating to 
Nashik. While he expressed an urgent need for the ration card, Rehaan stated he does not know 
how to acquire one in Nashik – though he is familiar with the process in his home town. Though 
Rehaan visits home at regular intervals, he stated the journey is too long to transport grains from 
his home household rations.  Rehaan described an informal arrangement between his family and 
their local dukandaar in the interim period before they managed to acquire a ration card. The 




used by illiterate individuals) as a proxy for a ration card. The dukandaar was familiar with all 
community members and recognised Rehaan’s family were in need. Such networks and informal 
avenues are not accessible to Rehaan in Nashik however. He claimed he lacks the knowledge of 
the location and processes necessary to obtain a local ration card.  
 
Other barriers related to the lack of ration card are directly linked to the migrants’ status as 
‘outsiders.’ My interviews with local labourers and relatively long-term migrants showed the 
option of purchasing groceries on credit in times of difficulty. This was also considered a ‘lifeline’ 
for temporary migrants who are paid in an untimely manner, as was also observed among 
construction workers based in Delhi (Betancourt et al., 2013). However, this option is not 
immediately available to temporary construction workers when they arrive. Networks and 
relationships tend to need time to develop and become concrete. As a result, barriers are 
temporarily posed to both the open market as well as ration subsidies for migrants in their initial 
work period, increasing their vulnerabilities  
 
“We have to face so many problems because we are outsiders, we 
don’t know where to go for hospital, we had no information on the 
Civil Hospital at first [local government hospital] so we had to visit 
the private one for illness. We even face problems when we don’t 
have money to purchase food or groceries, we ask the dukandaar if 
we can buy on credit, and only as we come to know him we gain trust, 
so we can buy on credit, but we cannot buy in the first place when we 
arrive.” (Bhaskar, from Washim, Maharashtra) 
 
The migrants also face a lack of mobility, particularly along gendered lines, beyond the 
construction and camp site. Opportunities to venture into central Nashik seemed limited to 
healthcare visits. In family-based households, men usually took charge of shopping duties and 
any household expenditures overall. Being spatially restricted – either through time and work 
commitments, or lack of knowledge or readiness to explore a new area – also limits access to 
facilities and services as well social networks, beyond the individual lanes and life of the 




provided some on-site services, ’sightings’ of the government remained minimal, if at all.  A lack 
of awareness regarding the location of administrative offices in town, or where to even enquire 
about ration card procedures recurred throughout the findings from Site One.  
 
As mentioned above, hospital visits appear to be the most common destination for the labourers 
and their families in Nashik, outside of Site One. The city’s District Collector (DC) at the time of 
my fieldwork highlighted health as one of the “main social issues” facing labour migrants and 
their families in the city. Though the state of Maharashtra had set up health camps for labour 
migrants, the DC noted there was low take-up among the migrants themselves, particularly for 
nomadic tribes, as they were reluctant to use them (KII with DC, Nashik, February 2014). 
Consistent with findings on the urban poor overall (Rogaly et al., 2004; Unnithan, 2004, 
Pattenden, 2012), private medical care tends to be accessed over public facilities, plunging 
labourers into debt for longer-term and more costly treatments. Injuries are a common occurrence 
on the construction site, and in response, the local NGO provided training sessions and 
interventions in healthcare targeting three main areas: maternal health, infectious disease and 
occupational safety.  
 
My own observation of a malarial check-up and treatment session for Site One inhabitants found 
it had attracted a small crowd of people who gathered in the relatively small space of the   
anganwadi. However, the crowd seemed to represent only a small fraction of a workforce with 
an estimated 500 members (not including their families). The NGO themselves reported a 
relatively low response rate.   I also observed an occupational safety training session in another 
local construction site employing mainly inter-state migrants, however uptake was difficult to 
measure and monitor during my time in Nashik without spending time, and exposing myself to 
risks, in the midst of the construction site itself.  
 




harnesses - shiny new versions of which were used in the training demonstrations. The Disha 
Foundation also helped to cover the medical costs of one injured labour at the time of my visit – 
for which medical costs are usually exorbitant (field interview with Disha Foundation, Nashik, 
2013). The toilet and WASH (water and sanitation health) facilities were not clearly visible in my 
observations of the camp site and it was implied that both men and women were required to go to 
a distant location behind the camp site with poor sewage facilities. At a collective meeting 
organised by the local NGO to celebrate National Children’s Day in November 2013, there were 
recurring complaints about the lack of WASH facilities from the labourers. Many families, 
including mothers, attended the meeting. However, it was only men who spoke out, both 
obscuring the narratives of women who are likely even more vulnerable in poor WASH conditions 
(Datta, 2016) and also using their relative male agency to highlight a sensitive and neglected issue 
‘on behalf’ of some of the most vulnerable inhabitants of Site One. 
 
In terms of barriers to healthcare, Aasif described his experience of going into further debt after 
paying for treatment while living in Mumbai (before he migrated to Nashik) – he would not have 
been admitted to the local hospital otherwise, though suffering from a fever and almost 
unconscious at the time. To gain access, he drew from his local social network - an engineer 
working on the same Mumbai construction site he was in. The engineer who knew someone in 
the hospital who was able to finally admit Aasif despite initial protests that he would not survive.  
As Aasif mused, official procedures are irrelevant: “Wherever I can pay, I can get the service. If 
I have money, I will get service quickly.” A combination of financial and social capital enabled 
Aasif to overcome barriers to treating serious illness – resources that are not immediately 
available to many of the labour migrants in Site One.  
 
Another migrant from Bihar, Nima, faced a double fee-barrier in accessing treatment. She 
explained she paid a nominal fee to the Site One anganwadi teacher, Maya (who is literate), to 




Bhaskar, an intra-state migrant from Washim described having to pay Rs, 1200 for treating his 
cataracts in a private hospital. He explained he was not aware of where the local public hospital 
was in Nashik, nor of any state-wide health facilities for migrants at the time and sought treatment 
in the only place he was aware of. As Zaarib, from West Bengal explained – and as the existing 
literature corroborates - problems related to healthcare for migrants are common in all urban 
migrant destinations and not specific to Nashik.  
 
The ration card is not only necessary for accessing the PDS but, as conveyed in the literature, has 
been regarded as a historically important proof of identity, necessary for social entitlements, 
securing work and housing (MacAuslan, 2011; Routray, 2014). While none of the labourers 
interviewed at Site One had their original ration cards with them, some mentioned possessing 
‘xerox’ copies of their original ration cards to serve as proof of identity, most commonly used for 
securing sim cards for mobile phones or in the presence of police authorities. Photocopies of other 
documents such as the ‘maddan’ card – the official document necessary to cast votes in elections 
- are used in Nashik to purchase sim cards and open bank accounts. Voter cards are also linked to 
a fixed place of residence; however, they are less difficult to acquire then the ration card (Sadiq, 
2008). They are also granted at the individual level and therefore in this sense more portable, their 
use and location only affecting the individual holder.  
 
According to my findings and the literature, a ration card application cannot be made without 
proof of identity and local residence, in other words documents are needed for further documents. 
Site One covers all light and electricity bills therefore migrants lack available proof of residence 
to procure documents for accessing entitlements. This is one factor in explaining why many 
labourers opted for private health services which do not tend to require proof of identity. Migrants 
who lacked birth certificates to enrol their children in local schools, relied upon the anganwadi 
which accepted children of all ages to at the very least, occupy their children. The knowledge and 




male head of the household usually manages and procures a household bundle of documents. The 
limited knowledge of where documents are located even within domestic household contexts 
represents yet another barrier to utilising such documents for access.  
 
The labourers in Site One seemed mostly self-contained within the residential camp in the local 
area – and women seem to experience limited spatial mobility to an even greater degree according 
my findings. The immobilities of Site One labourers limited opportunities to develop wider social 
networks beyond the camp lanes and available institutions at the site. The anganwadi provided a 
rare space for parents, particularly mothers to engage with each other as well as with the teacher, 
Maya, and representatives from the local NGO and other visiting agencies. Maya was regularly 
in touch with parents in the camp often acted as a de facto ‘community’ liaison between the 
labourers and agencies who came to visit – she often acted as a proxy fulfilling requirements 
missed by thekedars or the site owners. Fellow workers or ‘neighbours’ in each camp lane also 
provided financial support in times of need as well as distributing knowledge to address gaps 
among migrants of different temporal categories and levels of experience at Site One.  
 
4.3 Construction and corruption in Ahmedabad   
The ‘mega-city’ of Ahmedabad has observed a ‘construction boom’ fuelled by both public and 
private sector-led large-scale construction and infrastructure projects (Hirway et al., 2014).  The 
public-private mix is also characterised by collusion between the state and private construction 
companies and corrupt practices, such as rigging open bidding processes to contract select 
construction companies (Dayal and Agarwal, 2005). Such practices hint at the opaque nature of 
the industry and extent to which outsider access is prohibited. Compared with the growing (at the 
time of my fieldwork) city of Nashik where relatively less rigid systems of gatekeeping were in 
place – gaining direct access to migrant construction workers in Ahmedabad was difficult, 
particularly in the large-scale sites. Access was impeded by relatively impenetrable and elaborate 




confirmed that this impenetrability also characterised access patterns for civil society 
organisations. As a result, the amount of construction workers in my sample of participants in 
Ahmedabad was smaller in comparison with Nashik – 19 percent of the city sample overall. 
 
The large-scale construction sites that were akin to Site One, were not accessible for multiple on-
site visits which in-depth interview processes require. However, I was granted permission to make 
a visit and was able to conduct a survey on 25 labourers and make observations, if not interview, 
migrant workers in Site 2, a large-scale construction site comparable with Site One. The survey 
findings show that the construction workers were mostly inter-state (76 percent of all the 
construction workers in the sample) and over half (61 percent) made an average monthly income 
in the highest bracket. However, compared with Nashik, there was more variation in number of 
days worked on average per month, even among those working and living on construction sites.  
 
Site 2 is based in the north-west edge of Ahmedabad and owned by the Adani Realty group – an 
infrastructure and development conglomerate with offices across India and Dubai, and with close 
ties to the Modi government. Media reports have critiqued the close relationship and lack of 
accountability involved in the group’s work in Ahmedabad.80 At the time of my visit, the project 
aimed to develop four areas of luxury apartments within an ‘integrated township’ model spanning 
over 600 acres. The Adani Group is registered in the Gujarat chapter of CREDAI, and the housing 
development appears to be registered under legal real estate regulations (under CREDAI) and 
implicitly, covered by state laws regarding worker safety on the site. In keeping with the 
impenetrability experienced with in-person gatekeepers, desk research on the Adani Group’s 
construction sites in Ahmedabad yielded limited contextual information on regulatory protocols 
and commitments of the development project. The motto of the Site 2 housing development is 
‘The Good Life’ though this jars strikingly with my field observations of the conditions in which 
                                                     
80 See: Megha Bahree ‘Indian Billionaire Gautam Adani Finds A Savior In The Modi Govt’ Forbes 17 July 2014  
https://www.forbes.com/sites/meghabahree/2014/07/17/adani-finds-a-savior-in-the-modi-govt/#2089b8bb639f  




labour migrants lived on the site, and from their accounts given during the survey process. Lack 
of access to state social protections among labour migrants was intensified by working in what 
seemed like a regulatory void – thus making the labourers’ existence ‘hyper-precarious’ through 
lack of legal and social protection.  
 
The under-payment or non-payment of wages corresponding with the obligations of contracts 
emerged in in the findings from the participants themselves and from interviews with a local union 
branch for construction workers, Majoor Adhikar Manch. Most of the construction workers 
surveyed lacked ration cards in their places of origin and none had access in Ahmedabad. My 
own observations of where the labour migrants lived in Site 2, revealed bleak living conditions 
with no visible WASH facilities; infants and children left behind in empty camp shelters located 
on the margins of a vast space, far from the construction itself, while their parents worked for 
long hours without a break. Some children showed signs of malnutrition, and the living spaces – 
temporary shanties and tents - were cramped and barely ventilated, made even more difficult 
during searing summer temperatures in the city. The conditions in Site 2 stand in stark contrast 
with those of Site One in Nashik. Though residents at the Site One labour camp are also deprived, 
live and work in precarious conditions and the site itself is relatively smaller, there are some 
semblance of facilities provided by civil society organisations and access is made comparatively 
easier due to the smaller and less remote layout of the labour camp.  
 
The construction industry is also active in Juhapura, in the western zone of Ahmedabad. The area 
became a major destination for Muslim refugees following religious violence in the city, and 
particularly after the 2002 riots. My field observations showed that Muslim inter-state migrants 
also tended to settle and find work in this part of the city. As a result of the rapid ‘ghettoisation’ 
in the city (Breman, 2003; Roy, 2006; Mahadevia et al., 2014), both land and property prices 
underwent sharp inflation and subsequently an unauthorised and rapid construction boom took 




scale construction site in Juhapura consisting of the construction of three apartment blocks on a 
dusty square of land that is most likely not authorised for residential development, according to 
conversations with the workers on the site.  
 
One of the labourers I encountered there was Mohan, an 18-year-old construction worker, who 
had moved from Madhya Pradesh (MP) to Ahmedabad.  His parents and grandparents worked in 
agriculture and after dropping out of secondary school, he moved to join his uncle and aunt who 
have been settled in the city “for several years.” Mohan is a young, male lone migrant who did 
not seem to fare well in terms of wages – possibly due to his teenaged status - and networks 
despite having existing family links in the city. Social networks and inter-generational family 
patterns played a significant role in Mohan’s move to Ahmedabad.  He initially moved due to 
financial need, following a generational pattern of moving to the city to find work. Mohan’s 
relative – an uncle by marriage – was first bought to Ahmedabad as a labourer by his father, who 
had previously travelled to the city to find work. Eventually in turn, this uncle brought Mohan to 
the city upon his dropping out of secondary school. Mohan shared his plans to return to the village 
and bring his younger brother back with him to Ahmedabad. Mohan’s uncle undertook the role 
of thekedar and sought work for him and covered initial expenses. As the eldest son, Mohan felt 
compelled to find work in the city in order to help his parents and sends remittances back to his 
parents in MP. However, he felt isolated from his nuclear family: “I feel bad being alone and so 
far away from my parents” (Mohan). 
 
Despite access to family networks in the city, Mohan was eventually forced to live alone due to 
family strife with his uncle’s wife. Mohan explained how his uncle introduced him to another 
migrant whom he calls “Danesh bhai” (bhai translates to ‘brother’) working on the Iqbal site, and 
originating from the same village in MP. Though it is not made explicit, Danesh also appears to 
fulfil a thekedar role for Mohan, providing him with labour and granting him kharcha to cover 




occasionally provided on-site, and the wage was dependent on how many hours were completed 
in a day. Mohan also relied on networks to remit money to his parents in MP and described how 
he took an advance from ‘Danesh bhai’ to visit his family and this comes out of his wages.  
 
At the time of our interview, Mohan expressed that he saw no need for a ration card in 
Ahmedabad, as his food costs were supported to some extent by Danesh. Despite the family rift, 
his aunt (whose house he left earlier) continued to procure kerosene for him on the ‘black market’, 
so Mohan could still make use of his existing family networks.  Mohan kept his existing 
documents - a school leaving certificate - in his native village and stated he had no need for 
documents in Ahmedabad as he used a private hospital when needed and acquired a sim card in 
a fellow labourer’s name. He faced wage barriers, as a relatively new entrant to the local labour 
market. Not only did Mohan’s ‘outsider’ status render lower wages, but his youth and lack of 
experience at this stage also seemed to weaken his bargaining power.  
 
“I have no clear plan for the future as to whether I’ll settle here. I earn 
Rs, 300 per day but I do double the work, this is because I am new I 
am not paid on a daily basis or on a monthly basis like that. We get 
less if don’t do double time. Those who worked here a long time get 
Rs, 450 per day. Right now, I am unskilled, but I will learn a skill and 
become a karigar [skilled worker]. My contractor only deals with 
those from UP and MP and not with locals.”  
 
Mohan clearly recognised that there is an upward trajectory and his wage bargaining power would 
increase as his skills developed. Mohan hinted at social isolation, despite his initial arrival in the 
city being enabled by social contacts who conflate the role of family members and thekedars, and 
the presence of relatives in the city: “My neighbours are local, but I am new, so I don’t talk to 
anyone.” Despite the presence of Mohan’s family members in the city, his strongest link appeared 
to be with Danesh. Mohan depended upon him for work and wages, and sometimes even for food, 
and thus is the most important source of support. On the other hand, family strife – for example 
with Mohan’s aunt who originally took him in – illustrates that assumed guarantees of social 






4.4 Brick Kiln Workers - “we come here for survival…not to become wealthier”  
Brick kiln workers are predominately migrants, and engage in a structured form of labour, in some 
cases labelled as a contemporary form of bonded labour or ‘neo-bondage’ (Breman, 2010). The 
characteristics of this form of ‘bondage’ according to Breman include restrictive brokerage 
systems and the risk of debt, though in contemporary forms they last for a season rather than 
lifelong timeframes, as per traditional forms of bonded labour.   By procuring advance loans from 
brokers, brick kilns are usually tethered to one broker and one place of work for the entire working 
season and unfree to leave without incurring debts. The remuneration system in brick kiln labour 
is based on daily productivity targets – up to 15,000 bricks per day on large kilns - and failure to 
meet such targets can risk plunging labourers and their families into further debt. The brokerage 
systems in place among brick kiln workers are complex and “ambiguous” but can broadly be 
categorised as relations between labourers and ‘broker-brokers’ – those with elite standing in their 
community whose sole and specific livelihood is derived from brokerage; and ‘worker-brokers’ 
– less clear positions which blur the roles of labourer and broker. The latter are often deeply 
embedded within communities and family networks and positioned in relatively less hierarchical 
relationships with labourers (Gupta. 2003; Bhukuth, 2006).  
 
Family or household units of brick kiln workers are paid a kharcha to cover food and living costs. 
There are various exploitative practices endogenous to the payment and negotiation of kharcha 
and usually stark differences between the cost of living in Ahmedabad and that in the migrants’ 
places of origin.  Brick kiln workers face a highly specific set of vulnerabilities and an in-depth 
exploration of their experiences of barriers, both to fair labour outcomes and protections, go 
beyond the scope of this thesis. The opportunistic approach to sampling allowed me to capture 
some experiences through observation and interview and enable a presentation of a spectrum of 




those migrants who work in brick kilns as household units, the risks of debt incurred by payment 
of kharcha, and lack of PDS access can pose risks to nutrition and food security. Situated on the 
outskirts of the city on terrains that are contingent yet disconnected from urban resources and 
infrastructures, the spatiality of brick kiln labour also intensifies labour migrants access-related 
vulnerabilities.  
 
During my fieldwork in Ahmedabad, I visited two sites on the outskirts of Ahmedabad – Bavla, 
on the northern outskirts of the city, and Uvarsad, which lies on the south-western outer corner of 
the city. Bricks in Indian kilns are typically produced on a seasonal basis, starting in the late 
autumn and running through until the summer, thus making it a livelihood option for seasonal 
migrant workers seeking non-farm employment during off-seasons. Companies, and their 
contractors, prefer the employment of household or family units to keep costs down and boost 
efficiency due to the multi-task nature of the labour.  
          






According to my observations and interviews, there are five main categories involved in 
producing bricks. In addition to gender, the labour is segmented according to level of skill, and 
in some cases, even place of origin: brick moulding, typically unskilled and involves patting the 
bricks into shape and arranging them, usually involves women and any children on-site. Heavy 
manual labour is involved in the next two categories: loading and unloading bricks to set up the 
kiln. The last two categories are the transportation of bricks and managing the coal fires used to 
bake the bricks. The latter is the most dangerous of the tasks involved in the kiln and on the sites 
I visited, usually undertaken by men from Uttar Pradesh as a result of generational traditions and 
the accumulation of skills that evolved from the fact that inter-state migrants could not bring 
transportation carts with them for loading and unloading work. In the summer months during 
Ahmedabad’s scorching desert heat, the brick kiln work is made even more challenging, and 
access to adequate water and food is listed as a difficulty by participants. The participants 
generally spoke of long hours and are paid per set quantity of bricks; each family or group member 
take on shifts in turn.  
 
The labour conducted on brick kilns sites are mainly divided along gendered lines (Singh, 2005). 
While women are visible throughout the brick kilns, engaging in all stages of the process except 
maintaining the kiln fires (considered the most dangerous job on site), they did not come forward 
for interview or conversation during my time in the field. I observed young girl children engaging 
in household chores and serving us tea and informally interacted with some of the female 
labourers though they did not consent to interview, implying a particularly conservative or 
restrictive environment for women on the sites. Women of all ages were seen engaged in the 
labour itself mostly in the moulding, and transportation work using wheelbarrows.   
 
Ashwani is from Chhattisgarh, in his early twenties and with 13 members of his natal family, and 
his thekedar. He engaged in seasonal labour at the Bavla brick kiln. He was active in helping to 




and institutionally aware.  Ashwani represents the second generation in his family to engage in 
brick kiln labour and they are just one family among “half the village” back home who migrate 
seasonally for brick kiln labour in places as far as Punjab and Nepal. Ashwani and all his adult 
siblings dropped out of school, though at varying levels. The highest educated member of the 
household reached Class Eight (secondary school). Ashwani’s grandparents were farmers, but his 
father entered brick kiln labour, initially in UP before diversifying to other areas. 
 
“Before Chhattisgarh become a state,81 we were very far from the 
centre of MP [Madhya Pradesh] and behind the rest of the state. After 
separating from MP, we are finally getting benefits from the 
government, it’s only a little but we are getting something at least. In 
Chhattisgarh, it is mainly rural work and now is not the season for 
that – it is seasonal work.”  
 
Though the state of Chhattisgarh pursued inclusion policies by expanding access to the PDS 
within the state (Tillin, Saxena and Sisodia, 2015) – as mentioned in Ashwani’s reference to 
‘benefits’ – the need for adequate livelihoods still drives inter-state labour migration. Many 
labourers engaged in this sector are afflicted by debt, often inter-generational and driven by rural 
deficits (in the form of landlessness or drought). Ashwani’s family arrived in Ahmedabad through 
a thekedar and despite the limited opportunities to save and the strenuous conditions entailed by 
working long hours on a hot brick kiln in the desert state of Ahmedabad, he justified the move. 
Ashwani’s family are in debt to a local moneylender in their home village and thus compelled to 
migrate seasonally for brick kiln work, where they are guaranteed to find regular paid work for 
the entire family. As Ashwani explained: “If someone feels they can’t work, it’s okay because 
another family member will take over. We come here for survival, for food and not to become 
wealthier, we do not save anything.”  
 
The household are paid a kharcha of Rs. 64,000 for thirteen people, however they remain in debt 
to moneylenders, as money is borrowed to cover costs for the off-season. Interest is charged at 10 
                                                     




percent by the moneylenders. The thekedar explained he does not have land in the village and did 
not seem to be in an explicitly hierarchical position to the other labourers – a ‘worker-broker’ as 
per Gupta’s definition (2003). Instead, he was referred to as one of the ‘family’ - further 
exemplifying blurred boundaries between labour and social relations.  He explained how at the 
end of each season, they earn between Rs, 10,000 and Rs, 14,000 to take home and use as buffer 
during times when there is little to be made from agricultural work and in times of monsoon. A 
heuristic value of ten percent is named by the thekedar as the typical proportion of labourers’ 
earnings paid off him, to cover the cost of advances. 
 
Despite the poor socio-economic conditions and lack of livelihood opportunities experienced by 
families such as Ashwani’s in Chhattisgarh; the (relatively) robust governance system, regarding 
the PDS helps to alleviate food security needs. According to Ashwani and his family, the 
separation of MP and Chhattisgarh allowed for the new state government to improve social 
policies and programmes (though ultimately this was not enough to prevent Ashwani’s family 
from continuing to engage in precarious labour). In Ashwani’s household, they possess three 
ration cards: one in his name, one his parents name and another in his brother’s name. A range of 
socio-economic status levels are also distributed within the family – Ashwani’s parents receiving 
an ‘AAY’ card and Ashwani a BPL card.  The food items are heavily subsidised by the 
Chhattisgarh government: at the time of our interview, rice was being sold for as low as Rs, 1 per 
kilogram, along with lentils, sugar and wheat for similarly low prices. According to Ashwani the 
nominal cost of rice was to attract poor voters in the upcoming elections – an example of the role 
of non-market forces in modulating access. 
 
Without this buffer of accessible rations in Ahmedabad, food expenses for Ashwani’s migrant 
household were significant. At the time of our interview, it cost an average of Rs, 8,000 more to 
feed the household of 13 members than it did in Chhattisgarh.  The family explained that though 




the place of destination, the subsidy prevented them from falling into further debt.  
 
“In the village, we get rice from the ration card so it’s about 35kg per 
month. We do a partnership of agriculture where we store a portion 
of rice during the monsoon and therefore only have very little and 
have to rely on ration card…it costs so much more here.” (Ashwani) 
 
However, Ashwani’s family continue to make use of their ration card. The youngest son in the 
family stays behind during the labour season to attend school and manages the rations. Money is 
sent back to him whilst the family are away. Ashwani remits the money from his earnings at the 
brick kiln through a community member who returns regularly to the village during seasonal 
labour.  
 
I observed immediate distinctions among the Chhattisgarhi brick kiln workers and other inter-
state labourers: they seemed more accepting of their identity as seasonal brick-kiln labourers. 
They described the government culture in Chhattisgarh as comparatively more socially inclusive 
than most states, and generally they seemed more attuned to specific state protections and forms 
of industrial action, Ashwini and his fellow Chhattisgarhi workers contrasted with the brick kiln 
workers I engaged with in Uvarsad. Ashwani’s grievances seemed to be focused on unfair 
payment conditions which could be improved through protest and collective action.  In 
comparison, migrant workers in Uvarsad from Rajasthan seemed to view engagement in this form 
of labour as temporary and thus its concomitant precarities would be resolved eventually through 
entering alternative labour markets. Pratul and Kamal, two young brothers from the Dungarpur 
district in Rajasthan mentioned plans to leave brick kiln labour and aspirations to work in less 
precarious sectors.  
 
Pratul and Kamal worked in the Uvarsad brick kiln. They were both aged between 18 and 21 
years at the time of our meeting and represent the second generation in their family to engage in 




crops per annum and owned assets such as tractors. However, years of drought compelled them 
to sell their land and their children (and grandchildren) to seek seasonal labour elsewhere. The 
brothers described an ‘exodus’ from their drought-stricken village to seek urban livelihoods 
including brick kiln labour in Gujarat.  Despite food in Ahmedabad costing a large proportion of 
their salary from brick kiln work, Pratul explained it was their only option as they had only 
harvested one crop per year in recent seasons. During the off-season, migrating for brick kiln 
work was considered the best option to cover both regular and extraneous costs such as “occasions 
and funerals and weddings and so on”. Pratul indicated the current state of instability in his life 
and stated that he does not aspire to work in brick kilns in the future.  
 
Pratul and his brother were both members of a trade union branch in Ahmedabad. They described 
the collective vulnerabilities faced by brick kiln labourers, and the action supported by thekedars 
to overcome exploitation and negotiate labour and wage terms with employers – casting brokerage 
relations in a positive rather than exploitative light.   Pratul insisted on the harmony between all 
the labourers from different states and localities and how they employ agency in the face of the 
particular labour structures dominating brick kiln work.   
 
“When we feel exploited, we gather together [according to skill level] 
to demand a higher wage. When they [employers] go for price, we 
negotiate through the trade union with the employer.  They 
sometimes agree, but if they do not, we have to hold a strike for one 
day or as much as one week and the thekedar supports us in this. I 
don’t like having to pay fees to the trade union but at least when we 
are engaged in a strike, this covers our expenses.” (Pratul). 
 
The brothers arrived at Uvarsad brick kiln through a thekedar who advanced them a loan.  They 
gave the bulk of the cash to their parents and plan to work at the kiln for the entire season to pay 
off the debt (incurred by the advance loan). For the brothers, their entire kharcha was expended 
every week on groceries. They procure flour from a mill which charges an extra fee of Rs, 2 per 
kilogram therefore adding to the expense – one they do not face in their home village. When asked 




buying fuel and food, higher compared to the price of such goods in their home village. In terms 
of access to services and social protections in their place of origin, owning land can work against 
households as described by Pratul. He described how his family were rejected by their sarpanch 
(local leader) back in the village for a BPL ration card based on the fact they own some land.  The 
land was not arable and struck by drought, however this did not factor in the sarpanch’s decision.  
 
A younger brother of Pratul’s and Kamal’s had been educated up to secondary school level. He 
kept account of the number of bricks made and how much they are owed. At the end of the labour 
season, with the help of their literate younger brother, Pratul and Kamal negotiated any errors or 
shortfalls in their wage amounts with their thekedar. The brothers did not have documents with 
them: they use a borrowed sim card for the time they are in Ahmedabad. If they fell ill, they used 
a private hospital and provided the address details for the brick kiln owner himself who they claim 
also pays the bill for hospital and insurance cover. Compensation for injuries was not provided, 
although this had not yet affected the brothers. As Pratul observed: “Almost all the people around 
here are illiterate, and they work on the basis of trust. They don’t have any certificates or 
paperwork,” reflecting the workers’ vulnerability to exploitation and misinformation.  
 
The case of the young male Rajasthani migrants exhibits various examples of agency and 
relatively effective livelihood strategies – from the collective bargaining, through to assistance 
from social networks (for example, their literate brother) in directly negotiating the accuracy of 
payment records. They are drawn from a relatively higher socio-economic standing than many 
labourers involved in brick kiln labour in terms of owning land and enjoying relatively ‘free’ 
thekedar relations. They face a continuity of barriers however, to accessing state resources to 
alleviate vulnerabilities caused by crop failure and drought from their home context through to 
their experiences in Ahmedabad. In this case, the labour migration process appears to serve as a 





4.5 Summary   
The findings discussed in this chapter illustrate a range of vulnerabilities and precarious 
experiences associated with labour migrants who work on construction and brick kiln sites, 
including their lack of access to state resources. Though these industrial sectors are some of the 
main drivers behind ‘India Shining’ - an optimistic BJP electoral slogan focused on growth and 
development – the labourers working in these sectors are beset with multiple precarities. The 
labourers are predominately interstate and intra-state migrants from socio-economically 
vulnerable backgrounds; the work itself is highly hazardous; the labour relations are precarious 
(characteristics can include fragmented employer relations; risk of debt; untimely and mis-paid 
wages, long hours and limited or no freedom to exit contracts); the sites of labour are remote from 
urban resources and infrastructure such as adequate healthcare, and workers are denied both legal 
protection (such as compensation for worksite injury) and social protection from the state. The 
latter includes a lack of access to the PDS and other state resources which exacerbate the range 
of other precarities listed here. The extent to which these precarities can affect labour migrants is 
linked to factors such as their regional background (e.g. state of origin); social and economic 
standing; age and level of skill, and whether they are a lone or household migrants. In both Nashik 
and Ahmedabad, the migrant workers in this first category on my ‘spectrum’ of evidence represent 
a diversity of these factors. 
 
At Site One in Nashik, the migrants are spatially and physically divided on the camp sites, mainly 
in accordance with regional background. The layout represents the differences between them in 
terms of the specificity of barriers faced as well as the strategies available to help cope with or 
‘rework’ such barriers (Katz, 2004). The intra-state migrants have certain advantages over inter-
state migrants in terms of overcoming barriers to access, such as proximity to their places of origin 
to gather and utilise resources not available in Nashik, and slightly less precarious living 
conditions on the labour camp-site itself. Inter-state migrants from states such as West Bengal 




on the same site. While lone male migrants from states such as UP and Bihar often originate from 
slightly better-off economic backgrounds, and higher-skilled labourers are paid relatively high 
wages, their experiences at Site One itself are marked by multiple deprivations. Despite slight 
internal variations, the deprived conditions of the labour camp overall at Site One and at Site 2 in 
Ahmedabad affect workers universally, many of whom are expected to work and live on the sites 
for at least 12 months. A lack of WASH facilities; cramped living conditions; poor health and 
safety conditions and lack of access to health services and programmes such as the PDS can pose 
both high economic costs that limit the potential for accumulating wages (e.g. incurred through 
medical costs and purchasing food on the open market) and risks to overall wellbeing for the 
labourers and their families. Women and children in particular were faced with the most intense 
forms of vulnerability in these sites, lacking appropriate WASH, nutrition, education and health 
facilities and cut off from access to the rest of the city; social networks and mobility in general. 
These conditions of deprivation also characterised the living conditions on labour camps at the 
Site 2 construction site in Ahmedabad.  
 
Going beyond access to the PDS and state resources, certain migrants also face other forms of 
state hostilities. The issue of barriers fuelled by social discrimination based on identity groups 
and politics is pertinent when it comes to internal migrants in Maharashtra (Weiner, 1979) and is 
conspicuously absent from my findings, particularly in Nashik given its recent anti-migrant 
tensions and the broader historical context of Maharashtra.  Apart from the male migrants from 
West Bengal describing general risks of discrimination, the inter-state migrants did not share any 
incidences of hostility based on their regional background among other labourers or employers 
on the construction sites. The intra-state migrants were comparatively more open about the 
difficulties they faced as ‘outsiders’ (as Bhaskar from Washim put it). This may be a collective 
strategic undertaking by inter-state migrants aware of Maharashtra’s notorious anti-migrant 
politics (Weiner, 1978; KII with academic at IIPS, 2013). It may also mark a profound lack of 




Instead, all the participants were open about the hostilities they faced at the hands of the state and 
institutional representatives, either in the places of origin or destination.  
 
The situation of the brick kiln workers shows how PDS access can become irrelevant in schemes 
where kharcha is involved – the labour contracts can absorb food costs and the need for subsidies, 
though these same contractual conditions can subject labourers to the risk of exploitative practices 
and prolonged debt, adding further layers of vulnerability to those generally linked to seasonal 
migrant work (Breman, 1996; Srivastava and Saikumar, 2003). According to my interviews with 
both the labour migrants and key informants working in local trade organisations, industrial action 
is relatively pronounced in the brick kiln labour sector in Ahmedabad. There appears to be greater 
solidarity amongst workers than in construction sectors, where more fragmented thekedar 
relations can exist (KII with PRAYAS, Ahmedabad, May 2013).  Brick kiln labour is inherently 
precarious in terms of the physical risk and hardship involved, and the traditional practices of 
recruitment and payment are potentially exploitative, but my findings suggest that when 
conditions of debt and employment bondage are absent, it is viewed by labourers as a way of 
preventing a further descent into poverty during the off-seasons in rural areas (Bhukuth, 2006).  
 
Nuanced differences can be observed between different types of labourers found on particular 
brick kiln sites – resonating with the ‘varieties of unfreedoms’ represented in the literature 
(O’Neill, 2011). The variety of tasks on a brick kiln site, occupied by particular migrant ‘types’ 
hints at the highly nuanced multiplicity of labour experiences and outcomes that may arise. The 
Chhattisgarhi family at the Bawla site come from an economically deprived background and are 
afflicted with debt, but also share positive experiences of sub-national governance and quality 
access to the PDS in terms of coverage and the subsidies themselves. This sharpens the access 
(and food security) differentials between Ahmedabad and their home state and emphasises the 
‘hyper-precariousness’ associated with migration (Lewis et al., 2014).  In the case of the young 




precariousness and provides an important but temporary livelihood option in the face of 
agricultural and financial troubles in their home village. The brothers’ home state of Rajasthan is 
afflicted with governance issues when it comes to the PDS (Khera, 2008) and this is directly 
experienced in the denial of their own family’s access. The move to Ahmedabad therefore 
represents a continuity of vulnerabilities in terms of access rather than the rupture experienced by 
Ashwani and his family.  
 
Overall, the main defining characteristic of this first ‘category’ of empirics is the remoteness – 
physically and in terms of ‘sighting’ the state – of the brick kiln and construction sites, creating 
conditions and contexts of precariousness.  Migrants, already disoriented and disconnected from 
familiar places and networks, work and live in sites that are remote from infrastructure, resources, 
services and beyond ‘sightings’ of the state.  The ‘remoteness’ from the state – and concomitant 
entitlements such as the PDS –according to my findings are in some cases a continuity of such 
experiences of ‘state scarcity’ (Corbridge et al., 2005) in the migrants’ places of origin. All the 
labour migrants are generally poor and vulnerable, and marginalised from access to elites and 
power in their local communities. However, the governance context of their ‘native’ states can 
influence their access to state provisions and resources. For example, this is illustrated in the 
differentials between PDS access experienced by Ashwani in rural Chhattisgarh and that of Nima 
and Atif in their Bihari home town of Garri. Corbridge et al. (2005) describe the ways in which 
rural communities rely upon a combination of panchayat level officials and leaders and ‘economic 
actors’ or agents for access to resources, but access to these sorts of power brokers were not 
available to Nima and Atif even in their local context. When considered together with the family 
discrimination faced at the hands of Atif’s mother (in denying the ration card entitlements to 
them), a range of precarities at the place of origin are experienced and, in many ways, emphasised 
as a migrant in Nashik.  
 




to the health risks endogenous to construction and brick kiln labour (Breman, 2010; Pattenden, 
2012). The health risks faced by migrants in these precarious sites of labour are largely ignored 
by policymakers (Borhade, 2007). Migrants face barriers in accessing healthcare in their place of 
destination - both in terms of awareness and cost – a situation also commonly reported in the 
literature (Pattenden, 2012; Betancourt et al., 2013; Srivastava and Sutradhar, 2016). As the 
findings in this chapter illustrate, in some cases, certain documents are necessary for accessing 
public medical care, which may push migrant workers’ preference toward private facilities further 
adding to financial burdens in the city.  
 
In terms of the governance context – both cities (and the state governments they fall under) display 
policy dissonances in multiple ways as illustrated in this chapter. Though they can receive 
relatively high wages in accordance with skill and gender (compared with brick kiln labour, for 
example), construction workers face a range of barriers to state and other resources. The specific 
‘responsive’ strategies devised by the governments of Gujarat and Maharashtra at the time of my 
fieldwork excluded inter-state migrants – the majority of workers on these precarious sites of 
labour. While workers in the ‘unorganised sector’ overall, and specifically construction workers 
are supposed to be protected under specific state and national policies, my findings show they 
tend to exist in regulatory vacuums. However, this seems more pronounced in Ahmedabad then 
in Nashik, due in some part to the latter’s relative openness to civil society assistance and less 
established status as an industrial centre. However, the ‘hostile policy environment’ characterises 
both cities when considering the protection of industrial interests in the construction sectors, 
collusion with the government and commitment – whether rhetorical or substantive – to worker 
conditions (such as the Unorganised Workers Act in 2008) and other laws pertaining to 
construction workers at federal and state level.  
 
In Maharashtra, the movement to protect vulnerable workers such as those on construction and 




findings from KIIs and the NGO, Disha Foundation. In Gujarat, neoliberal priorities appear to be 
more overt. State strategies did not apply to migrants in construction and brick kiln work and they 
fall prey to both market forces and ’state scarcities.’ In the ‘best-case’ scenarios, civil society 
organisation address gaps in services and protection. However, as shown in the case of Site One, 
without sustained institutional backing from both the state and the construction companies 
themselves, interventions fail to become embedded within such sites and are prone to resistance 
from site owners or even cancellation. In the case of Ahmedabad, due to a ‘hostile environment’ 
for construction workers shaped by large infrastructural as well as residential construction 
projects; high-cost real-estate investments and politically-backed development companies, the 
sites were even more isolated and impenetrable to outsider access – in the form of civil society 








5. BARRIERS TO ACCESS FOR LONGER-TERM MIGRANTS: THE 
PARADOX OF INTEGRATION 
This chapter focuses on migrants engaged in casual labour, mainly through gathering at nakas – 
roadside junctions where contractors employ labourers on daily or short-term bases. A paradox 
lies in the findings related to this second group of migrants: they have migrated on a medium-
term or long-term basis (generally more than five or ten years) but are predominately engaged in 
casual labour, usually sought on a daily basis at nakas. Most of the migrant ‘naka workers’ I 
observed had been settled in Nashik or Ahmedabad for a decade or more; the second highest 
proportion among my participants was constituted by those who had been settled for over five 
years.  
 
Nakas are a prominent component of the “highly segmented casual labour market[s]” (Mosse et    
al., 2005: 3026) characterising cities in western India. Migrant workers who are not recruited 
through thekedars, try to find casual work at nakas. According to my fieldwork, these migrants 
tended to be either inter-state or intra-state and often jostle directly alongside their local 
counterparts to find work, though many of the nakas observed were roughly segregated along 
‘migrant’ and local lines. They also tend to live in slum settlements alongside local communities. 
Though this group of migrants are vulnerable in multiple ways, they can be situated in the middle 
of the ‘spectrum of vulnerability’ representing my overall sample and can be seen as facing a 
‘median’ level of barriers.  
 
This chapter will examine the vulnerabilities experienced by long-term and medium-term 
migrants who work at nakas, first in Nashik and then in Ahmedabad.  In many ways, the 
vulnerabilities related to access are similar to those faced by the migrants depicted in the previous 
chapter. However long-term, or settled, migrants are deemed to have certain advantages according 
to established narratives of migrant integration (Portes and Zhou, 1993; Taylor 1999; de Haas, 




and state infrastructure are accumulated over time. While this held in some of my observations – 
particularly local knowledge and accumulation of social and communal ties – vulnerabilities 
persist in the form of economic deprivations structured by informalised labour and power 
distributions.  
 
The proximity of migrants and their local counterparts in both labour markets and living spaces 
casts these migrant-specific barriers into sharp relief. In addition to structural barriers; other social 
aspects such as caste and religion can become more prominent aspects of identity in the eyes of 
local communities (as the sense of migrants’ temporariness perceived by local residents is dulled 
over time). This can make long-term migrants relatively more vulnerable to social discrimination 
and nativist resentments from their neighbours, other labourers and even more intensely, 
exploitation at the hands of ‘semi-institutional’ actors represented by dukandaars and agents. The 
creation of ‘black markets’ for grains and cooking fuel represents economic barriers for poor 
migrants, and the adverse impact of unequal PDS access in urban locales. The competition within 
labour markets at nakas is therefore compounded by the competition for tangible resources.  
 
This chapter will start with a description of the general profile of migrants observed in the 
‘median’ category of vulnerability and the type of labour relations they enter into. The following 
sections then follow the format of the previous chapter – discussing the findings from naka worker 
in Nashik before turning to the findings from Ahmedabad, including observations of a local 
‘zonal’ office of the AMC where several instances of ‘dhakkas’ are demonstrated. A comparison 
of both places and between the different types of migrants observed in this category in relation to 
access, vulnerability and precariousness and governance context will be summarised at the end.  
 
5.1 Barriers of implementation and innovation 
This second group of migrants can be loosely labelled as relatively less vulnerable in terms of 




typical profile of members of this category is based on medium-term and long-term migration (for 
five to ten years or longer) and engagement in casual work, usually day labour sought at nakas. 
While some naka workers are seasonal (Mosse et al., 2005), the members in this category 
generally observe more linear migration patterns and represent both inter-state or intra-state 
migrants. Here, the characteristics differ slightly according to each city. An expansive translocal 
network of Rajasthani migrants exists in Ahmedabad and they constitute a large component of 
naka workers, and long-term migrants in the city. Many of the long-term seasonal migrants in 
both Nashik and Ahmedabad belong to tribal castes, driven by drought or deforestation to seek 
urban livelihoods (Udmale et al., 2014; Deshingkar and Start, 2003). This group of long-term 
migrants also includes rural to urban migrants who have moved within their districts.  
 
According to sedentary norms, both intra-state and long-term inter-state migrants who have been 
settled in their place of destination for ten years or more would face less intensive barriers to 
access. Over time, it is expected they develop awareness, social networks and financial stability. 
This is also facilitated through an official process where settled migrant households can delink 
their ration cards from their native places and apply for a new card in their city of destination. As 
shown empirically, some long-term migrants try to pursue these formal paths to access. However, 
such activities are commonly met with dhakkas and are susceptible to both barriers of design and 
implementation. Going beyond these policy norms, both Gujarat and Maharashtra governments 
established state-wide ‘temporary ration card’ schemes, particularly in response to the plight of 
deprived tribal migrants, driven in large numbers by drought and deforestation. Both state 
governments pioneered programmes to untether PDS access to fixed places of residence, however 
these have not succeeded. In fact, some governance innovations in the state of Gujarat have made 
conditions worse for migrants, as shown in the empirical findings. In these cases, barriers emerge 
from policy re-design, as well as from subjectivities in implementation – recasting the meaning 
of ‘policy dissonance’ where explicit intention to enable inclusivity result in diametrically 




so-called ‘progressive’ technologies of governance. This is further evidenced in the impotency of 
the Aadhaar card in its initial promise to enable portable access to state resources. 
 
5.2 Characteristics of naka workers and labour 
At a typical naka, labourers are picked up by contractors for low-skilled or unskilled work in 
various sectors including construction, carpentry and painting usually on a daily, or sometimes 
longer, basis. In addition to these sectors, some contractors employ casual domestic workers – 
typically women – at the nakas I observed.  The intermediaries, hired by construction sites and 
companies, represent informal and precarious labour relations, and are usually the main or only 
point of contact for labourers (Mukherjee et al., 2009; Naraparaju, 2014). Nakas are typical of 
urban agglomerations (Naraparaju, 2014) and the locations of these daily labour ‘markets’ are 
distributed throughout the cities of Nashik and Ahmedabad. In general, a mix of both local and 
labour migrants are found at nakas. While the next chapter will delve into the experiences of local 
labourers, here the focus will be on the migrant workers who engage in naka work – a term that 
can be made synonymous with ‘casual’ or ‘day labour’. The migrant groups are predominately 
long-term or settled migrants, compared with the higher concentration of seasonal or more 

















Table 5.1: Typical characteristics of migrant naka workers 
Characteristic Migrants - naka workers 
Age 18-30 years (44.7%) 31-45 years (38.7%) 
Gender Male (80.5%) 
Religion Hindu (84.7%) Muslim (10%) 
Migrant duration Long-term (53%) 5-9 years (21.3%) 
Frequency of visits 2 times a year (34%) 4 times a year (30%) 
Type of migrant Inter-state (41.7%) Intra-state (31.3%) 
Reason for migration Livelihood (36.1%) Family (27.1%) 
Marital Status Married (76.4%) Single (16.2%) 
Education Up to primary school (29.3%) Illiterate (22.7%) 
Income More than INR 5000 (45%) 
Days of work 25 days plus (21.8%) Less than 15 days (22.4%) 
Ration card Yes (60.6%) 
 
While a significant proportion of migrants, usually from ST groups and within the given state, 
seek work at such nakas (Mosse et al., 2005; Naraparaju, 2014), my findings show that nakas 
tend to be visited by a high proportion of long-term inter-state migrants. In both cities, the inter-
state migrants predominately originate from the northern and eastern states of UP and Bihar. In 
the case of Ahmedabad, a high proportion of inter-state migrant groups are from Rajasthan 
(representing a mix of long-term, seasonal, household and lone migration). The findings show 
that such migrants tend to be long-term and relatively more settled into their place of destination, 
though many maintain strong linkages with their place of origin. These linkages serve to 
supplement gaps in resources experienced in the city, such as social and financial capital and state 
entitlements. Some migrants, usually household migrants, seek to follow official routes to access 
in their place of destination but still face dhakkas. However, many maintain distrust in the state, 
learning from their experiences of dhakkas in their places of origin, and either pursue informal 






Overall, naka workers represent 35.6 percent and 32 percent of my participant samples in Nashik 
and Ahmedabad respectively. While predominantly male, my observations showed significant 
numbers of woman also seek labour at nakas. Almost half of the sample of naka workers (41.7%) 
are inter-state migrants in both cities and each sample consists mostly of long-term migrants 
(more than 10 years) and medium-term migrants, making up the second largest proportion. The 
nakas in Ahmedabad are greater in number and larger in size, though there are significant naka 
markets of all sizes concentrated in the city of Nashik. In Nashik, where the construction industry 
was undergoing a boom at the time of my fieldwork, a greater number of short-term migrants was 
observed in nakas (represented by those who had arrived in the past four years). On the other 
hand, the sample representing Ahmedabad shows a larger proportion of long-term and settled 
migrants in naka work.   
 
Overall, naka workers represent 35.6 percent and 32 percent of my participant samples in Nashik 
and Ahmedabad respectively. While predominantly male, my observations showed significant 
numbers of woman also seek labour at nakas. Almost half of the sample of naka workers (57%) 
are inter-state migrants in both cities and each sample consists mostly of long-term migrants 
(more than 10 years) and medium-term migrants, making up the second largest proportion. At the 
nakas I visited in Nashik and Ahmedabad, both local workers and migrants gathered to find casual 
labour. The nakas in Ahmedabad are greater in number and larger in size, though there are 
significant naka markets of all sizes concentrated in the city of Nashik. In Nashik, where the 
construction industry was undergoing a boom at the time of my fieldwork, a greater number of 
short-term migrants was observed in nakas (represented by those who had arrived in the past four 
years). On the other hand, the sample representing Ahmedabad shows a larger proportion of long-
term and settled migrants in naka work.   
 
Naka workers typically live in slum settlements in the city, sharing space and resources (or the 
lack of) with local populations. It is in these contexts where the reciprocal impacts of barriers 




diversion of subsidised rations to the black market on migrant demand, itself generated by the 
lack of access to the PDS. However, a significant finding was that migrant groups, particularly 
the longer-term and more settled migrants, did not vocalise any complaints or negative views on 
local populations. This was unexpected, particularly in Nashik given the city’s history of nativist 
tensions and the context of migrant hostility across urban Maharashtra. Such views were more 
openly expressed by local communities, in both Ahmedabad and Nashik. This implies that longer-
term migrants are likely to use strategies to help their integration (such as refraining from sharing 
experiences of hostility, or actively promoting social harmony) in the face of social as well as 
structural barriers in the city. 
 
Figure 5.1: Akhbar Nagar Naka in Ahmedabad (Photo credit: Nabeela Ahmed, March, 2014) 
 
       
Figure 5.1 depicts one of the larger nakas in the city of Ahmedabad, Akhbar Nagar. Here we can 
see the area within the naka where mostly women locate themselves, usually seeking unskilled 
labour in construction or in domestic work. Unlike Nashik where alcoholism (and open 
harassment of women) among male labourers is commonly seen in certain public areas and thus 




scene in Ahmedabad.82  
Akhbar Nagar is an example of how naka workers organise themselves around the perimeter of a 
traffic circle or junction, where migrant and local workers cluster themselves broadly according 
to social and labour skill groups. For example, those from northern states such as Bihar and UP 
cluster around one point, with local communities, and intra-state migrants clustering elsewhere. 
These can be roughly aligned with level of skill, with the higher skilled labourers originating from 
certain caste groups in the local community or from northern states; and unskilled labourers 
usually found within intra-state and intra-district migrants, and among women overall. Wage 
differentials are mapped out according to skills rather than residential status according to my 
interviews. The labourers usually gathered by about 8.00 a.m. each working day and the crowds 
– usually between 300 and 500 at the smaller and medium sized nakas – usually dispersed by 
10.00 a.m. Those who remain without work for the day are typically local labourers – a pattern 
also observed in research by Mosse et al. (1997).  
 
5.3. Naka workers in Nashik 
At the time of my fieldwork, Nashik was undergoing rapid urbanisation with growing naka 
markets across the city. My interview participants were drawn from samples gathered at four 
nakas that are listed in Annex Three: Peth, Rana Pratap, Gangapur and Sakal nakas, each varying 
in size, and distributed across strategic points throughout Nashik city. Many of the migrant 
workers attending nakas are from UP and Bihar, with some from Southern states such as 
Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh and others from further east (West Bengal) or west (Gujarat and 
Rajasthan). Traditional inter-state migrant flows into Maharashtra have concentrated in cities such 
as Mumbai and Pune (Census of India, 2001), and recent demand and urbanisation in Nashik has 
made it the third largest city in Maharashtra to attract migrants (Borhade, 2007). Each naka I 
                                                     
82 Ahmedabad is a dry state and alcoholism less commonly seen in public, though it does occur covertly according to 




observed was at capacity, and large crowds would remain after contractors had left, signalling an 
oversupply of labour at the time of my fieldwork.  
 
Many of the nakas I observed were adjacent to slum settlements where both migrant and local 
labourers lived. Interviews were usually conducted at the homes of the labourers in these 
settlements. In general, the settlements all consisted of low-quality infrastructures or inadequate 
access to resources such as water. Electricity was usually illegally tapped, and communities were 
heavily reliant on the will and whim of the local nega sevak (urban community leader) for access 
to entitlements or improved infrastructure. However, each settlement showed variations in terms 
of deprivation, with some families living in small but fully furnished pukka83 households (though 
on illegally claimed land) and others crammed into small semi-pukka or kacha constructs.  
 
The nakas themselves ranged in size with Gangapur naka being the smallest, and Rana Pratap 
and Peth naka attracting the largest crowds. I would usually arrive at around 8.30 a.m. to approach 
those who were still waiting or had been unsuccessful in procuring work for that day as they had 
more time and patience to engage in conversation. The crowds at Peth and Rana Pratap would 
still be significant at this time of the morning, suggesting the oversupply of labour at these points. 
Scenes of social disruption were common at the nakas, particularly at Peth, where men abusing 
alcohol would hassle their wives for money or generally exhibit disruptive behaviour within the 
crowds. Alcoholism is widespread among the poor in Maharashtra and the disruptive gendered 
impacts on households have been documented in the literature and by the Right to Food 
movement, which argued the PDS offers safeguards against household income being spent on 
substance abuse rather than on ensuring nutritional needs are met (Ghosh, 1998; Das et al., 2006 
field interview with RtF members, 2014). 
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Long-term and settled migrants dominate the group of research participants in Nashik, in keeping 
with assertions in the literature (Mukherjee et al., 2014) that nakas tend to be popular with long-
term migrants. The type of barriers reported across the labourers I interacted with were similar – 
a lack of awareness and lack of access to governmental representatives. Those that possessed 
ration cards linked to their native households were either unaware or misinformed of the process 
of delinking their cards from their native locations. The experience of longer-settled migrants is 
represented in their establishment of local social (or non-state) networks and through their 
propensity toward using agents and middlemen in accessing the ration card and other services.  
 
One of the first slum settlements I visited in Nashik was Siddharth Nagar, located in the Satpur 
area and has a population of approximately 1,115 (Bhamare, 2014) – it is centrally located and 
can be accessed easily from one of the main streets in the town centre. The slum settlement 
consists of a mix of pukka and semi-pukka housing and is mainly populated by local residents, 
and long-term migrants from rural parts of Nashik district. They are mainly casual workers who 
find work at several of the nakas nearby, including Pett, Sakal and Gangapur.  Vanitram and 
Laxmi are an elderly married couple, rural to urban migrants, who hailed from a village in the 
Nashik district called Dindori and at the time of our meeting resided in Siddharth Nagar. Vanitram 
had been a labourer acquiring work at the local naka for most of his time in Nashik, and Laxmi 
had engaged in casual domestic work. They said they had been settled in Nashik for two decades, 
and in that period had shifted to a pukka house. Most of their children were grown and lived 
separately.  
 
The couple described the barriers to the PDS that they faced – which can be categorised as those 
related to implementation. Their household was assigned an ‘APL’ ration card – despite the 
couple earning a combined income that fell under the BPL threshold. However, even in acquiring 
an APL card, they were faced with severe bottlenecks, delays and pushbacks – known as 




significant of these were administrative delays and limited access to information. Though they 
arrived in Nashik two decades before, they had only undergone the process of delinking 
themselves from their original ration card (from their village in Dindori) a few years prior to the 
time I visited them.  
 
According to Vanitram, the easiest way of acquiring a card was through an agent – rather than 
directly from the state, “because if you have an agent, he does everything: he fills out the form, 
asks for the correct documents and gets the signature, and cancels your name in the village. I don’t 
have any idea how to do all this on my own.” However, a wait of two years was still required 
even with the supposed expedience of using an agent – indicating a collusion between officials 
and agents in prolonging the process and denying beneficiaries access.  
 
On the other side of the slum, closer to the city centre, lived another elderly couple, Gopanlal and 
Ritu. They are urban-to-urban migrants; an elderly couple who initially migrated from the town 
of Sinnar (in Nashik district) to Thane (in the Mumbai Metropolitan area) “over 20 years ago”, 
and then to the city of Nashik in 1992. They head a household of five members, two of their 
children are working adults, and one attends school. Ritu formerly worked as a vegetable trader, 
though in her old age she can no longer bear the physical burden of carrying heavy loads. Gopanlal 
was working as a day labourer, mainly in construction, procuring work at the local naka. 
However, he had been out of work due to low labour demand for the previous three months – a 
community wide problem he claimed, due to the local sand-miners’ strike.84 The entire household 
currently relies upon the salary of the eldest son, Ajay, who has recently taken on a low-paid 
temporary position at a local computer servicing company, despite his completion of further 
education. Their son’s new bride lived with her parents in her native village at the time of our 
meetings. Gopanlal claimed his daughter-in-law’s name was not on the household’s ration card 
and it would have been ‘an extra mouth to feed’ that is not subsidised but does not make it clear 
                                                     





how long this arrangement will last. 
 
Gopanlal initially moved to Thane with his family to join his brother who had migrated there for 
work. After his brother left the city, and due to the lack of stable work opportunities Gopanlal and 
Ritu decided to move again, to Nashik, though they never secured long-term or ‘permanent’ work. 
They seem well informed about the processes involved in obtaining a ration card in a new place 
of residence and describe clear barriers of implementation. During their time in Thane, the couple 
were granted an APL ration card linked to their fixed address which they returned to the local 
District Collector (DC) office before leaving permanently for Nashik city. The couple received 
an official receipt from the DC office as proof of their deleted ration card linked to their Thane 
address. This receipt was then shown to the local office at the NMC and yielded a new ration card 
linked to the couple’s Nashik address. Again, Gopanlal and Ritu were given an APL card, though 
they petitioned for a BPL card which they felt they were eligible for. However, the Nashik 
officials denied the request without further investigating the realities of the household’s socio-
economic circumstances and maintained the status given prior in Thane.  
 
From experience and knowledge, the couple have developed a pragmatic approach to dealing with 
local officials and using agents. Though they have an awareness of the ‘official’ procedures 
having experienced them directly in Thane, they were also privy to the need to expedite the 
processes of local administrations in order to achieve an outcome.  
   
“It is not possible to interact with ‘burra lok’ [high-status people], I 
went four or five times [to the local office] and each time they used 
to say, ‘come again another day’. I had to spend about Rs 5 every 
time I went to the office. In the end I just got fed up and paid an agent 
to get the ration card” (Ritu) 
 
Another form of ‘dhakka’ was experienced through agents, encountered within the municipal 
office itself, blurring the distinction between official and unofficial modalities of access. 




able to procure a ration card (even if it was not what they felt was the correct level of entitlement), 
Ritu and Gopanlal explained that they knew the agent they used – a familiar member of their local 
network which safeguarded against the agent cheating or in their view, exploiting them. This 
appears to be an advantage compared with the struggles of their neighbourhood members, 
including fellow long-term migrants. 
 
However, despite owning their own house and having a working son, the family faced challenges 
in managing household costs such as groceries and cooking fuel, particularly during the sand-
miner strike. In addition, Gopanlal found it increasingly difficult to work in old age. Laxmi 
explained she had to borrow money to help pay off the latest gas bill. In terms of the ration card, 
Ritu claimed the APL card in Thane enabled broader access to grains and fuels than the equivalent 
in Nashik. Their local ration shop in Nashik had stopped supplying sugar and certain cereals ‘a 
few years before’.  They were forced to purchase the remainder of their household groceries from 
the open market which were double the price of subsidised grains at the time of my visit.  
 
Gopanlal described advice given by his dukandaar to approach the NMC directly for a BPL card 
but he claimed that he does not have the time to visit the office multiple times for what he predicts 
will be fruitless endeavours – from past experience he was aware the officials would not grant 
him the form. Despite awareness and experience, and in their view, eligibility, Gopanlal and Ritu 
and their family were unable to procure a BPL card.  They attributed this ultimately to their caste 
status. They stated they belong to the local Marathi caste, officially categorised as the OBC (Other 
Backward Caste) category rather than in any specific caste group where they felt they could build 
allies or undertake collective action with other members. As Ritu said, “We are neglected [by the 
state] because we are in the ‘other’ backward caste.”   
 
Heena is a domestic worker, also in Siddharth Nagar and procuring work at the local naka. With 




Nashik, more than ten years before. When she had been living as part of a joint family with her 
in-laws back in her village, Heena and her husband were on an APL ration card. They delinked 
their identities from this when they separated from the joint household to migrate, and acquired a 
new ration card when they arrived in Nashik. It emerged that Heena and her husband had to “run 
here and there and do a lot of work” to obtain the ration card but through an agent rather than 
through officials. Heena believed they have been misallocated an APL card, given their household 
circumstances but like Gopanlal and Laxmi, she was unwilling to try to go the NMC office to 
change this having heard negative reports concerning routine dhakkas at the hands of officials. 
When asked about whether she thought the process would have been easier for those who are 
‘proper Nashik’ – a colloquial way of referring to city locals - she said things are the same for 
everyone who is in need.  
 
“It is difficult for everyone, for those who are proper Nashik too, the 
office treats them the same. When we go, they are like ‘come 
tomorrow’ or ‘come again the next day’ and they delay things but 
with an agent there is direct action.” 
 
Heena and her family felt that the ration card entitlements could not adequately feed the whole 
household. Even though they had a ration card, they were unclear whether the subsidy actually 
made things easier for them even in times of stable and relatively high income. Heena’s eldest 
children were married and lived in separate households. The gendered structural barriers posed 
by the ration card design are exemplified by the situation of her eldest daughter.  
 
“My daughter, with her joint family and in-laws, they have a ration 
card, but her name is not on it and they don't get enough food from 
the ration card. I have four brothers-in-law but I myself still cannot 
get a separate ration card.”  
 
This indicates the barriers of design outlined in Chapter Four and consolidates existing gendered 




communities in India. 
 
Swa Babar Nagar85 is one of the largest slum settlements in terms of population size in Nashik 
with over 7.5 thousand residents, according to NMC records (cited in Bhamare, 2014). The Disha 
Foundation had previously completed interventions in the slum related to health and labour rights 
awareness, and the slum settlement has attracted news headlines for its deprivations in WASH 
infrastructure.86 A greater mix of inter-state, as well as intra-state migrants, live in this slum 
settlement compared with Siddarth Nagar, and overall the sprawling settlement seems to be more 
difficult to access from the centre of town, and generally more deprived in terms of access to the 
city’s resources and infrastructure.  
 
Ramesh is a long-term migrant settled in Nashik. He is from the Akola district in northern 
Maharashtra. An intra-state migrant, he had been living in Nashik for approximately 30 years. 
Ramesh engaged in daily casual work as a semi-skilled mason. He claimed his ration card was 
still linked to his native village address where his mother and elder brother were based. Ramesh 
was living in Nashik with his wife - his four adult children were married and lived separately. In 
his home village, Ramesh’s mother was the only recipient of the ration card subsidies. Ramesh 
claimed there are barriers to access in his home village and regarded efforts to address the issue 
with his local sarpanch as futile.  
 
As for Nashik, Ramesh seemed equally disillusioned, hampered by the frustration of ‘dhakkas’, 
corruption and also misinformation on matters such as the need to pay for a ration card. Ramesh 
explained that he was told fees would have to be paid on a quarterly basis, though in his direct 
experience, he found: “You don't get the ration card if you ask for it.” Ramesh went on to vent 
his frustrations on the frequent dhakkas experienced by his community. In one of our interviews, 
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his neighbours listened in on our conversation and seemed to agree with what he is saying. 
According to Ramesh, daily labourers are in an especially vulnerable position simply because 
they have no time to try and acquire access to their entitlements.  
 
“I know where the court is and where the office is. But nobody pays 
attention. They do the rounds.  I have been 2-3 times and there is no 
luck even if you go there. No-one will do anything [neighbours who 
are listening in on the interview chip in here to agree]. All the women 
go and do the housework jobs, come back, the men go and do 
masonry [labour] and come in the evening, get money, buy things, 
eat and next day again in the morning start working.”  
 
Ramesh did not explicitly mention the use of agents and is it not clear whether this is an omission 
or due to misinformation. Instead he described paying large sums of money (as bribes) to local 
community leaders. 
 
“We gave money to two or three people, to local leaders who come 
here and say they will get us a ration card for money and then they 
go away. I have given sometimes Rs 500, 2000 or even 4000 and they 
didn’t ask for light bill or documents or anything. We give [try] again 
and again because it’s very essential to get a ration card…it’s very 
difficult. Vegetables and so on are very costly.”  
 
This suggests another route – blurring the lines between formal and informal – to access, not 
explicitly mentioned by other naka workers. Unlike Gopanlal and Laxmi whose neighbours used 
their nega sevak as an intermediary to gain access to officials, here they seem to be complicit 
within corrupt actions represented by both state and non-state actors such as agents.  
 
Sumesh is a lone migrant in his early forties from UP who has been working in Nashik since he 
was 15 years old. However, his wife and two teenage daughters have always resided in his native 
village in UP. He returned there to get married and explained he visited home approximately 
every two months to spend time with his family. In Nashik, Sumesh lived in his sister’s household, 




was also a naka worker. Sumesh’s sister and her family lacked a ration card in their household’s 
name and Sumesh’s marital family back home also lacked a ration card, though he insisted they 
were sufficiently provided for in terms of wheat and grain, from their own small-hold. Sumesh 
described the multiple setbacks he had faced in trying to access a local ration card in Nashik for 
himself and his sister’s family.  
 
“I went to the office what feels like twenty times and tried my level 
best and called the nega sevak and such community leaders ‘Dadaji, 
babaji’ [respectful honorifics] and everything, and pleaded with them 
but it was no use. In the office, I have asked agents, I have asked so 
many people, I don’t know who they all are, but they don’t help in 
any case. Somebody tells me to ask somebody else – they say come 
next month, come some other time. They pass me around and are 
shipping me between people […] With whom can I quarrel? I can't 
keep fighting with these people at the court [NMC].” 
 
The experiences here parallel those of the local labourers who petition for access in itself, or that 
which accurately reflects their status – as detailed in the next chapter. Though Sumesh resided in 
a fixed local address and did not own an existing ration card in his name, he was denied access 
through routine processes of rejection and dismissal with no accountability or explanation.   
 
While Sumesh himself did not feel he urgently needed subsidised food, his sister required one for 
the household and for Sumesh, the ration card represents a gateway to other entitlements. He 
described barriers to obtaining other documents such as the passport where a birth certificate or 
school leaving certificate is required in lieu of or addition to a ration card. Sumesh was orphaned 
at a young age and did not know his exact date of birth. He is also illiterate and did not attend 
school and thus lacks a School Leaving Certificate. These deprivations are only multiplied by 
extension with further denial to access to social protection and aspirations for improved livelihood 
(such as overseas migration, which necessitates a passport). Sumesh was familiar with risks posed 
by the use of agents and had heard from fellow workers they ‘take your money and run off with 





5.4.  Naka workers in Ahmedabad 
In Ahmedabad, my findings showed that in addition to ‘typical’ inter-state migrants from places 
such as Bihar and UP, a large proportion of naka workers originate from Rajasthan. Labour 
migration between Rajasthan and Gujarat forms one of the most popular migration corridors 
within India (Census of India, 2001, as cited in: Thorat and Jones, 2011). A history of tribal 
migration from southern Rajasthan, namely the Dungarpur and Udaipur districts, to Gujarat has 
been established, and Ahmedabad is a major destination (Thorat and Jones, 2011). The two states 
share a border and to an extent, cultural proximity, though there is a stark differential in terms of 
economic development and infrastructure as captured well by one migrant worker who tells us, 
“you can tell when you cross the state lines, the roads stop being bumpy and become smooth!”  
 
Migrants from Rajasthan represent the span of the labour spectrum in Ahmedabad both in terms 
of skills and sector – including construction, niche trade sectors, brick kiln work and the security 
service sector (Aajeevika Bureau, 2007b). Such migrants were typically in their late twenties, 
married and left behind their marital families and visit home approximately three times a year 
according to a study focusing on migration corridors by Jones et al. (2011). A high rate of 
illiteracy was also observed among migrants from Southern Rajasthan. This ‘profile’ generally 
aligns with the Rajasthani migrants captured in my sample. 
 
The other dominant group of migrants who seek work at nakas in Ahmedabad are tribal migrants 
– both intra-state and inter-state migrants. They originate from the borders of Rajasthan and MP 
as well as from the tribal belt of Gujarat – mainly the Panchmahal district. Such areas are afflicted 
by deforestation and land fragmentation thus compelling communities to seek work in urban 
locations. Mosse et al. (2005) track such migration patterns back to the 1960s, undertaken by 
those who do not migrate through contractors and instead seek work at nakas. They are typically 
illiterate and unskilled and paid the lowest wage ranges in the sector.  
 




construction work, lone male migrant naka worker experiences in Ahmedabad seem 
particularistic with regards to patterns and attitudes toward access. I interviewed those who 
worked as daily labourers on construction sites. Such migrants are typically younger – not much 
older than 18 years – and unmarried; or they are in the mid-range of the age group (31-40 years) 
and have left their wives and families at their place of origin. The barriers they describe are more 
directly related to security – both social and structural such as mis-payment of wages and labour 
exploitation – rather than specifically related to the utility of ration cards. 
 
Bhavin, from Udaipur, Rajasthan is a labour long-term migrant who lived near Vasana naka. 
When we met, he was aged 38 years. Bhavin initially moved to Ahmedabad to follow his elder 
brother, though he no longer maintained contact due to a long-standing argument. He lived with 
nine other local labourers in a rented house in a semi-informal settlement. Bhavin had been living 
and working in Ahmedabad for 24 years. His wife and two children remained in his village of 
origin and his parents were smallholders where they produced seasonal crops of chickpeas, rice 
and corn for subsistence rather than sale. However, chronic drought had led to frequent crop 
failure or otherwise meagre crop yields. The troubled livelihood options deterred Bhavin from 
returning ‘home’ despite the long separation from his family.  In Udaipur, Bhavin’s family had a 
ration card and they were eligible to access rice but not wheat and occasionally sugar. However, 
the household were denied regular access to the subsidies, and at times were required to wait as 
long as two or three months for quota deliveries. Bhavin claimed his family’s illiteracy held them 
back from lodging complaints about their dukandaar’s malpractices. 
 
For part of the year, the family were forced to make purchases from the open market and spend 
around Rs, 5000 on groceries – the average amount that was sent home by Bhavin each month 
(when he  was paid on time). Bhavin used his salary, which he reported is an average of Rs, 10, 
000 per month, to help fund his family’s expenses. At home, Bhavin was not able to earn more 




this. Bhavin’s wife could sporadically access a maximum of 10-12 days of work via the local 
MNREGA programme, but only earned Rs, 60 per day.87 Bhavin lacked a ration card in 
Ahmedabad and was compelled to purchase kerosene from the ‘black market’ where he was 
charged Rs, 55 per litre and required on average of five litres per month. 
 
Bhavin suffered a serious eye injury after being electrocuted while working at a local construction 
site. The injury initially incurred medical costs of Rs, 35,000 which were covered by the site 
owner.  A follow-up operation costing Rs, 20,000 was not borne by the site owner, and the injury 
has had lasting effects. There are burn scars branded onto Bhavin’s face and body and he suffered 
pain in hands and feet as well as permanent visual impairment in his injured eye. Bhavin appeared 
to have no knowledge about trade union representation or his rights to compensation and was 
never offered any by his employer at the time. Although Bhavin stated he still accessed on average 
20-25 days of work per month, he could not go to a site alone and needed the support of other 
workers due to this eye injury.  
 
On the younger end of the age spectrum is Rakesh, a 20-year-old migrant from Tilonia, Rajasthan. 
Like Mohan, described in Chapter Four, he is a young lone male migrant working in construction 
when we meet, though he is slightly older than Mohan, and seems to fare better in terms of wages 
and social capital. Though having been married as a child (in accordance with rural customs), 
Rakesh was not yet living with his wife and at the time of our meeting, untethered to familial 
financial and social responsibilities in the way Bhavin was.  Rakesh had been in the city for five 
years and first arrived with a relative (his cousin’s husband whom he calls brother-in-law or ‘jija’) 
who also fulfils a thekedar role. Rakesh claimed he borrowed a loan from his parents to help fund 
the move rather than accept an advance from his thekedar. Rakesh’s parents are small-holders 
and grow wheat and chickpeas both for sale and for their own consumption. Rakesh came from a 
household of ten members and wass one of two brothers who have left the village to seek urban 
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work.  Like Mohan, he also dropped out while in secondary school: “I was a layabout in the 
village, so my jija told me I should go with him to Ahmedabad and find work.” Though this 
suggests a level of agency rather than the typical rural ‘push’ factors to which urban labour 
migration is attributed (Mosse et al., 2002; Deshingkar and Start, 2003), it also suggests limited 
opportunities for aspirational young people in large families.  
 
Initially with the loan from his parents, Rakesh lived with his jija for two years and left when his 
cousin came to join them. Rakesh appeared to benefit from a social translocal networks made up 
of both friends and family members from his home village. He explained he could rely upon his 
jija to help with any problems while settling into Ahmedabad initially. Additionally, Rakesh was 
accompanied by two friends from his home village in his move to Ahmedabad but lives alone in 
a single dormitory-style room in a residential building near Vasana naka.  One of the friends, 
Arun, joined us when I interviewed Rakesh and occasionally joined in the conversation. 
 
In terms of food costs, Rakesh reports his biggest expense as drinking water - he spent Rs, 3-4000 
per month for water access. He was self-reliant for domestic chores, using a small gas stove and 
processed grains for cooking.  Without a ration card in Ahmedabad, Rakesh made all his 
purchases from the local market and purchased kerosene from the black market for Rs, 45 per 
litre. In the village it was Rs, 13 per litre, according to Arun.  For Rakesh, the ration card was 
trumped by the importance of the election card in Rakesh’s case and it was indicated that the pre-
election atmosphere (at the time of interview) emphasised the importance of voting to him. He 
did not indicate any specific need for food subsidies and shared problems that are more associated 
with a sense of isolation from his household and the burden of taking on domestic duties, than of 
financial hardship or specifically, lack of access to the PDS.  
 
“Here we are getting proper money.  In this building there are people 
from UP, Kerala and Rajasthan but I don’t know why there are only 
migrants living here. For those who are coming here are coming for 





Arun joined the conversation, “90 percent people are helping us, and 10 percent are denying us 
access.” However, neither Rakesh nor Arun were willing to speak in detail of any specific 
experiences of discrimination against them as migrants in the workplace, in terms of wages or 
treatment.  
 
“Yes [we face discrimination here] because we can’t get any voting 
card or sim card and we have to get it in another identity. We have 
problems. We cannot use our own ID cards and have to borrow from 
local people and sometimes they give us document or access and 
sometimes they deny it.” (Rakesh) 
 
Instead we see here the focus is on general and ‘practical’ rather than existential burdens that were 
alluded to by Mohan on the Iqbal site – having to ask other people for favours -   and bureaucratic 
‘barriers’ that discriminate between migrants and local people. However, compared with  Mohan, 
Rakesh seems less troubled by social isolation. The distance between home and the city, 
established migration corridor and relatively higher socio-economic standing seems to be factor 
into Rakesh’s relative confidence and access to support networks. 
 
Drought and lack of arable land have driven many small landowners and agricultural labourers to 
the cities of Gujarat, including Ahmedabad for labour. Chitranjan and his wife, Purnita come from 
the Udaipur district in Rajasthan and lived with their two small children near Gurukul Naka, a 
common site for seeking daily wage labour. At the time of interview, they lived in a small, first 
floor apartment in a building owned by the local Rabari88 pastoralist community. Chitranjan was 
formerly engaged in agricultural work but for a daily wage of only Rs, 80 and work was only 
available for ten months of the year. His father was a smallholder and could not produce enough 
corn to feed the family nor sell on the market. Chitranjan came to Ahmedabad at the invitation 
from an uncle who used to live in the city. He was advised to come and earn money and used his 
                                                     




“own savings” to fund the move, and thus did not require the assistance of a thekedar. Eventually, 
Chitanjan returned to his home village to get married and as per the custom of many migrant 
husbands, after a year, he left his wife, Purnita behind in the village to return to Ahmedabad. After 
five years, following delivery of their child in the village as there was no available government 
hospital in Ahmedabad, Purnita moved to join her husband with their child.  
 
The financial draw of settling in Ahmedabad for work was made clear when Chitranjan noted 
how he had been engaged in casual or contract labour for fifteen years, starting from a wage of 
Rs, 100 per day for loading work and graduating up to a wage of Rs, 300 per day. According to 
Chitranjan, his wage had increased on average once every five years. Whilst Purnita was engaged 
in domestic help when she lived in Udaipur but settled as a housewife after becoming a mother. 
In terms of ration card access, they had recently acquired a BPL card in their home village after 
government officials surveyed their housing situation, and with it they were able to procure wheat, 
kerosene and sometimes sugar. However, “[t]he dukandaar sells things to other people and to 
ration card holders they deny; they say they have not got the quota. They sell everything to the 
black market” (Purnita). 
 
In the 15 years settled in Ahmedabad, Chitranjan and his family previously lacked a ration card 
in the city but would procure rations from their parental household in Udaipur and transport them 
back to the city. In times when scarcity affected rations in Udaipur, Chitranjan and his family 
would make their main grocery purchases from the local open market in Ahmedabad. The price 
discrepancy for kerosene between Udaipur and Ahmedabad was significant according to Purnita 
– Rs, 15 per litre in Rajasthan and Rs, 50 per litre from the local black market. Purnita estimated 
that average of 6-7 litres is required for the household each month and an expense of Rs 150 per 
day for their grocery needs as a household of four members. In order to finally procure the ration 
card in Ahmedabad, Chitranjan was instructed by local officials, after multiple fruitless visits to 




applying for a new one. He reported taking the ‘official’ route to reassigning his entitlements to 
Ahmedabad, thus symbolically signifying his new ‘settled’ status.  
 
Many of the naka workers interviewed in Ahmedabad were based in one of the city’s largest 
slums, Ramapir no Tekro. The latter is home to approximately 150,00 residents,89 both migrant 
and local communities. It is one of Ahmedabad’s largest slums, located near the centre of the city 
and inhabited by both local communities and migrants. The slum settlement, encroaching upon 
government land, has existed for over fifty years and facilitates many who were seeking 
resettlement following a large flood in the 1970s.90 The migrant communities are predominantly 
from SC and ST groups in Rajasthan and rural Gujarat, though certain sections are also inhabited 
by those from northern states such as UP. Many of the inhabitants are involved in informal, low-
paid labour including day labour procured at nakas. Nativist tensions were expressed by some of 
the local-born residents of the slum, specifically in reference to the diversion of PDS grains 
toward the ‘black market.’ On one end of the slum live Shivraj and Radha, a young couple from 
the city of Banaras in UP who moved to Ahmedabad three years before. Radha was six months 
pregnant when we met, and they have a son of three years. The three of them – soon to be four – 
lived in a rented cramped tin shed. After marriage, Shivraj moved to Kolkata without his new 
family, working the machinery in a leather factory for approximately Rs, 2000 per month. In the 
meantime, Radha suffered from ongoing conflict and abuse at the hands of her mother-in-law so 
Shivraj took her and his son with him when he shifted to Ahmedabad. In Ahmedabad, Shivraj 
worked as a day labourer finding work at the nearby Akbar naka. Radha, heavily pregnant at the 
time of our interview, worked as an embroiderer for a piece rate and relied upon her supplier for 
payment and work.  
 
                                                     









In terms of acquiring a ration card, Shivraj expressed awareness of an AMC office is in his locality 
but was deterred by “top to bottom corruption” and the need to pay bribes. Though he followed 
due process and completed the application form with a photocopy of his father’s ration card, 
Shivraj was denied by an officer and told he was ineligible. The reasons behind this decision were 
not made clear to him. Other repercussions were the lack of credible or valid proof of identity in 
the city. Shivraj has an APL ration card linked to his native address in Banaras though he felt it 
has been incorrectly assigned. Shivraj told us of how he offered a bribe to his local sarpanch in 
Banaras for a ration card and for a BPL card was instructed to give approximately Rs 600 for a 
BPL card.  
 
“All the wealthy people get the BPL ration card and poor don’t get 
anything […] Even the sarpanch said ‘you can’t complain, nothing 
will happen. I have the power’” (Shivraj) 
 
He applied for BPL card and filled the form with photocopies of his documents linked to his 
native household but was refused and told he was ineligible by officials in the office. Shivraj and 
Radha made their grocery purchases from the open market and cooking fuel was acquired from 
the local ‘black market’ – most likely diverted from their local ration shop. They estimated they 
would make a saving of Rs, 350 each month from their grocery costs with a ration card. Food is 
not the only reason they needed a ration card however. They also lacked an important proof of 
identity, without which they could not prove where they are from or where they reside, “for 
anything, for a government job, you need an ID card, a ration card” (Shivraj). 
 
The family also faced barriers to health, compounded by a hostile family environment. Their son 
is ill, and they were forced to spend Rs, 25,000 on treatment back in Banaras. Shivraj’s mother 
failed to share any of his remittances with Radha to treat her son, another reason she and their son 
were sent for in Ahmedabad. Radha was not aware of any maternal health benefits she was entitled 
to in Ahmedabad and had only had limited interactions with her local hospital though she was 




conditions and hardly any mobility, whilst also responsible for taking care of a young, sick son 
and performing household duties whilst Shivraj is at work all day.  
 
Though low wages are paid both in Ahmedabad and Banaras according to Shivraj and Radha and 
they lacked access to the PDS and other entitlements - the move was considered worth it to protect 
Radha from abuse from her in-laws. They described the intergenerational pattern of family 
conflict between mothers-in-law and daughters-in-law that first forced Shivraj’s mother to move 
from UP to Surat, Gujarat (before moving again) and then triggering Shivraj’s shifting of his 
family to Ahmedabad. “The main benefit to moving here is that my wife does not have to live 
with her in-laws. They fight all the time in my family” (Shivraj). As alluded to in the preceding 
chapter, family strife and gendered intra-household social norms can lead to vulnerabilities 
derived from social networks, as well as state sources.  
 
Among the intra-state migrants interviewed in Ahmedabad, we see very specific vulnerabilities 
attached to specific identities – religious, caste-based or tribal. The degrees in vulnerability vary 
widely in correlation with migrant status. Amir is a naka worker from the Amreli district in 
western Gujarat and in Ahmedabad, his family live in a canvas shelter, as semi-street dwellers 
near the Juhapura area. Amir and his wife migrated to the city some 17 years before and live in 
some of the most deprived conditions observed in the city. Amir hails from an ST community 
which practices ‘reverse dowry’ and there are four brothers in the family. Each one used a large 
loan to pay for marriage and together have amassed a crippling level of debt. For Amir’s marriage, 
he paid Rs, 45,000 at the wedding itself and currently the debt stands at around Rs, 7000. Amir’s 
parents left a small amount of land divided up among four brothers. Amir’s wife, Nasreen has 
engaged in manual labour to help pay off the debt.  
 
Amir himself sold water when he could not find naka work, and before marriage was a full 




his family – they provided milk and served as assets in a very basic housing situation.  His brothers 
also lived in Ahmedabad in similar situations and one remained in their home village. A mix of 
social discrimination and debt trapped Amir and his family in these deprived conditions, where 
they are not even afforded a home in a slum settlement. 
 
“Now I can earn up to Rs, 300 per day but nobody allows me to 
become a karigar [skilled worker] and earn more money. Employers 
are not willing to give me a karigar salary even though I have been 
here for a long time and I don’t have the skills or energy to bargain 
and negotiate with labourers for higher salary.” (Amir) 
 
Amir alluded to discrimination either due to his ST or Muslim status among employers. Amir was 
also unable to draw upon state social protection to supplement his continually low wage income. 
Though he had a ration card in his late parents’ names, it was shared between his four brothers 
and they could only procure a small supply of food and kerosene on it. The remainder of kerosene 
was procured not from the local black-market sellers but from neighbours with ration cards, 
highlighting an informal redistribution among claimants as well as market actors. Food security 
for the children wa supported however thanks to the state-sponsored Midday Meal Scheme91 in 
schools. Amir described of multiples challenges to his household food security from the previous 
year alone. He described times when they feed only the children and go without meals or are 
forced to borrow money from neighbours or make purchases on credit.  
 
In terms of documents overall, Amir lost his voting card and other valuable documents in a fire 
and lacked photocopies. Lacking even a birth certificate or school leaving certificate. Amir relied 
on using relative’s documents to enrol his children in school.  
 
“Whenever officials “big people” come to the locality they are just 
talk and don’t do anything [….] I am not able to get sim card and not 
even the ration card because they ask where you are from and send 
you back to your village and you will not get the receipt. I have not 
                                                     
91 Government programme under the Food Security Act which provides nutritious meals to school-going children 




gone through an agent because I have no documents.” (Amir). 
 
The social discrimination among employers and state officials is highlighted clearly here. Amir 
and his family’s ‘bivalent’ vulnerabilities based on his ST and religious status (Fraser, 1997; 
Kabeer, 2000) are a prominent factor in exacerbating culturally entrenched sources of 
precariousness (such as the dowry practice) though Amir seemed to lack the ‘collective’ 
dimension in Ahmedabad and lacks collective bargaining power both in ‘reworking’ wages and 
entitlements. Other long-term labour migrants in the city that I spoke with also highlighted 
religious discrimination, such as Ismail, a karigar originally from UP, who recounted a difficult 
work history in the city due to his identity both as a Muslim and migrant in the city, “it is difficult 
to get work as a Muslim sometimes.” He was often asked to show his identity documents within 
the city and was only able to advance though his social connections established in the ‘ghettoised’ 
area of Juhapura.  
 
5.4.1 Barriers in observation – urban sightings of the state 
The barriers of both design and implementation experienced by the labour migrants as described 
in Chapter Four and here can be attributed to a series of divergences between policies and 
implementation practices, behaviours and attitudes at the local level of governance. This ‘front-
line’ level is also where poor and vulnerable citizens can ‘see’ the state and seek accountability 
in terms of access to state resources such as the PDS. The below are notes from a field observation 
in Ahmedabad at a ‘zonal’ office, a sub-district municipal office dealing with ward-level PDS 
administration in Gomtipur, Ahmedabad. My observation offers some insight into  how the gaps 
between policy design and implementation are caused by negligence or rent-seeking behaviour 
among local officials, and how they further generate ‘barriers of implementation’ for groups such 
as local labourers and labour migrants. 
 
The office is crowded and small, with two staff members at their 
desks. Visitors wait on benches lined up against the walls and or just 




of the PDS procedures in Gujarati. A man who has been waiting goes 
up to one the clerks, a woman, and sounds angry as he complains 
about waiting for a lengthy period of time without being seen and 
uses the word ‘dhakka’ several times. The clerk tells him calmly to 
return the following week, but he continues to complain loudly and 
angrily and says he has been coming back and forth to the office for 
four or five months. The clerk responds saying there is normally a 
two month wait for a BPL card to be processed. A lady with a badly 
torn sari sits close by waiting patiently.  
 
Finally, there is a chance to speak with the clerk and ask a few 
questions, but I am conscious of the fact we are holding up the long 
queue. The clerk answers several questions from claimants in 
between answering mine and she seems to be doing several tasks at 
once. She said the main challenges faced in her job are the lack of 
staff – there are only five members designated at that office and only 
two are actually in the office, the rest are out working on ration card 
distribution.  The other main challenge had been bought on by the 
Gujarat state itself – in an attempt to modernise how the PDS is 
accessed, ration cards were reformed to include a barcode. This 
overhaul was contracted out to a private agency and in the process, 
“thousands of mistakes” were made in the information on the cards 
and in whom they were allocated to. The agency was not made 
accountable for dealing with and addressing the mistakes and instead 
the zonal level offices’ already disproportionate workload was 
“doubled.” 
 
On the way downstairs, out of the office, we meet a lady in a veil 
who tells us this was the fourth dhakka she experienced. She had 
an old ration card and it stated correctly that she did not have an 
LPG [gas] connection. When she moved from one place to 
another, the new card said she had an LPG connection.  Previously 
she went to the office and with a xerox of the old card but was 
repeatedly told that she has been given an LPG connection.  Then 
she spent Rs, 200 on an affidavit to prove she doesn’t have an LPG 
connection – today she was successful in getting an appointment 
for a making a new correct ration card and was told to come back 
on the 20th June for a new ration card and she thinks it is only 
because we were there. 
   
   (Field notes, Ahmedabad, May, 2014). 
 
 
The granting of an appointment to change the woman’s ration card was attributed to ‘front-stage’ 
behaviour of the officials (Goffman, 1995), as referenced in Chapter Three. However, in any case 




involved in local PDS implementation in Ahmedabad. The small, busy office; lack of staff; 
intimidating posters (inaccessible to the illiterate and semi-literate) and quietly hostile behaviour 
of the staff all depict a challenging environment for vulnerable citizens to ‘sight’ the state and 
make their claims. The overall observation typifies some of the everyday encounters or 
“sightings” (Corbridge et al., 2005) between the urban poor, both migrant and non-migrant, with 
government representatives. The word dhakka was commonly used by both migrants and local 
labourers to describe their encounters with officials in local institutions and the meaning beyond 
the literal definition is captured in the above observations. People are batted or ‘pushed’ away 
with words of rebuff if not rejection.  
 
The clerk I spoke with also established the ‘formal’ rules regarding migrant transfer of PDS access 
– they should delete their names attached to ration cards in their place of origin and apply for a 
new card in their place of destination. In sharing these ‘formal’ rules, the clerk also inadvertently 
exposed the discretionary and informal practices that take place, as the experiences of Gopanlal 
in Nashik and Shivraj in Ahmedabad show, “top to bottom corruption” (Shivraj, from UP) still 




Though this group of migrants remains vulnerable in multiple ways, they can be situated in the 
middle of the ‘spectrum of vulnerability’ when it comes to access conditions and experiences. In 
some ways this group of migrants possess certain advantages over the migrants described in 
Chapter Four. They also engage in precarious forms of labour - in terms of wages and availability 
of work but live in informal settlements in relative proximity to public resources, rather than on 
remote sites. Though these slum settlements are themselves sites of multiple inequalities and 
precarities for both local and labour migrants, they provide living conditions that are distinct from 




develop communal ties, local awareness and social networks – essential for identifying informal 
routes to access and entitlements and enabling ‘reworking’ strategies (Katz, 2004). However, 
living and seeking work alongside local workers can throw social tensions into relief, and while 
the breadth of this topic falls beyond the scope of the thesis, it is notable that this tension was 
vocalised mainly by local communities rather than the migrants themselves. Intra-state migrants 
and established inter-state migrants also described multiple experiences with dhakkas in official 
spaces, as also observed in my visit to a municipal office. While still denying access, these 
encounters imply a level of awareness of local governance infrastructure and opportunities to 
catch sight of the state, that are not afforded to the labour migrants discussed in Chapter Four.  
 
However, mapping vulnerabilities of the different groups across my ‘spectrum’ of findings is not 
a straightforward task. In terms of labour relations, the naka workers can be defined as ‘the 
precariat’ – they are not in contracted relationships (though these themselves can be exploitative 
as outlined in Chapter Four). While the mean average for working days per month was in the 
highest bracket for Ahmedabad (20-25 days), it was reported as 15-20 days for individual naka 
workers in Nashik, implying greater competition among labour supply in the growing city. Many 
of the long-term migrants working via nakas reported periodic scarcity in terms of income and 
subsequently resources. Many migrants in this category do not require a thekedar to enable their 
movement to seek urban labour as they already have relatives or friends in Ahmedabad to help 
identify labour at nakas and settle into the destination. In Nashik, the dynamic construction boom 
taking place across the city buoyed demand for casual, as well as contracted labour, attracting a 
mix of inter-state migrants away from the cities of Pune and Maharashtra. Long-term intra-state 
migrant networks have formed among those who have left the drought-stricken districts of 
Washim and Beed. Compared with the migrants described previously, the labourers are less 
‘unfree’ or bonded to one particularly place and can themselves potentially ‘compete’ for wages 
and working conditions. They are less beholden to share a significant proportion of wages to a 




steadily increase wages. Long-term migrants in nakas are also relatively free to regularly maintain 
strong linkages with their native places.  
A complex range of experiences exist even within the group of migrants covered in this chapter. 
The duration of migration does not necessarily correlate with a decline in vulnerability. Narratives 
of social tensions and discriminations emerge for inter-state migrants, as covered in the extant 
literature (Weiner, 1978; Rajan et al., 2011; Bhagat 2015) and also for certain types of intra-state 
migrants, regardless of the length of time spent in Ahmedabad or Nashik.  Such migrants are 
neglected both by their ‘native’ and urban state representatives. Tribal migrants are among the 
most marginalised of social caste groups in India (Mosse et al., 2002), overrepresented in terms 
of illiteracy, unskilled labour, poor health indicators and lack of assets. The vulnerabilities 
experienced by these particular groups are distinct, and while urban migration can help prevent a 
further descent into poverty and provide crucial livelihood options for such groups, the lack of 
access to social protections in both places of origin and destination compounds the double 
disadvantage experienced by all labour migrants.  
 
For long-term and medium-term migrants living in Nashik and Ahmedabad, specific nativist 
hostilities come to the fore, rather than the more neutral and mechanical dismissals of the urban 
poor overall or more clearly ‘othered’ communities – spatially zoned off out of public ‘sight’ in 
construction sites or brick kilns.  Insidious forms of discrimination and social othering are 
widespread. Living in slum settlements alongside local communities, migrants from UP and Bihar 
are, often disparagingly, referred to as the ‘bhaiya lok’92 and regarded as a burden on both local 
resources and labour supply. However, this seems to hold less for the intra-state migrants in 
Nashik and Ahmedabad (who do not belong to ST groups), who establish social networks and 
accumulate skills, and thus financial capital, as well as social capital over time. In Ahmedabad, 
dense and extensive social networks that have emerged out of the historical Rajasthan-Gujarat 
                                                     
92 ‘bhaiya lok’ is a crude slang term referring to migrants from northern states, usually Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. It is 
in many senses derogatory although arguably has become normalised and is a form of group identification common 
for categorising migrant groups from different states across the country even by the state and among migrants 




migration corridor (Aajeevika Bureau, 2007a) benefit both household and individual migrants. 
Household migrants in Nashik tend to be intra-state migrants from rural backgrounds, and initially 
face a host of dhakkas in the city when trying to access the PDS though in some cases this is 
‘reworked’ over time through the use of agents, persistence or bribes.  
 
For lone male migrants – usually inter-state - ration cards do not seem integral to their 
experiences, as by design cards are geared toward whole households rather than individuals. The 
cards are often left with their parental or marital households. Whilst the entitlement does not 
appear to be urgently required by those cooking only for themselves, lone migrants are forced to 
purchase kerosene on the black market.  Other forms of vulnerabilities related to migrant identity 
are revealed here - sim cards are obtained on other people’s names, access to free healthcare or 
medical compensation is often denied and labour relations are often exploited. Network migration 
plays a role in establishing local social networks for newly arrived or sole migrants (Massey et 
al., 1993), as we see with Rakesh, though the experience of Mohan (in Chapter 4) shows family 
networks in the city are not always reliable. Inter-state migrants also experience major barriers to 
healthcare through blocked routes in the form of knowledge and access. They face institutional 
barriers to ration card access in their home towns and are thus primed for dhakkas and setbacks 
in Ahmedabad. 
 
A running theme in the findings from this group is the extent to which intra-household conflict 
can motivate household migration or exacerbate vulnerabilities and precariousness at the place of 
destination, also referred to by some of the migrants described in Chapter Four. For example, 
Shivraj in Ahmedabad explicitly cites the abuse his wife faced from his mother-in-law in UP 
during his absence, as the reason for bringing his whole marital family to Ahmedabad, despite a 
range of new barriers faced in their destination. This breaks with traditional gendered norms 
surrounding intra-household power balances in situations of daughter-in-law abuse, where 




siblings and quarrels among in-laws are frequently mentioned, and also noted in the findings of 
Parry in his work on long-term migrants in Chhattisgarh (2003). My findings suggest that social 
ties are not necessarily reliable safeguards against the barriers faced by labour migrants in either 
their ‘home’ or destination contexts.  
 
In terms of city context, in Ahmedabad, the communal riots that took place in the 1980s and in 
2002 have also heightened identity-based vulnerabilities in the city, creating scope for recognition 
of marginalised groups such as migrants in the process, though the city’s active civil society sector 
continue to neglect the specific vulnerabilities of labour migrants Both religious and tribal 
segregation and dynamics in the city represent ‘bivalent collectivities’ such as in the case of Aamir 
and Ismail. Longer-term migrants overall are relatively more open in their discussions of social 
barriers. The findings from Nashik among this group of migrants however, is consistent with 
those covered in Chapter Four – silence, or overtly positive accounts of life in the city prevail 
among labour migrants.  
 
Finally, in terms of governance, though more empowered by way of awareness and availability 
of time, naka workers still face structural barriers of implementation. Migrants who followed due 
course in both Nashik and Ahmedabad and attempted to transfer their ration cards across from 
their places of origin, still faced dhakkas at an inter-state level, highlighting the weakness of inter-
state linkages across Indian governance in terms of PDS access. My observations from a 
municipal office and the findings that emerge from the intra-state migrants themselves show a 
combination of ‘unintentional’ policy dissonances or departures from policy design, (in the 
flawed delivery of the barcoded ration card overhaul) and more wilful dhakkas that claimants are 
subjected to. These experiences can be termed as barriers of PDS re-design that remain subject to 
the vulnerabilities generated by policy dissonances, even in contexts which actively seek to 
improve social inclusion through technological advancement. In Maharashtra, allusions to social 




figure in my conversations with labour migrants though a subtle tension is seen in references to 




6. BARRIERS TO ACCESS FOR LOCAL LABOURERS 
Contrary to expectations that local labourers fare significantly better than their migrant 
counterparts in accessing the PDS (and other state resources) (Sabates-Wheeler and Waite, 2003; 
MacAuslan, 2011), my findings show that both groups are at a disadvantage. Both broad groups 
face barriers, though at different structural levels. While migrants are locked out of access to the 
PDS due to barriers of policy design, as well as experiencing barriers related to implementation: 
local labourer experiences of vulnerability are primarily related to the latter. As sedentary citizens 
with fixed and local proof of address, they are eligible for ration cards in their locality in Nashik 
or Ahmedabad, however they also face barriers of implementation representing a range of corrupt 
practices from rent-seeking and patronage to discrimination or negligence.  
 
The barriers of implementation faced by local labourers are characterised by dhakkas with state 
officials and also with dukandaars at the front-lines of PDS access structures. The barriers are 
commonly attributed to dissatisfaction with what Corbridge et al (2005) term as ‘state scarcity’; 
and nativist resentment toward labour migrants themselves is common among local labourers. 
Local labourers experience dhakkas mostly when trying to seek redress for a form of 
misallocation or non-allocation of entitlements. For example, many households I encountered 
considered themselves as ‘below poverty line’ (BPL) according to their income - corroborated by 
my observations of their household, family size and (lack of) assets - but were allocated ‘above 
poverty line’ (APL) entitlements and thus denied adequate food rations.  
 
In response, local labourers are relatively well-equipped, compared with labour migrants, to 
navigate informal routes of accountability and to draw upon social capital (Putnam, 2000) and 
local resources of ‘mediation’ (Berenschot, 2010) to acquire access to ration cards, other 
entitlement documents or the food and fuel provisions themselves.  However, labour migrants do 
not escape barriers of design - which affect vulnerable, poor and marginalised communities in 




out of access in the way they do for migrant populations but certain design elements of the 
targeting system and PDS operations as implemented in Gujarat and Maharashtra can inhibit 
access as highlighted in the findings.  
 
Certain indirect barriers, or at least obstacles, to access are filtered through misinformation and 
can be considered specific to those with fixed place of address, or in biopolitical terms, being ‘in 
sight’ of the state (Scott, 1998). An example of this is where the offer of access tools – such as an 
additional identity document - are manipulated to persuade citizens to share information and often 
to pay a bribe but end up being no use to the claimant. Local labourers also face barriers of re-
design, as introduced in Chapter Five – where sub-national governments seek to recast existing 
systems to become more efficient and inclusive. However, as my observations at a local municipal 
office in Ahmedabad and in the experiences of labourers in the city show, these processes remain 
exclusionary and dissonant from policy. The redesign promises of the Aadhaar card also failed to 
materialise in the lives of my research participants at the time of fieldwork. The main source of 
barriers experienced by local labourers however are related to the implementation patterns of the 
PDS both in terms of the ration card and the rations themselves.  
 
The experience and intensity of access barriers are correlated with the socio-economic 
background and identity of the labourers themselves. Through selected for being engaged in 
informal and low-income labour; living in slum settlements in BPL conditions and belonging to 
ST or SC groups – variation was found among the labourers themselves depending on age, 
specific SC group, religion, gender, social connections, family background and level of education. 
Those who are relatively well-off mainly benefitted through non-labour sources for example by 
belonging to higher caste categories, social connections and inherited assets, and literacy. And, 
though the labour relations are relatively less precarious than those of migrants (Breman, 1996; 
2010; Lewis  et  al., 2014); women-headed households (who do not tend to migrate, (Keshri and 




(Fraser, 1997; Kabeer, 2000) – vulnerable identity groups - fare the worst in terms of access to 
the PDS and other state resources and face their own range of structurally embedded precarities. 
 
The bifurcation between labour migrants and their local counterparts is represented in the level 
of nativism among communities in Nashik and Ahmedabad. Migrants themselves are perceived 
to be a source of barriers themselves in accessing the PDS for local labourers. PDS resource 
burdens and grain diversions to the black market are recurrently attributed to the presence of long- 
and medium-term migrants in a given locality. Though the formal and informal market dynamics 
involved in the PDS are complex and extend beyond intra-urban community resource disputes, 
nativist perceptions stigmatise labour migrants and can inhibit their access to social networks, in 
addition to state resources thus intensifying their ‘hyper-precarious’ lives (Lewis et al., 2014). 
Concomitantly, local labourers perceive a barrier and source of vulnerabilities, highlighting the 
reciprocal nature and socially layered nature of state-imposed barriers to access through design 
and implementation.  
 
In general, the most striking contrast in the experiences of local labourers and migrant experiences 
are observed in the fluency and easy vocalisation of specific grievances compared with those of 
migrants. Locals seemed more confident in expressing them in elaborate detail. Many concerns 
regarded the misallocation of ration cards and serial rejections by local actors to provide remedial 
action. While the impacts of no access to the PDS on food security - expressed as ‘not enough’ 
and being forced to procure food ‘on credit’ were reported by all groups - local participants 
appeared more familiar with local community structures and could use these to draw upon 
resources. Those more confident in their residential security were more explicit in reprimanding 
the ‘unruly practices’ of officials in the process of administering ration cards. 
 
As shown in Appendix Four, and in Chapter One, the highest proportion of ration card holders is 




therefore suggesting a correlation between time and spatial stability and access, as per sedentary 
policy norms. We can see here that barriers of design are comparatively less of an influence in 
determining local labourers’ experiences compared with migrants.  However, as the findings 
show, many households faced a variety of barriers in accessing the ration cards themselves, 
despite their sedentary and locally rooted status. The locals who did have ration cards spoke of 
problems emanating from the delivery or bureaucracy regarding the delivery of grains or 
management of ration cards. The migrants on the other hand spoke of the high price of household 
items (food and fuel) purchased on the black or open market and the burden it created on 
households already suffering from credit constraints.  
 
The following chapter will present the findings from interviews with local labourers who were 
born in the cities of Nashik and Ahmedabad and remained there for the majority if not entirety of 
their lifetimes. The chapter will illustrate the experiences within each respective urban milieu, 
with various types of barriers, within the specific labour-market sector and spatial settings, paying 
attention to the contextualised differentiations along lines of caste, gender and religion. The 
findings are organised according to the three main types of barriers experienced by local labourers 
in Nashik and in Ahmedabad – barriers of design (which also affect labour migrants, though in 
distinct ways); barriers of implementation (also faced by migrants, though they have fewer 
resources to overcome these) and finally barriers at the front-lines of the PDS. These describe 
dhakkas and other challenges faced in relation to dukandaars at the FPS representing the actual 
point of access for resources.  
 
6.1. Access to the PDS – barriers by design 
The characteristics of the survey sample for local labourers captured in both Nashik and 
Ahmedabad show that local labourers experienced vulnerability as shown in the indicators: ‘lack 
of ration card’ and ‘income’ under the poverty line. Below we can see in addition to belonging to 




urban poor are vulnerable to being denied access either to PDS rations, or in some cases, to a 
ration card itself. A small proportion of the sample of local labourers did not possess a ration card 
at all, despite residing at a fixed local address. 
 
Kajal is an elderly widow who lived in semi-pukka construction in Siddharth Nagar in Nashik, 
where some of the long-term migrants discussed in Chapter Five were based. Her eldest son, the 
primary earner in the household had died ‘a few years’ before we met and the household, where 
Kajal lived with her widowed daughter-in-law and grandchildren, relied on wages from naka 
labour – usually in domestic work conducted by Kajal and her daughter-in-law. The vulnerability 
of this female-headed household was compounded by Kajal’s illiteracy and lack of awareness. 
Her main source of information and representation in ‘sighting’ the state had been the male 
members of the household – her late husband and son. When asked about the ration card, Kajal 
initially confused it with the Aadhaar card, before we verified she was not in possession of either. 
Kajal explained that while her husband had been alive, he had applied for a BPL ration card and 
filed the necessary documents, but they were ignored: “They give excuses. ‘There is nobody there 
to sign, Sir is out of station’, they ask us to apply again.” Kajal had not heard of nor received an 
AAY ration card despite her both her own and her daughter-in-law’s eligibility as widows, 
reflecting both her lack of awareness and lack of state support.  
 
The slum settlement surrounding Chandhola lake in south Ahmedabad is one of the most 
deprived, religiously segregated and largest in the city.93 Fowzia lived there as a single mother 
with six children aged between 22 and seven years old and was separated from her alcoholic 
husband. The family live in a precarious kacha construction. On one of our visits during a rain 
storm, I observed a heavily leaking tin roof and damp mud floor – posing risks not only to the 
inhabitants of the house but their labour assets, crucial to Fowzia’s livelihood.  Fowzia is a 
Muslim woman who was born in Ahmedabad and lived there her entire life though her parents’ 
                                                     




family originates from UP. Her abusive and alcoholic husband lived separately and did not 
financially support the household except for occasional contributions to medical expenses.  
 
Dilapidated though it was, Fowzia’s most significant asset was her house – in her name and 
bought with the help of loan from her father. Her livelihood, since marriage, was based on making 
handicrafts; rakhees (bracelets of woven thread used in a particular Hindu festival) and brooms – 
on a contracted piece rate, similar to the brick kilns. The brooms for example are sold for 30 paisa 
(0.3 percent of a rupee) per plastic wrapping and handle, thus generating Rs, 300 for each 100 
brooms. Fowzia initially learnt the skills for her work informally through networks at her in-laws’ 
house, and through her neighbours. Initially she earned Rs, 100 on average per day (on a piece 
rate) for machine stitching work and at the time of our meeting, her daughter had taken up this 
work whiles she focused on broom making and jeans-cutting work. Fowzia negotiated work with 
three different contractors for the brooms, jeans and stitched scarves and her daughter who has 
been schooled was responsible for keeping accounts and in total earned a combined average 
income of Rs, 3000 per month. This diversification of income and intra-household contributions 
of labour, in addition to negotiations with multiple ‘agents’ displays a sense of agency and 
strategic calculation in the face of multi-dimensionally precarious circumstances. 
 
Fowzia’s husband was formerly the main breadwinner, earning approximately between Rs, 700-
800 per week and his departure has caused a significant loss to the household income. Fowzia did 
not allow her husband back in the house despite the negative financial impact, “before [it was 
worse], we always had tension - ‘when will he come back and beat me?’” Fowzia’s husband’s 
alcoholic behaviour – also commonly observed among labourer communities in Nashik - 
highlights the fallibility of the ‘dry state’ imposed in Gujarat – where illicit alcohol is available 
to elites and among the urban poor though with significant health risks for the latter, as it is usually 
derived from toxic and illicit substances (Shah et al., 2012; D’Silva, 2015). For Fowzia, the 




constant threat and trauma of domestic violence. Fowzia’s social and gender identity are both 
instrumental to her vulnerability.  
 
In terms of social protection, she lacked formal manifestations such as the ration card, but had 
access to strong networks within the community and was visited upon by civil society actors in a 
way that was not experienced or observed among migrants in the same socio-economic category.  
Some of Fowzia’s financial burdens were eased through family help, her brother covered the 
children’s schooling costs. But there were still many challenges: the household did not own a 
ration card as Fowzia’s and her children’s names were on her in-law’s household ration card. 
Fowzia had tried to apply for a ration card – she stated she had visited the state office three times 
to no avail.  Instead, she was constantly faced with minor harassments via processes of being 
sighted by the state and by civil society actors.  
 
Many government people have come here and surveyed me about 
income and so on. But nothing happens. Many NGOs come here and 
take photographs, but they don’t follow through with anything. They 
are coming regularly, regularly! But no action. Once an agent came 
to the slum and those who are rich paid Rs, 5-7000 for an APL card. 
When I asked, the agent only asked me for Rs, 3000 because I am 
poor, but I didn’t have enough at that time. 
 
These are just some of the numerous accounts shared by Fowzia regarding being tricked, cheated 
and exploited by both state and civil society actors – representing an institutional continuum of 
negligence and exploitation, reflected in Fowzia’s continued lack of access to social protection 
and precarious experiences.  
 
Mahesh and Leela were a local couple living in highly deprived conditions near Chandhola slum. 
They were a household of six members include Mahesh’s mother, Pia, and reside in a very small 
pukka construction of approximately 8 by 10 feet and visibly infested with mice. Mahesh’s family 
background is unique among the research participants I encountered in that his mother still had 




1947). Pia shared that she has never been granted an India visa for longer than two years and was 
charged Rs, 1500 each time a visa was processed: citizenship seems to be entirely beyond her 
reach. She had applied several times for Indian citizenship, according to the proviso that it can be 
obtained after living in India for 40 years. Frequent payments to agents to try and obtain Indian 
citizenship had been met with no success and Pia had faced several dhakkas or lack of response 
from officials.  She had also sold various assets in a bid for citizenship to no avail. Each 
application for a visa or for citizenship involved a costly journey to Delhi adding to the burden 
and barriers faced by Mahesh’s mother.  
 
As for Mahesh himself, he traced his experience of losing his ration card among other documents 
in a flood in the 1980s and being compelled to live as a pavement dweller for roughly ten years 
before shifting to pukka housing. Among various precarities – represented by his mother’s more 
existential form of precarity, to his family’s economic precariousness - is the lack of state support 
without a crucial base of documents. In addition, without a ration card, the cost of household 
groceries was too high to sustain “Sometimes we can only afford to eat bread and buttermilk and 
the children are hungry. In the past six months, we have done this many times” (Mahesh). 
 
The family had tried to acquire a new ration card but were stalled when asked for documents by 
officials.   
 
We have tried many times to get the ration card but they ask for 
documents… I have been trying to get the election card, and I paid 
Rs 500 to an agent, I met him outside the municipal office. I have 
heard of many stories where the agent has run away after taking the 
money so I will not pay Rs 1000 to an agent to get a ration card. 
(Leela) 
 
To add to financial challenges, Mahesh had also experienced injury at work but did not receive 
any compensation and was out of work for four months at the time of our interview. During this 




6.2. Access to ration cards – implicit barriers in implementation  
The findings suggest that misallocation of ration cards is widespread and common. A significant 
proportion of the highest earners consists of BPL ration card holders, and inversely a high 
proportion of APL card holders are found in the lower income brackets. According to my findings, 
76 percent of local labourers in my sample from Nashik reported possession of a ration card (of 
any status) and 14 percent as formerly owning one. This compares with a national average of 23 
percent and 19 percent of urban households across India in purchasing rice and wheat 
respectively, through the PDS. In 2006, 81 percent of households in India possessed ration cards 
(Paul, 2006). 
 
Motilal, a naka worker, and his wife Jigna are a middle-aged couple who exemplify a household 
with mismatched state entitlements. They lived in a rented pukka but cramped construction in 
Siddharth Nagar in Nashik. The household ration card was registered in Motilal’s name. Their 
son was married and had children of his own and lived with them in the same household, however 
this situation and the new family members were not reflected on the separate ration card. Though 
Motilal and his family felt they were eligible for a BPL card, and were in possession of a ‘BPL 
certificate’, they were given an APL card. Each month they received 10kg of wheat and 2kg of 
rice, but no kerosene. They made their remaining purchases from the open market. Though 
Motilal and Jigna stated they did not experience any problems in accessing the grains according 
to the quota, Jigna explained they were reluctant to buy things from there every month as the 
quality was poor, claiming their daughter-in-law and grandchildren were frequently ill because of 
the low-quality grains.  
 
In addition to these ‘front-line’ barriers, the family also seemed to have faced indirect dhakkas 
from local officials. Motilal recounted that the ration card was acquired at the local NMC office 
but a fee of Rs, 500 was paid – it was not clear whether this went into the pockets of bureaucrats 




Siddharth Nagar – approximately a decade or so ago - and informed the residents about the ration 
card process, distributed forms and instructed them to fill them out and submit at them to the 
NMC. This modality of access, by way of formal induction, contrasts with the dissonant practices 
that took place at the NMC itself – where a process or ‘rule’ (of paying a bribe) additional to the 
completion and submission of forms was introduced.  
 
Going into further detail about the BPL survey official’s visit, Jigna shared they had also been 
asked to verbally complete some forms there and then; simply providing their name, number of 
people in the household and address. On this basis, they were granted a BPL certificate. Jigna 
mentioned they were not asked to state their income. The government official informed them they 
could use the document to prove their socio-economic status when applying for state social 
programmes or government loans. The couple showed me the certificate - carefully packed away 
in a dust sheet in an old suitcase and clearly not in regular use. The certificate bore the official 
credentials of the NMC, however in practice it has had no bearing on the family’s PDS access. 
Motilal claimed his local PDS dukandaar disregarded the certificate and informed him he could 
not access BPL subsidy prices without an income certificate from his employer. Motilal split his 
time between Gangapur and Peth nakas to find work and also relied on the occasional phone call 
from a known thekedar. With such weak employer ties, he found it challenging to acquire an 
income certificate. These experiences represent a conflation of formal and informal institutional 
practices – thus blurring their lines in the eyes of the urban poor. An additional layer of barriers 
in the form of misinformation and deceit, as represented by the dukandaar further tilt asymmetries 
of power that structure state-social relations in Nashik for the urban poor, compounding existing 
precarities related to income poverty and labour. Motilal and his family’s experiences also 
represent a set of vulnerabilities exploited through biopolitical ‘counting’ processes and enabled 
by their fixed place of residence – in contrast to the barriers faced by migrants.  
 




Nashik. Their elder daughter was training to work in a beauty parlour and the other children 
attended school. While Sonal and her husband are natives of Nashik, her husband himself was a 
migrant at the time of our interview, working in the city of Vapi in Gujarat as a contracted painter 
on construction sites. Ramu found work through a thekedar for 10-15 days per month. Sonal also 
engaged in naka labour occasionally in times of need but preferred to find domestic work through 
word of mouth. The household income, including their daughter’s beauty parlour salary cost 
approximately Rs 8000 - insufficient to feed a household of six members according to Sonal. 
They were granted a BPL ration card when Ramu first applied a decade or so before, but since 
then have faced barriers of implementation. 
 
“I tried to apply for my children’s’ names to be included in the ration 
card but the dukandaar said it’s not necessary, I will not get it. The 
dukandaar just gives quotas to the bhaiya lok black market, those 
from UP. We get 5kg less in the rice ration and 10kg less in the wheat 
ration, than the original amount – the rest goes to the bhaiya lok” 
(Sonia) 
 
Nativist resentments towards inter-state migrants (from UP) are explicitly mentioned here, citing 
them as an indirect source of the vulnerability faced by Sonal’s family while she also perhaps 
failed to recognise the fact that her own husband is an inter-state migrant. This also suggests the 
‘regionalist’ and identity-based nature of Sonal’s resentment - aligning with community-wide 
patterns of discrimination in Nashik. However, the resentment seems directed mainly toward the 
dukaandaar – the institutional representative in Sonal’s PDS transactions. Sonal’s dhakkas were 
experienced at her local Fair Price Shop (FPS) – on the frontlines of PDS implementation – rather 
than at her local NMC office suggesting a lack of awareness regarding official routes of access 
and accountability - though as seen in the findings these are not clear even within formal spaces 
due to internal practices of corruption, malpractice and unaccountable behaviours among local 
officials.  
 




for 15 years and they had two school-aged children. They lived in the Rampir No Tekro 
settlement, on the opposite end of the settlement to where the migrants described in Chapter Five 
are settled. She engaged in rag-picking work (earning on average between Rs, 150 and 200 daily) 
and her husband was a naka labourer though he intended to set up a small business.  The family 
owned a semi-small pukka house in the slum and possessed an APL ration card which was only 
granted after they separated from Pushpa’s in-laws as part of a joint household. Though Pushpa 
contributed financially to the household through a socially derided form of labour, she displayed 
a striking level of confidence and auto-didacticism. She took initiative to independently acquire 
knowledge of how to use her voice and hold authorities accountable. Pushpa described various 
dhakkas she faced in trying to obtain the new separate ration card at the AMC office, waiting for 
an average of 45 minutes each time she visited. In addition to the ration card subsidies, she 
estimated an additional Rs, 5000 were spent on grocery costs on a monthly basis for the 
household.  
 
At the FPS itself, Pushpa recounted the multiple encounters she had experienced where she tried 
to complain about the under- or non-provision of adequate quotas and was only met with hostile 
language and treatment. “I said to him [the dukandaar] ‘the government gives you this 
responsibility to answer to our questions, this is your job’ but he only scolds me and never gives 
the ration on time.” Pushpa expressed the desire to raise a Right to Information (RTI)94 proceeding 
against the dukandaar to try and find out his quota records and see whether he is reporting them 
correctly but is not sure of the process.  She explained she learnt about the RTI from “watching 
the news on the TV.” This partial ‘information failure’ is an example of how the lack of 
knowledge and access in utility among the poor remains a barrier in spite of a progressive 
legislative framework aimed at empowering citizens to demand accountability, “we the local 
people who have a ration card never get the ration on time because the dukandaar sells the quota 
in the black market to the bhaiya lok.”  
                                                     
94 An application for access to public information in order to make appeals and redress grievances. A specific RTI 




Like Sonal, Pushpa directed her resentments and grievances toward both institutions and inter-
state migrants though her active efforts in using voice and agency to try and ‘rework’ if not resist 
(to use Katz’s framework, 2004) the institutionalised distribution of resources does not seem to 
be focused toward migrants. Pushpa represents an example of a relatively privileged and thus 
louder voice among the urban poor in Ahmedabad – her very cognisance of the specific types of 
barriers that make up local PDS structures can help empower her pursuit of accountability, though 
ultimately policy dissonances between RTI law and access (as well as practice, see: Roberts, 
2010) help to further entrench structural barriers.  
 
Paresh and his family also live in Rampir No Tekro. Paresh engaged in unskilled manual labour 
on a contract basis but had been out of work for two months due to illness. The household consists 
of six members including Paresh’s mother-in-law who was ill. They needed to correct multiple 
errors on their existing ration card and transfer the names of all their children onto it. However, 
attempts to address these issues had been met with dhakkas and rejections: “They are asking for 
a Rs, 1-2,500 bribe for a [correct] ration card” according to Paresh, although it is not clear whether 
he is referring to government officials or agents.   
 
Paresh explained that whenever he tries to go to the office to ask for the ration card corrections 
he is told to return the next day. He stated that the age and names of his mother-in-law and his 
wife are mixed up, and there are various other mistakes and omissions on the card following a 
recent state-led update of the card. Paresh and his family are yet another family who have been 
adversely affected by Gujarat’s ration card overhaul, which failed in its aim to be innovative and 
improve access. The overhaul has also affected both local and intra-state migrants, as shown in 
the previous chapter. Paresh had a photocopy of his original (and accurate) ration card which he 
brought on his multiple visits to the NMC office: “I am going there [the office] many times but 
no response. If I go again and again, I am not getting a proper response from the government 




Paresh had recently been out of work) – this situation describes a common barrier to access for 
labourers. 
 
As a result of the incorrect ration card, the household was not able to fully access their ration 
entitlements. Paresh and his wife, Rani, insisted they are forced to make purchases not just for 
kerosene but also basic grains from the ‘black market.’ “Those who have BPL cards and don’t 
want or need to buy wheat, so the [market sellers] are buying it at a rate of Rs, 75 per 10 kilos and 
we are buying it from them at an inflated price of Rs, 120 per 10 kilos” (Rani). On average, the 
family made purchases each month from both the ‘black’ and the open market to meet their 
household consumption needs. According to Rani, “we are managing somehow each month, if 
we don’t have the money then we have to buy on credit.”  The impacts of misallocation where 
BPL assigned families ‘do not use’ their quota, rather than migrants, are highlighted here. In 
addition, the use of social networks is also flagged - the grocer who lends to families on credit in 
times of crisis occupies a similar space to the FPS dukandaars further blurring the lines, in this 
case between ‘hostile’ and supportive behaviours practiced by actors.  
 
In addition to Paresh, most of his family were engaged in some form of casual or manual labour, 
including child labour. A gendered division of labour was apparent as was the prioritisation of 
their one son’s education over that of the daughters.’ One daughter had dropped out of school and 
helped with household work and was a cook’s helper for events and occasions such as weddings, 
earning an average of Rs, 250 per day. The children were also involved in work with Rani as rag-
pickers (waste collector) and collected firewood for household fuel. The girls earnt roughly Rs, 
20-50 per day.  Paresh and Rani’s son did not work and attended a school run by a foundation and 
charges Rs, 100 per month. The youngest daughter had medical problems, but Paresh was not 
sure he could afford the full treatment advised by doctors at a private hospital. In such cases, he 
explained, a choice often had been made between food for the family and medical care for one 




Paresh was in, due to borrowing from local moneylenders charging exorbitant rates of interest. 
He could not ask his siblings as one brother has passed away and relations with the other are 
damaged due to conflict between their wives. Paresh also used loans to cover his brother’s funeral 
costs – his brother was an influential figure in local politics and an important source of support 
while alive – as well as treatment for serious illness and to fix his household water supply. A 
combination of debt, illness and rupturing of close and significant kinship ties, intensify the 
vulnerabilities faced by Paresh and his family, who had entered into child labour, and further 
generational impacts of vulnerability, despite their local status in Ahmedabad. Their working and 
living conditions were further emphasised by their lack of access to adequate state resources.  
 
Rahul and Seema also live in Rampir No Tekro slum settlement with their two children, a boy 
and a girl who both attended school. Rahul was a day labourer, usually on construction sites. His 
family was one of the many in Ahmedabad who were misallocated or delayed receiving updated 
ration cards in a 2013 overhaul of Gujarat’s state-level PDS reform which included barcoded 
access and involved a poorly implemented update of ration cards. Their BPL card was replaced 
with an APL card stating they had an LPG connection, and thus denying them access to much 
needed kerosene. This is despite Rahul possessing an income certificate which entitles him to a 
BPL ration card, obtained at the AMC district collector’s office. He reported paying a fee of Rs, 
300 for the certificate. However, “until now, it has not had any use.” Rahul described the extent 
of misallocation and nepotistic behaviour at the hands of local officials. 
 
“Their [a neighbour’s] annual income is below Rs, 36,000 and the 
government official recorded that they earned Rs, 40,000 instead. I 
asked for BPL card and they said it would cost Rs, 10,000. The 
government only helps those who are dominant and connected. The 
ration card is only given to favourite people” (Rahul).  
 
This quotation clearly captures the ‘unruly practices’ of officials, in direct contravention of 
official rules for entitlements. While the ‘personalised’ form of targeting according to anti-




and in evidence from Mumbai (Abbas, 2016), the unscrupulous targeting methods here are 
attributed to nepotism toward ‘favourite’ people – indicating particular favoured social markers 
such as caste, as well as the propensity to comply with rent-seeking practices.  
 
Rahul’s wife, Seema had applied three times for the corrected ration card and had made a 
photocopy of the original ration card to show bureaucrats the error regarding their lack of LPG 
connection. However, she was told it would cost them Rs, 2000 to rectify the mistake.  
 
“I am going alone to the office to try and fix the problem because my 
husband needs to find work. I went last month, it was very crowded 
and busy in the office and nobody responded to me, no staff were 
there, only two people. Once in the past, a rude lady asked about the 
jewellery I was wearing. I go by walking because the bus fare is too 
much” (Seema) 
 
There are various dimensions to the challenges faced in Seema’s encounters or ‘sightings’ with 
the government. Seema experienced personal insults as well as outright rejection of her claims 
for entitlement; her experience was highly gendered and there is an economic cost in terms of 
time spent at the NMC offices as well as the transport needed to travel there  
 
6.3. Access to rations – frontline barriers 
In this section, the focus is on barriers that are mainly experienced at the front-line of accessing 
the PDS – at the ration shops themselves. These are some of the more complex layer of barriers 
at the level of implementation influenced heavily by the arbiters of access including local 
governance actors and their co-opted agents working in both official and unofficial capacities 
(such as brokers and agents). Indicators for nutrition among the urban poor reflect conditions of 
deprivation and lack of access to resources through state – as well as social and economic – 
barriers.  
 




members, but their ration card only reflects the names of four members of the household. It is a 
BPL ration card, but the family were still required to spend money at the open market to buy 
sufficient groceries to cover the needs of the large household. 
 
“I need to buy from the open market - rice and wheat to supplement 
the rations. I purchase 30kg wheat and 10kg rice from the open 
market, and I get 5kg from the ration shop in the last month. At the 
open market, I think I spend about Rs. 20-25 per kg of wheat, Rs 25-
40 per kg for rice depending on the price fluctuation. Vegetables are 
very expensive. We do not have enough for the family” 
 
Madhavi did not acquire the ration card directly from the government offices but went through a 
local community member who she seems reluctant to identify as an ‘agent’ – ‘a neighbour helped 
to get the card, he is based here in the community itself.’ 
 
A neighbour, a woman of a similar age to Madhavi overhearing our conversation, chimed in:  
 
“We get 5kg less [then entitled amount] in the rice, and they cut 10kg 
wheat from the original amount.  I have made a complaint to the 
ration shop dukandaar, I made a complaint, but others should also 
talk and only then he will listen. What can I alone do? …No, I don't 
buy [from the black market] because that is expensive, it’s for the 
bhaiya lok”   
 
The complainants’ description of treatment from dukandaars and the openly known diversion of 
grains toward the black-market centre on hostility, corruption and collusion with distributors and 
suppliers. Madhavi’s neighbour also highlighted the individualised, rather than collective, nature 
of complaints that are lodged against institutional actors and representatives. The direct impact of 
migrant’s lack of access to rations on local communities is clearly depicted in these findings.  
Shifting understandings and engagement with the black market are also shown in these interviews 
– where in Ahmedabad, the ‘black market’ is used by local as well as migrant residents, in Nashik 
it is clearly understood a recourse for inter-state migrants – though highlighting the burden it 






Naia lived in the Swa Babar slum with her two sons and husband - they are all Nashik locals. Her 
two daughters were both married and lived separately. Her husband had an eye injury and did not 
work – Naia alluded to his alcohol dependence. The family possessed a BPL card, and the main 
earners in the household income were Naia and her son. The first few times I met with her, we 
attracted a crowd of her neighbours. Naia appeared to bicker constantly with her neighbours over 
matters such as where her son parked his two-wheeler vehicle. In our interviews, we frequently 
competed with loud and long quarrels among the neighbours, sometimes in the background and 
sometimes with Naia involved in the quarrels.   
 
Naia showed the ration card to us - it included the names of herself, her husband, her father-in-
law and the names of three children. It was not clear why the second daughter’s name was not on 
the card.  Naia claimed she did not remember the process of obtaining the card itself, explaining 
that her parents-in-law acquired the card and paid a nominal fee at the time. The family could 
obtain the correct amount of wheat and rice on their ration card. They sometimes obtained five 
litres of kerosene, but access was irregular. They had never received sugar and when they had 
asked the dukandaar, they were told they were ineligible.  Otherwise, Naia spoke positively of 
her experience at the ration shop describing the service as cooperative. “Even when they are 
running short on grains, they give me at least a little amount of what they have.” It does not seem 
to occur to her that the grains that fell under her quota may have been diverted surreptitiously. 
When asked about how often this happens, she says it is only every few months or so.  
 
When the shortfall occurred, Naia made her monthly purchases from the nearby open market 
where she bought her fresh produce. She calculated that she needed to spend a significant 
additional amount on overall groceries: “We need at least 5kg more of grains from the ration 




gas connection. When they lacked access to kerosene they used firewood and cooked on a chola 
(open fire). Naia was reluctant to discuss purchases from the black market in front of her 
neighbours, as it was considered the preserve of socially derided inter-state migrants.  
 
In Ahmedabad, Naresh, a semi-skilled labour who lives in Rampir No Tekro with his wife Harisha 
and grown children, also described the added financial and time burden of having to travel further 
to access the rations from his previous locality as in the Gujarat state overhaul of ration cards, his 
card was not linked to his current address. Their local dukandaar was not sympathetic to their 
situation and refused to provide them with rations. Harisha stated the cost of the rations were too 
high on the APL card and stated that to make things worse, the dukandaars administer rations 
inconsistently – on different dates every month - and the grain quality was unacceptable: 
“Normally it’s so bad you cannot even give to the cattle.”  
 
6.4 Summary 
The findings covered in this chapter suggest that a strong dichotomy between barriers to accessing 
the PDS does not hold for labour migrants and local labourers. Local labourers face a range of 
barriers at different levels regarding the PDS. However, they are situated at the lower end of the 
‘spectrum’ I set out in Chapter One, as they fare relatively better in terms of access outcomes and 
processes. Local labourers can access strategies, assets and resources to help them cope with and 
‘rework’ if not resist barriers (Katz, 2004) to access, making them less precarious than labour 
migrants in the cities of Ahmedabad and Nashik. Local labourers also have advantages in terms 
of being embedded within existing social networks in the city, familiarity with local and 
governance infrastructures and therefore are better equipped to use ‘mediation’ processes for 
access to state resources (Putnam, 2000; Berenschot, 2010). Within a ‘hostile’ urban environment, 
as outlined in Chapter Two, where competition for labour and resources define many of the 
struggles among poor communities and conflicts with elites and middle-class groups in the city, 




The local labourers described in this chapter all show indicators of vulnerability: low-income 
status, precarious labour relations and conditions (though not in the worst forms), living in 
deprived slums and socially-embedded vulnerabilities (for example, related to gender or caste and 
religious identity). Like the labour migrants in Ahmedabad and Nashik, they also face multiple 
barriers to accessing state social protection including the PDS. They either lack access to the PDS 
by not having a ration card at all or, more commonly, possess a misallocated or outdated ration 
card. Access structures for urban poor overall, including local labourers, are distorted through 
corruption, collusion, confusion and misinformation and misallocations – some of these can be 
articulated as dhakkas from the state.  
 
Barriers can be experienced at the level of design, in terms of aspects that universally affect poor 
and vulnerable households and individuals; though not to the same extent that they affect labour 
migrants. The barriers of implementation - such as the dhakkas and corruption – are more 
commonly described in the accounts shared by local labourers in Nashik and Ahmedabad. Also, 
as the labourers are all living at their fixed places of address, they are more likely to experience 
dhakkas from the ‘front-lines’ of PDS access structures and the FPS themselves where 
unscrupulous dukandaars can also manipulate and deny direct access to the subsidies themselves. 
The migrants themselves are referred to as a source of barriers to accessing PDS subsidies 
according to local labourers and their families, in both Nashik and Ahmedabad. The rare instances 
of any vague open hostility expressed toward migrants were mostly reported in relation to 
discussion of the ‘black market’ and diversion of quotas for ration holders. This highlights the 
mutually reinforcing factors which generate precarious and vulnerable conditions of all labourers, 
due to failures of governance – characterised as ‘state scarcity’ (Corbridge et al., 2005) and 
divergences between policy and implementation.  
 
However, local labourers are relatively more empowered than their migrant counterparts and 




and deploy known agents to circumvent barriers to accessing the PDS. They can also tap into 
illicit markets, navigate the local open markets to assess and compare prices of goods and also 
use established relationships to borrow on credit in times of need. The relative advantage of local 
labourers is shown in their vocalisation of dhakkas and grievances – they are both cognisant of 
the barriers they face and relatively more equipped to try and mitigate or even overcome such 
barriers. These dhakkas themselves entail complex processes and outcomes – representative of 
both small forms of ‘reworking’ and even resistance strategies but ultimately within the confines 
of structure (Jessop, 2001). 
 
Barriers to be access for local labourers feature in the governance contexts of both Ahmedabad 
and Nashik. In terms of improving the lives of the urban poor, and making development more 
inclusive, the living conditions and resources available on the slum settlements in both cities I 
observed can be represented as a fractal of inequalities and degrees of precariousness. The degree 
of access to resources and living conditions varied within the slums and among the slums 
themselves, as well as contrasting with formal and privileged spaces in the cities. These sites of 
exclusionary urbanisation, inequality and deprivation seem to stand in direct contravention of the 
national government JNNURM funds which both cities are beneficiaries of.  
 
In Ahmedabad, a digital governance initiative designed to make the PDS inclusive and better 
targeted at those in need had been poorly implemented, as described in the findings of this chapter. 
Gujarat’s commitment to ‘e-governance’ (Jani, 2015) is fuelled by claims that technology can 
improve inclusion and social policies and resolve issues of corruption and inefficiency. However, 
this does not match up with the implementation chaos that emerges in the evidence from my 
fieldwork. These can be considered as barriers of re-design, where access mechanisms perpetuate 
barriers to access for both migrants and local workers despite so-called ‘progressive’ innovations. 
The redesign, aiming to make access more inclusive, adversely affected those who already 




highly-priced open market to supplement misallocated cards and restricted rations. The 
governance failures with the ration card overhaul have been attributed to the rural-urban divide 
in local governance structures (KII with representative of Government of Gujarat, 2014) thus 
highlighting a confluence of urban and social inclusive governance failures.  
 
Nashik is a smaller city, and ‘sightings’ between local labourers and the state seem to be more 
concentrated and common. Most people who were native to the city knew the location of the 
‘CBS Court’ as the NMC office is known, but it is usually associated with practices of mediation, 
rent-seeking and generally a place where dhakkas frequently occurred. The local labourers, and 
also long-term migrants, living in Nashik were often unable to disentangle formal and informal 
actors in the NMC offices, thus suggesting both an asymmetry of information between elites and 
the urban poor, as well as the deeply entwined and collusive relationships between agents and 
government officials. The barriers to access here can be attributed mainly to traditional forms of 
rent-seeking and corrupt behaviours, and lack of accountability structures rather than unwieldy 
attempts to integrate service infrastructures through technology as in Ahmedabad, which can 
generate mixed outcomes for citizens (Masiero, 2016). ‘Unruly practices’ of corruption and 
mediation are also prevalent in Ahmedabad, as they are in Nashik however the ration card 
overhaul is seen to play a more significant role in distorting PDS distribution of access according 







7. MULTIDIMENSIONAL STRATEGIES TO OVERCOME BARRIERS  
The preceding empirical chapters have focused on multiple vulnerabilities in the form of barriers 
experienced by migrants and local labourers. The findings also provide evidence that migrants, 
and the urban poor overall, do not passively experience these barriers. In recounting experiences 
of vulnerability, the participants also revealed narratives of active resilience and agency. Beyond 
the ‘sightings’ of the state and experiences of ‘dhakkas’ which themselves are complex examples 
of mutual processes of structure and agency (Giddens, 1984), this final empirical chapter sets out 
the economic, social and spatial strategies deployed by different groups within the urban poor – 
both migrant and local. Drawing from Katz’s (2004) framework of agency that is “disaggregated” 
(as described by Carswell and de Neve, 2013), the strategies deployed to mitigate the absence or 
inadequacy of PDS subsidies can be categorised as ‘coping.’ These include diversification of 
household resources or accessing illicit markets; and more active forms of ‘reworking’ through 
utilising social networks and engaging with ‘agents.’ Social capital remains a crucial factor across 
these strategies and, as described in the previous chapters, is generally more available to local 
rather than migrant groups, least accessible to those engaged in the most precarious and 
segregated forms of labour.  
 
Chief among the strategies used specifically by migrants, are linkages maintained between their 
place of origin and the cities where they work. While migration itself is considered a strategy to 
overcome vulnerability (Stark and Bloom, 1985; Sabates-Wheeler and Waite, 2003), the barriers 
faced by urban migrants warrant further strategies of resilience and protection. The findings reveal 
that in the absence of local social networks and awareness, migrants of all types and durations 
actively engage in maintaining linkages with their place of origin. While this is an expected 
observation for seasonal migrants (Deshingkar and Farrington, 2009), the same held in my 
findings for long-term and long-distance inter-state migrants. In addition to splitting households 
between places of origin and destination, migrants traverse both sites regularly; remit money over 




express emotional and aspirational linkages where they locate future plans in their place of origin, 
or even beyond India, rather than their current cities of residence.  These linkages shed light on 
the ‘self-exclusion’ practices and attitudes displayed by many long-term and household migrants 
who would theoretically benefit from cutting ties with their place of origin and applying for social 
protection access in their city of residence but remain unwilling, or unable, to do so. 
 
In terms of strategies used at urban destinations - ration cards are also used strategically in ways 
that go beyond their intended utility. They are often informally used as forms of identification 
(MacAuslan, 2011), and as such, lack of access to ration cards can also lead to the loss of political 
voice for migrants as well as deprivation of entitlements. In turn, several identity documents not 
available to migrants in their destination are a baseline requirement for accessing a ration card. 
As a result, ‘document paucity’ among poor labourers, particularly migrants, can represent 
another barrier to access.  In addition to accessing the PDS, the ration card can be used as a general 
identity card – it is highlighted it as often the most sought-after document among those who are 
poor and vulnerable and typically lack formal access to the state as it offers both entitlements and 
identity proof. Whilst formally linked to the PDS, the ration card has multiple informal purposes 
– granting access to medical care and banks, as well as proof of identity or citizenship to police 
and other authorities (Aashray, 2002; Sadiq, 2008).  
 
This chapter reveals the ways in which the possession or absence of ration cards (and other 
documents) can be modulated to mitigate, or even overcome, barriers to accessing citizenship 
rights in addition to PDS entitlements. Returning to one of the sub-questions of this thesis – how 
the state has responded to structures and patterns of access for migrants - this chapter also makes 
brief reference to how individual actors and institutions within sub-national governments respond 
to the exclusionary characteristics and outcomes of policy design in the PDS. Both Maharashtra 
and Gujarat introduced state-wide schemes seeking to modernise the PDS and become more 




understanding of the relationship between institutional dynamics and the persistence of barriers.   
 
This chapter will first present the strategies employed by the urban poor overall – both migrants 
and local labourers – to mitigate barriers to access, delineating the differences in strategies 
available to each group. These strategies are endogenous to urban structures, shaped by the socio-
economic contexts of Ahmedabad or Nashik.  The chapter then turns to strategies of linkage 
undertaken specifically by migrants, focusing on long-term and long-distance migrants.  These 
linkages themselves represent a crucial strategy for migrants in overcoming lack of access to 
resources in their cities of destination. Threaded throughout each of these sections is how 
‘responsive’ policy strategies adopted at state level (as introduced in Chapter One) designed to 
make PDS access more portable and inclusive, have impacted the lives of the urban poor, 
revealing the entrenched nature of barriers against migrants.  
 
7.1. Strategies to overcome barriers to access  
One of the ways in which both migrant and local households in Ahmedabad and Nashik strategise 
to overcome PDS barriers, either because of a lack of, misallocated or non-functioning card, is by 
diversifying their household expenditures. My empirical findings demonstrate ways that labourers 
employ micro-scale economising skills and use the open and/or ‘black market’ to make purchases 
in a way that allows them to manage in the absence of the PDS. In both cities, local residents 
claimed to be directly impacted by migrants who lack ration cards and thus generate demand for 
the ‘black se’ as the black market is known. Dukandaars are incentivised to divert subsidised 
grains and more commonly, kerosene, to the black market where those who lack ration cards, 
predominantly migrants, are forced to make purchases. This is one of a complex range of factors 
involved in the creation of the black market as cited in the literature. These factors include grain 
transportation leakages, quotas miscalculated at state level and open market fluctuations involved 
in the creation of the black market (Jha et al., 2009; Saxena, 2011).  For those who cannot afford 




option. Both kerosene and chola based cooking methods are deployed for economic efficiency in 
many households among the urban poor, in particular for migrant families.  
 
Strategies for accessing credit vary according to different categories of migrants. Many migrant 
workers lack the necessary documents to open a bank account, although there are several 
participants among those who have been settled in Ahmedabad or Nashik who use their newly 
acquired Aadhaar cards to address this. The very nature of informal work undertaken by the 
‘precariat’ is characterised by intermittent periods of work, due in part to micro-economic issues 
affecting the locality such as a strike in a particular sector, or personal economic shocks such as 
medical emergencies. Wages can also fluctuate each month depending on number of days’ work 
accumulated. In such times of shortage, almost all the migrant workers mentioned borrowing 
loans either from their employers or thekedars; or for more established migrants, borrowing from 
social networks and developing relationships with local dukandaars in order to build trust and 
purchase household items on credit in times of need. However, this is not an immediate option 
for recently arrived or temporary migrants, or those isolated from broader social networks such 
as those working in construction sites, as discussed in Chapter Four.  
 
7.2. Local labourer strategies – household level 
Most of the local labourers that I interviewed and surveyed did indeed possess a ration card, 
however they experienced barriers of implementation: they were either given an incorrect or 
insufficient allocation. The most common FPS aberration was the lack of subsidised cooking fuel 
and provision of sugar – the former more keenly felt in both states. While certain grains and food 
items can change in priority according to season and state culture (typical diets vary across India), 
cooking fuel is a consistent necessity but the commodity most prone to corruption and diversion 
within the PDS.  In response, labourers and their families economise by diversifying cooking fuel, 
to ration the use of rations – a tautology which represents the inefficacy of the PDS and its barriers 




purchases for essential household grains. Local households are sometimes also compelled to 
purchase kerosene from illicit markets.  
 
In Ahmedabad, Rahul and Seema, local labourers who live in the Rampir No Tekro slum 
settlement use both a chola and gas stove in order to ration their kerosene use – one litre is 
typically used up within three days. According to Seema, one kilogram of wheat from the open 
market is Rs, 20, versus Rs, 7.50 under the PDS. The need to supplement costs of food from the 
open market can significantly impact on household expenditures, particularly during periods of 
unemployment. In the same slum settlement, Paresh, who was not working due to illness, 
explained that his family buy rice for approximately Rs, 40 per kilogram from either the black or 
open market - signifying the similarity (or Paresh’s confusion) regarding both options. In times 
of financial shortage, they purchased from their local grocers on credit – an option which seems 
to be more widely available to locals in the city. Paresh borrowed money from friends or relatives 
in times of need (though specifically not moneylenders), to help out during times of hardship.  
 
Local social ties are imperative for coping with barriers to access, generated through both 
economic and institutional factors for vulnerable households such as that of Fowzia’s. Fowzia is 
a single mother living in the Chandhola slum in Ahmedabad whose abusive husband did not live 
with nor provide for her or their six children. This meant she could no longer access her in-laws’ 
ration card (which was registered with her and the children’s names). 
 
“When there is no work in the rainy season, we buy food on credit 
from the provision store…[Now] my sister has a ration card and she 
helps me with rations. My in-laws had a APL card and got kerosene 
and wheat. My sister has APL and gets the same. My sister has six 
members in the household and is financially better off so can give me 
her rations. …Sometimes the neighbours send me leftovers to eat and 
feed children and that is how we can manage.”  
 
Fowzia’s sister provided 20 kilograms of wheat and six litres of kerosene per month. Fowzia 




She did not have enough for the whole household of seven members to run for a month. 
Nevertheless, this redistribution of rations between family members and occasional support from 
members was vital for keeping Fowzia afloat in the absence of a ration card and would not have 
been possible without social capital.   
 
In Nashik, several local labourers and their families, both with ration cards and without, resorted 
to the open and black markets to procure groceries. Naia who lived near Satpur was compelled to 
‘top-up’ her subsidy with a significant portion of her household grocery needs. She also 
diversified her monthly household expenditures on groceries to accommodate both cash and 
resource shortages.  
 
“[The ration] is not sufficient so that’s why I have to buy from open 
market - there should at least be an increase of five kg at least, or five 
litres is enough for the month - I don’t have an LPG connection and 
I use an open stove - when I don’t have enough oil, I use wood.” 
 
Naia echoed many of her neighbours who possessed a ration card but did not feel it adequately 
supplemented their needs as a BPL household. By employing a variety of household-level 
strategies, Naia stated she could just barely manage the expenses but the risk of sliding further 
into poverty remained imminent. 
 
7.3 Migrant strategies - household level 
Strategies used in migrant households in the city are similar to those of local labourers. In 
Ahmedabad, migrant workers are typically compelled to make purchases in the black market as 
the residents lack access to an LPG connection and chola is not always possible if firewood cannot 
be easily obtained, particularly in dense urban spaces. Those with ration cards also created an 
additional layer in the black market, distributing even more limited resources among ordinary 





I buy kerosene from the black market here not only from the 
shopkeeper but in the neighbourhood from people who have ration 
card.  I pay about Rs, 50 per litre. We use about five litres per month. 
The children benefit from the Midday Meal scheme at school” (Amir, 
intra-state household migrant) 
 
Amir is a long-term migrant. At the time of our interview, he and his family had lived in deprived 
conditions in the city for his entire adult life due to ‘bivalent’ vulnerabilities – a conflation of 
social and economic factors (Fraser, 1997; Kabeer, 2000). However, he was able to undercut 
structural barriers, for example by illegally tapping electricity; diversifying livelihoods by 
maintaining livestock as assets and engaging in casual labour, as well as relying upon state 
resources such as the Midday Meal Scheme to feed his children. The black market and level of 
access within his locality, though inconsistent, could also be used to help cope with, to a limited 
extent, the high barriers Amir and his family experience.  
 
Migrants also economise and strategise by using a combination of both the black and open 
markets for food and fuel. Bhavin, a labour migrant from Rajasthan, working and living in 
Ahmedabad on a long-term seasonal basis purchased kerosene from the black market. All other 
groceries in the city were purchased on the open market by default as his ration card remained 
with his family in his ‘home’ village. However even in Rajasthan, the family used the open market 
as a buffer during times of food shortages. Bhavin had been living in Ahmedabad for a number 
of years and despite family strife with his brother who also lived there, had established contacts 
in the city. In times of financial need he was able to borrow money from acquaintances and 
reported that he was always able to successfully repay such informal loans. Chitranjan and 
Purnita, another couple from Rajasthan living in Ahmedabad, maintained tight linkages with their 
families in Rajasthan, and relied upon them to help out with accessing subsidised grains. In terms 
of credit shortages in the city itself, they were able to draw upon the help of trusted neighbours in 
their slum settlement.  
 




on the ration card in ways other than through socio-economic category. As Rakesh, the young 
lone male migrant from Rajasthan living in Ahmedabad explained, one cannot access subsidised 
kerosene if their card shows they have an LPG connection in their household. Even if these 
circumstances are not accurate or if they have changed – the subsidy in practice is still denied. 
Mohan, another young lone male migrant living in Juhapura in Ahmedabad, relied upon his 
familial networks in the city to acquire kerosene on the black market for his cooking needs – his 
aunt purchased kerosene from her local black-market peddler on his behalf. His thekedar 
occasionally provided food for him though this was not on a fixed basis. Without the ration card, 
Mohan estimated he spends approximately Rs, 2000 a month on food and cooked it by himself – 
often regarded as the main challenge by lone male migrants such as Mohan and Rakesh.  
 
In the Site One construction site in Nashik, labourers were also compelled to make purchases 
from the open market in lieu of PDS access. A common refrain among the participants here is the 
high cost of such goods both in comparison to PDS subsidies and also to the open market prices 
of their places of origin. The importance of social capital as a means of procuring financial capital 
during times of crisis is highlighted by intra-state migrants. Naka workers also struggle with 
expensive food costs in Nashik. Radhika is a young widow who lived with her in-laws in Swa 
Babar Nagar and her young baby. She underlined the importance of maintaining social networks 
within her local neighbourhood to access credit in times of need. Repayment of such loans is also 
vital to maintain this informal source of social protection according to Radhika, “When we don’t 
have money, we have to borrow money.  […] Yes, yes, we return it otherwise we won’t get it 
again.” The comparatively more ‘established’ intra-state migrant Ramesh, lives in the same 
neighbourhood as Radhika, and also experienced barriers in terms of food expenditure. According 
to his accounts, almost each day was characterised by some sense of ‘food insecurity.’  
 
“Almost every day is like that… if there is no money, we just borrow 
from our neighbours. Cooperation is important - one who is very rich 





Ramesh offers an incisive - and pithy – account of power and class relations at large, as well as 
within his neighbourhood in a Nashik slum. In certain cases, local communities can pool together 
resources despite their shared status below poverty line. Variation in income, household size, 
deprivation and access can be redistributed through such modalities. This example stands in sharp 
contrast to Amir’s world of a black market fuelled by deficits in PDS implementation -where 
barriers of implementation are reconfigured into new ones for certain community members.    
 
7.4 Strategies in the city – the use of agents   
The use of agents can be viewed as both a further barrier (and this is represented in the prior 
chapters focusing on structural and social barriers experienced by participants). However, in cases 
where opportunities to access entitlements are repeatedly thwarted, using agents strategically - by 
identifying those reputed to be trustworthy and those charging ‘reasonably’ priced fees – can 
serve as ‘reworking’ strategies to overcome barriers to the PDS and other state entitlements 
(Berenschot, 2010). Reddy and Haragopal (1985) refer to such agents as fixers who ‘lubricate’ 
state processes while also disseminating misinformation to exploit vulnerable groups 
(1985:1161).  Agents represent a diverse market of enablers, ranging in fee costs, social ties and 
reliability. Some collude with the state – demonstrated by the fact that ‘agents’ can be found at 
the local municipal offices - making it difficult to parse between formality and informality even 
for local labourers and longer-term migrants who may be more familiar with local infrastructures.  
 
Almost all the local labourers in both Ahmedabad and Nashik encountered agents, with varying 
outcomes. Some of the participants reported experiences (both direct and heard from others) with 
agents who ‘ran away’ after taking money, sometimes exorbitant amounts. However, others 
reported using agents, often embedded within their wider social networks, who provided a 
valuable service. In Nashik, the role of the urban and slum community leaders (nega sevak) 
figured often in accounts of overcoming barriers to access. Some were through informal means 




scale collective demands at formal institutions such as the local municipal office.  
 
In Ahmedabad, corruption and chaos appear to be widespread when it comes to the experiences 
of the poor and vulnerable.  Rahul and Seema obtained their previous ration card “four or five 
years ago” and explain they procured it through an agent for a fee of Rs, 200-250 and the provision 
of birth certificates and a light bill as proof of identity in order to “avoid all the dhakka.” They 
claimed the agents were not difficult to find as they were present in the AMC office itself.  Overall, 
Rahul and Seema displayed extensive awareness of where the local municipal office was located 
and how to go about lodging a complaint. However like so many others, they have met with 
several dhakkas.  As local residents they seemed more familiar with local community structures 
than their migrant counterparts.  
 
Long-term migrants, particularly those who originate from within the given state, also describe 
the use of agents to overcome or mitigate access barriers. While for local labourers, agents are 
used to expedite bureaucratic processes, for migrants they offer a vital opportunity to circumvent 
the lack of proof for a fixed local abode. Vanitram, an intra-state migrant, described how a number 
of his neighbours in his slum who lacked ration cards collectively approached their nega sevak – 
who acted as a mediator. The group went to the NMC office, filled out the relevant forms and 
provided documents proving their fixed place of residence in application for a ration card. 
Vanitram and Laxmi estimate they had paid approximately Rs, 1000 to agents to acquire a 
household ration card. As described in Chapter Five, Vanitram considers using an agent as the 
only way to procure a ration card in the city.  
 
In some cases, exorbitant fees charged by agents are paid in instalments by labourers and their 
families. Aariz and Alia are inter-state labour migrants from Maharashtra living in the Chandhola 
slum. They paid Rs, 3000 to an agent, along with other documents to procure a ration card. 





“There is no benefit in going to the government. Once you go to the 
government office they will ask you for more documents. I have 
plenty of documents but sometimes the officer asks for more and 
more documents. That’s why I’m not going there. I have not myself 
tried to go but I’ve heard from neighbours and others about this […] 
so it’s just better to go through an agent. He will handle everything.”  
 
It emerges that Aariz and Aalia developed this understanding based on secondary reports from 
neighbours and contacts, as well as their experience with the state prior to arriving in Nashik. 
They had never actually visited the municipal office in Ahmedabad though they are aware of 
where their nearest branch is located. Agents are widespread, embedded within local social 
networks and easy to encounter in the Chandhola slum, “we come to know them” (Aariz).  
 
In Nashik, Heena and her husband are long-term intra-state migrants living in a slum settlement. 
They obtained their ration card but through an agent rather than through officials. They paid 
approximately Rs, 1000 for the ration card, in monthly instalments, after hearing about the agent 
from the local dukandaar stating this is the only way to achieve “direct action.” For Heena, and 
other intra-state migrant participants, the security offered by a ration card, both in terms of food 
security and as an identity documents warranted the high prices paid to acquire one in the absence 
of functioning formal routes.  
 
7.5. Linkages as multilocational strategies for migrants – ana aur jana hai 
The linkages maintained by migrants in the city and their ‘native’ homes can be categorised 
according to their quality and quantity. Table 7.1 below represents the quantity of one form of 
linkage reported by different groups of migrants – regular visits home. The qualitative interviews 
reveal the reasons behind these visits, ranging from seasonal livelihood and agricultural demands 
to family and social reasons, such as religious festivals or weddings.  Marital and natal families; 
material assets; official documents and perhaps most strikingly, psychological attachments, are 




(and in some cases the entire adult life-course of migrant workers). This stands in contrast to the 
‘waiting room’ or ‘prison’ tropes representing the village that emerge from Parry’s findings on 
long-term migrants in Chhattisgarh (2003). The constant flow of visits and upkeep of ‘translocal’ 
ties (Brickell and Datta, 2011) perhaps remove the tendency to preserve memories (Levitt, 2009) 
and imaginings of ‘home’ in unrealistic terms.  
 
The idea of bifurcated residences, whether spatial or psychological, conforms to a binary 
conception of ‘home’ – an idea problematised however by evidence in the recent migration 
literature (Ahmed, 1999; Walsh, 2006; Datta, 2015). The experience shared by many of the 
migrants in both Nashik and Ahmedabad reconfigures conceptions of home and destination as 
integrated and reciprocal spaces rather than separate places. The term ‘multi-locational’ has been 
used broadly in the literature by Deshingkar and Farrington (2009) and others (cited in Rogaly 
and Thieme, 2012; McDowell and de Haan, 1997), mainly to describe circular and seasonal 
migration. However, these paradigms can fall short of capturing situations where long-term 
migrants tend to reside in their place of work for lengthy periods of time ‘returning’ annually or 
biannually for social reasons. This is encapsulated by long-term migrant Sumesh from UP, “ana 
aur jana hai” literally translated to ‘coming and going’ (in present tense thus denoting this process 
as continual).  
 
Instability and insecurity are familiar ontologies for those who are poor and vulnerable and are 
further evidenced by the narratives of migrant lives that emerged in my findings. Many of the 
migrants I spoke with did not see themselves as permanently fixed in either place. For those long-
term and medium-term migrants who were more vocal and teleological about how they envisioned 
their life trajectories; they see their native homes, or even beyond India, as their eventual ‘home’, 
rather than their current location. These findings provide insights into some of the practices and 
attitudes of ‘self-exclusion’ from ration card access among migrants – attributable to a 






Linkages are manifested in various forms and can create enmeshed milieus of both the city and 
‘native’ homes for migrants. These forms include financial remittances; multilocational and 
shifting households according to the availability of livelihoods, schooling, care economies, health 
and safety or expenses; upkeep of material assets and state entitlements and identity documents 
such as the ration card.  
 
Table 7.1: Proportion of migrants by frequency of visits home 
Frequency of visiting home Percentage of migrants 
Once a month or more 10.3 
Once per quarter (every 3 months) 21.3 
Twice per year (every 6 months) 37.7 
Annually 20.2 




The figures in Table 7.1 suggest that the migrants in my survey sample overall visited their homes 
regularly, according to their self-reported responses. Over a third (almost 38 percent) of migrants 
visit their homes twice a year on average, and the second highest proportion (21 percent) returned 
home on a quarterly basis. The figures represent an aggregate of both Nashik and Ahmedabad, 
across migrants of all duration types. Returning home of course represents just one aspect of 
linkages, a broader range of which are presented in the findings below.  
 
7.5.1 Family linkages 
Multiple types of linkages can be combined in the practices, attitudes and behaviours of long-
term and medium-term migrants (between one and four years). For example, a split household 
usually entails financial linkages through remittances, sent by lone male migrants and in many 




supplement resources for the main, often unemployed or under-employed, household back home.  
 
Dipesh is from Gorakhpur in UP and lived with his brother in Nashik, in the Swa Babar Nagar 
slum.  At the time of our interview, he had been based in the city for three years while the rest of 
his natal family remained in the village. Dipesh explained that visits and social ties with the place 
of origin were generally determined by one’s family situation and marital status. He himself 
reported annual visits ‘home’, attributing the infrequency to the fact he was single, stating that 
married migrants tended to visit home more often. Dipesh maintained relatively limited contact 
in terms of financial linkages: he remitted on average a small amount of his wages (approximately 
Rs, 5000) to his family each year. This formed part of an overall contribution also remitted by his 
brother.  
 
The conditions of urban labour can create gendered patterns of migration for inter-state migrants, 
particularly those from Bihar and UP (also reported by de Haan, 2004), belying an overarching 
sense of unease and lack of integration in the city.  Dipesh explained that safety and economic 
constraints were key factors in such household scenarios.  
 
“My brother is here, and he is married but left his wife in the village. 
I am getting married in a few months. I will leave my wife in the 
village. I will not bring her here, there is no good atmosphere here, 
we come back late night after finishing work and we have habit of 
drinking and anyone can go to anyone's house and it’s not safe. [But 
why not rent a room separately?] It is not affordable.” 
 
In this case, the linkages with ‘home’ are not entirely voluntary but allow individuals to 
strategically pursue livelihoods and ‘maintain’ family life (in both senses of the word – to continue 
practice and to fund). The stratification of labour and domestic spheres across a labourer’s life-
course is typical of many of the northern migrants I met in both Nashik and Ahmedabad. 
Narratives of the city as an intrinsically nefarious and risky environment for migrant women 




counterpoint to existing ‘distress migration’ narratives in the literature (Mukherjee et al., 1999; 
Breman, 2013). As discussed in Chapter Four, Aasif in the Site One site also described the 
additional economic burden of migrating with one’s family considering the cost differentials 
between Nashik and his home town in Bihar. 
 
Dipesh also maintained strong ties with his native place through institutional means, in the 
absence of possessing proof of identity or access to entitlements in Nashik. For many of the 
migrants I spoke with, places of origin signify security in a literal sense of being free from physical 
dangers and threats: physical documents are considered prone to theft or damage in an urban 
setting. And also, in the sense of social security - the government has spatially fixed administrative 
and citizenship-based identity (and concomitant rights) with the place of origin, thus according to 
this logic, moving such documents could threaten the security of those rights. Dipesh harboured 
aspirations to migrate overseas for work and at the time of our interviews, had processed his 
passport application in the village in UP as he lacked proof of identity in Nashik.  
 
“Because of security reasons and formalities, I prefer to apply for 
passport from my native place and my parents applied for it and got 
it from an agent on my behalf. The Aadhaar card was applied for from 
here and I also have a Pan card95 but for security I applied passport 
from there”  
 
However, Dipesh did not did not benefit from a ration card either in his native place or in Nashik 
with his brother’s family. In keeping with the findings on lone male migrants overall, the PDS is 
a low priority for mitigating household costs. The emphasis in the quote above [my own] 
highlights Dipesh’s spatial conception of security, emphasised further by the presence and 
involvement of his parents in the action described. Family-based and historical-spatial linkages 
are invoked here and indicate that the passport is a valued document for a single, aspirational 
migrant, more so than the ration card. Notably, Dipesh’s international aspirations do not seem to 
                                                     




be hampered by his impending marriage, suggesting a link between non-conformance to marital 
habitation norms and ‘freedom’ to pursue livelihood-based aspirations.  
 
In Nashik’s Site One, Bhaskar, an intra-state migrant, was open about his outsider status, as 
highlighted in Chapter Four. Bhaskar was clear about his intentions to return home to Washim 
eventually, though he was not sure of when. When asked if he planned to acquire a ration card 
after working in Nashik for four years, his response captured his uncertainty: 
 
“I am not sure about my residence here. I am not sure how long I will 
stay here and because of that I have not tried to get the ration card 
and there is no need to transfer these things [pause] I’m just not sure.” 
 
The hesitancy is represented even in the way Bhaskar shared these future plans, perhaps 
emphasised because he was unmarried at the time, and represents both existential and livelihood-
based drivers behind the spatial stratification of his current location and the native place to which 
his state entitlements are tethered. Bhaskar overcame the temporary barriers faced in access to the 
PDS by exercising strategic linkages with his natal family members at home. His brother used the 
ration card in his absence. Bhaskar arranged the ‘temporary’ situation with the local dukandaar – 
evidence of access to social capital and networks based on trust in his home village.  
 
7.5.2. Financial linkages 
Sumesh, introduced in Chapter Five, is another lone male migrant from UP living in Nashik 
though he lives with his sister and her family. He arrived as a teenager and at the time of our 
interview had been based in the city for over 20 years. Sumesh’s wife and two teenage children 
remain in UP in his home village where he owns a small piece of land. Sumesh described how he 
is continually “coming and going” between his home village and Nashik, every few months. 
Sumesh lacked a ration card both in Nashik and at home but he supplemented his wife’s and 
children’s costs by remitting some of his earnings – typically Rs, 6000 a month – regularly. He 




intentions of eventually migrating abroad, perhaps to Dubai where he had some contacts, which 
can explain his unwillingness to move his own (marital) family to Nashik with him, after being 
settled in the city with his natal family members for most of his adult life.   
 
Medium-term migrants also show similar patterns of multilocational migration. Though Aasif, 
from Site One in Nashik, had his conjugal family living with him in his previous destination in 
Maharashtra, he sent them home to Bihar due to financial concerns. The purpose of migration 
itself can elicit the automatic need to sustain close linkages with both conjugal and natal families. 
As Aasif explained, “I send money home. My family at home needs money, and here I need 
money for maintenance and survival. I have to send [remittances] every month for the wife, baby 
and parents.” Like many labour migrants, Aasif’s future plans were dictated by labour availability 
rather than a clear long-term objective – he stated his plans to stay in Nashik as long as the work 
is available and will move next to “wherever there is work”.  Nima and Atif, also from Bihar, 
planned to return ‘home’ eventually but according to Atif, “maybe just for 10 or 15 years. I will 
never return there permanently.” With their children enrolled in school in Nashik, the couple 
stated they were more interested in obtaining a ration card in Maharashtra, though they appeared 
to lack awareness that a fixed address, rather than their temporary abode in Site One was required 
for access.   
 
In some cases, for longer-term migrants the financial situation can also pose a barrier to 
maintaining social and family linkages with the place of origin. According to Danan, a married 
male family migrant who originates from UP, and lived in the Jamfel Wadi slum settlement in 
Ahmedabad:  
 
“If I want to go home, I have to plan in advance to save for travel and 
also to for the village to give to my parents. Occasionally I send 
money to my parents, about Rs, 2000, to my father’s bank account 
every few months […] earlier there was a facility in LS Bank where 
if you put it in one account it can be deposited in anyone’s anywhere 




card so since 2013 I had to send money through a colleague.” 
 
As Danan’s experience shows, both access to financial institutions in the place of destination (and 
origin) as well as the ability to send money back home are obfuscated by spatial, governance and 
economic factors. The increasing scope of nationally imposed surveillance measures, mentioned 
in Chapter One, as exemplified by the trajectory of the Aadhaar card and increasingly tightened 
security measures for acquiring a sim card, has had a detrimental impact on all-India access 
portals. Along with rights and entitlements, access to credit and the private transfer of resources 
have also become biased toward sedentary norms. In place of formal mechanisms, remittances 
can also be facilitated through the linkages of other migrant community members through old-
fashioned hawala-style96 mechanisms. Interstate migrants in both Ahmedabad and Nashik 
reported putting money ‘in the hands of others’ to be transferred physically from place to place.  
 
7.5.3. Resource-based linkages 
Other forms of resource-based linkages emerge in my findings. Kavita and Manish, and some of 
their children migrated from Washim and work in Site One in Nashik. Their youngest children 
remained in their native home with Manish’s parents and they maintained use of a ration card 
there. They explained how they collected a bulk of rations whenever they returned to their home 
village, though the cost of travel is relatively high (Rs, 400 each way) so they strategically limit 
visits home to every few months and combined the purpose with social reasons when labour 
demands were low in Nashik. The transportation of PDS grains is a linkage-based strategy 
afforded to those migrants whose places of origin are relatively proximate and logistically easy 
to access from their destination – predominately intra-state and inter-state migrants, and for those 
in Ahmedabad, migrants from Rajasthan, particularly in the southern part of the state. 
 
Chitranjan, a naka worker (introduced in Chapter Five) lived in Ahmedabad with his wife and 
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young child. At the time of our interview, his ration card was still linked to his natal family’s 
home in Rajasthan where he returned every two months for what he cited as social reasons – to 
visit family and partake in festivals or weddings – but also stocked up on subsidised grains to 
bring back to Ahmedabad.  Chitranjan and his wife Purnita explained there is a differential of five 
rupees in grain costs and more substantial difference (Rs, 35) in the price of kerosene between 
their village in Udaipur and Ahmedabad. Reclaiming some of their entitlements helped to mitigate 
their barriers to access in the city. Chitranjan explained he travelled to Rajasthan on an 
inexpensive and commonly used bus route, covertly bringing the grains and kerosene in a bucket 
hidden among his bags.   
 
Priya and her husband are long-term intra-district labour migrants from rural Ahmedabad who 
faced dhakkas in trying to acquire a ration card in the city for their family, similar to those 
described in Chapter Five. To help mitigate these barriers, they drew on family linkages to 
transport grains from their native ration card to Ahmedabad.  
 
“My father-in-law was helping us out and when he came to visit us 
from the village he would the rations for us. Rice, wheat and so on. 
He took the local train, so it was only Rs, 200 as he paid the elder 
citizen discount. After he died, everything came on us.”  
 
This practice came to an end following the death of Priya’s father-in-law. Priya and her husband 
both worked long hours in the city and could not afford the time to make regular trips back to 
their village of origin. Priya’s case highlights how multi-locational linkages, represented through 
family and transportation links, can provide an important source of relief for deficits and dhakkas 
faced even by long-term labour migrants in the city.   
 
7.6 Documents as anchors and state strategies 
As mentioned in previous chapters, state-wide measures have been introduced, and largely 




paucity’ affected seasonal migrants, was the Temporary Ration Card (TRC) scheme in 
Maharashtra. The TRC was a state response to national demands to include vulnerable persons in 
the BPL category, adapt to a multidimensional, rather than simply income-based definition of 
poverty and an attempt to hold governments accountable (Pande, 2008).  The scheme came about 
through the confluence of ‘judicial activism’ under the Right to Food (RtF) movement (Ruparelia, 
2013), NGO advocacy (exemplified by the Disha foundation in Nashik, and Mobile Crèches in 
Mumbai) and state-level government consultations. They resulted in a government resolution that 
recognises the very barriers discussed in Chapters Four and Five.  
 
[A]s workers in the unorganised sector migrate in search of 
employment, do not reside in a fixed place and do not live in their 
native place, they do not have documentary proof, such as a birth 
registration certificate or a certificate for school enrolment for their 
children. It is also very difficult to get documentary proof on 
migration.97 
 
The resolution allowed for temporary ration cards to be issued to intra-state migrants. The proviso 
also allowed for flexibility on the migrants’ part – if they wished to stay longer, the document 
duration could be extended (Borhade, 2007).  The RtF committee ruled in favour of a state-wide 
temporary ration card scheme in 2001. Those who did not even have a ration card in their place 
of origin, were eligible for the ‘pink’ ration cards – temporary cards to access grains whilst in 
cities (field interviews with Mobile Crèches, 2013; and NMC District Collector (DC), February 
2014). The gap in state implementation in this case became inhabited by NGOs such as the Disha 
Foundation in Nashik and Mobile Crèches in Mumbai.  In Nashik, the NGO was able to help 
implement the TRC by building relations with a responsive District Collector, and acting as a 
mediator between state representatives, such as the Labour Commissioner, and beneficiaries 
(seasonal labour migrants). The intervention targeted small numbers: Disha was able to 
successfully mediate between state authorities and beneficiaries through legitimate processes, 
                                                     
97 “Extract from the State Government Resolution 1000/G.R.399/2000/NP28 issued on 9 November 2000, for providing 
ration cards to migrant (temporary) and unorganised workers in urban areas. (Translated from Marathi) (as cited in 





which led to the NMC’s enactment of the resolution to administer cards for four months to a 
sample of seasonal migrants against their existing ration cards. Seasonal migrants were ordered 
to have their cards cancelled by the ration department when they departed for their areas of origin, 
in order to become eligible again for subsidised food grains in their home villages; the cards could 
be renewed upon each return to Nashik (Borhade, 2007: 14).   
 
According to the DC of Nashik however, the introduction of such access innovations both in terms 
of expanding criteria and digitisation, ultimately failed in Nashik due to lack of information and 
promotion of the scheme among sub-district officials, as well as potential beneficiaries. The 
number of applicants for both the TRC and attempts at increasing the numbers of other documents 
such as birth certification in Nashik remained low.  
 
“Migrant workers do not want to waste time getting ration cards, so 
the strategy is for the elderly to take the ration quota and stockpile 
and as per their convenience, they go and deliver to family or family 
goes back and access the grains.” (KII, with Nashik DC, February 
2014).  
 
The DC’s perceptive view aligns very closely with the experiences shared in my own interactions 
with labour migrants in Nashik and Ahmedabad, though it fails to account for the ‘time wasted’ 
experiencing dhakkas at the hands of the state, often both in Nashik and in the place of origin.  
 
In Gujarat, a KII with a representative from the state’s Food, Civil Supplies and Consumer Affairs 
Department revealed that a state-wide ‘roaming ration card’ system had initially been introduced 
as early as 2003 for intra-state migrants but to limited success. The programme was stopped after 
its initial phase of implementation in 2004.  The failure was attributed mainly to the lack of 
technology involved in implementation. Information systems were managed on a district-wise 
basis and not shared, therefore when a claimant moved from one place to another within the state, 
authorities were not able to verify identity manually in a reliable manner (KII with official from 




portable rights and entitlements, lack of political will at local levels of government and limitations 
in bureaucratic and administrative infrastructures are exemplified in failure of the roaming ration 
card programme. 
 
Another state response to appease demands for the right to food, and enable portability, among 
Gujarati citizens, was the introduction of a multi-level shared information system enabled by the 
use of barcoded ration cards (ibid). The programme aimed to enable the mobility of food grains 
within the state across district and sub-district levels. At the time of my fieldwork, approximately 
85 percent of the new barcoded ration cards had been distributed (KII with Gujarat government, 
2014). As described in the previous chapters, the process entailed an unwieldy system overhaul 
for both ration card claimants and sub-district bureaucrats and was characterised by chaos, error 
and inefficiency – leading to further barriers of implementation for local residents and intra-state 
migrants alike. 
 
According to the representative in Gujarat, the long-term objective for this revised ration card 
system was to enable portability of access throughout the state so that grains can be accessed 
anywhere with the same ration card.  At the time of the interview, the system was under review 
and the interviewee acknowledged significant challenges in implementing this in urban contexts, 
such as Ahmedabad. Cities lacked the necessary infrastructure, and the state government were 
unsure of which city authority should be delegated with card authentication duties. The impacts 
of this circuitous route of accountability and policy design were highlighted in the field 
observations from a municipal ‘zonal’ office in Ahmedabad, covered in Chapter Five, as well as 
in the experiences of research participants. 
 
Not one of the migrants who I interviewed, or surveyed, had heard of the roaming ration card in 
Gujarat nor the TRC in Maharashtra. However, some migrants who have been settled in 




benefitted from the card overhaul when officials conducting door-to-door surveys captured new 
claimants as well as updating existing ration cards. Certain migrants, who had been settled a while 
in the city, were able to acquire a ration card in this way without showing documents and simply 
by filling out a form. The acquisition of the ration card in the system overhaul in some cases 
provided opportunities that enabled certain migrants to address their document paucity and obtain 
a voter card with which they opened a bank account in Ahmedabad.  
 
For those whose lives were not changed by the state level strategies in Maharashtra or Gujarat, a 
combination of social networks and multi-locational strategies are used to mitigate challenges in 
the absence of a valid ration card. In the case of Rakesh, a young lone male migrant from 
Rajasthan working as an unskilled labourer in Ahmedabad, he had not yet been asked for proof 
of identity at the time of our meeting “No, no one has asked. The landlord is from UP and has the 
same issue as me, so she let it go as she knows the situation. I didn’t give anything or any photo 
or any such thing.” He had only just reached the age of eligibility for a voter card and kept his 
original documents at home; and photocopies with him in Ahmedabad. He was able to procure a 
sim card using his brother-in-law’s name. Networks are tapped to address gaps in proofs of 
identity and documents. Many use private medical facilities if in need and purchase sim cards in 
the names of their employers or any social contacts they have in the city.  Those who originate 
from Rajasthan or within the state felt they could return home easily to access any documents if 
necessary. 
 
Newer, or lesser earning, migrants generally tend to split their documents between home and 
destination bringing with them a photocopy of certain documents, particularly those who come 
from relatively shorter distances. In our discussions, many of the participants equated place of 
origin with security and permanence and thus kept important documents and established points 
of access to important facilities and services (e.g. bank account) in places of origin. Documents 




eyes of the state. The prevailing sense of uncertainty about future residence, regardless of time 
spent at place of destination or distance travelled governs many of these decisions as illustrated 
below.  
 
“Right now, I am living here as a labourer and I don’t know about the 
future and whether I will live here or go back and don’t know what 
will happen, might have to go back to the village. Mice might eat the 
documents, so we don’t keep any here, we keep it in the village” 
(Chitranjan, from Rajasthan). 
 
Chitranjan and Purnita expressed a need for a ration card in Ahmedabad but initially did not wish 
to delete their name from their ‘native’ village, anchored by existing documents attached to that 
address, “we have a bank account in the village and Aadhaar card there too” (Chitranjan). They 
both lacked birth certificates, as did their children who were born in private hospitals. They had 
been asked for such documents at the point of enrolling their child at the local school.  Both had 
voter cards attached to their native town where, according to Chitranjan “people are getting money 
for voting.” Chitranjan explained they are not asked for documents by their landlords as they 
themselves are of tribal caste – Rabari - and consider themselves ‘outsiders’.  Many migrants 
stated they had not been asked for identity documents, usually due to living in proximity to other 
interstate migrants and paying rent to those who themselves who are considered migrants. The 
reciprocal support systems enabled by small ‘eco-systems’ of inter-network migrants is seen to a 
greater extent in Ahmedabad, where it appears there are more deeply embedded and broader 
networks of non-‘native’ communities than in newly urbanising Nashik. The findings also provide 
insights into some of the practices and attitudes of ‘self-exclusion’ from ration card access among 
migrants –attributable to a combination of structural barriers, strategy and choice.  
 
Priya, a migrant in Ahmedabad kept all the family documents in her home village. Her birth 
certificate, her and her husband’s voter cards and her Secondary School Leaving Certificate 
(SSLC) were kept there: “Here we never lock the house and children are playing here so we don't 




a sim card, she returned home to obtain relevant documents when necessary and then returned 
them on her next trip home.  Priya used a photocopy of her ration card and her light bill to open 
a bank account and enrol her children in school. The ration card is still considered the most reliable 
and trustworthy document by both migrants and local labourers (in addition to the voter card) in 
terms of the entitlements it represents, as well as a reliable identity proof and Priya explained that 
her husband does not wish to cut their names from the village ration card.  
 
Those who lack documents both in their native location and in Ahmedabad are among the most 
vulnerable in terms of ‘document paucity’ and lack of entitlements. Shivraj, from Banaras in UP 
who was introduced in Chapter Five, stated he would benefit greatly from public healthcare for 
his wife, Radha, pregnant at the time of our meeting, and sick child.  Radha was keen to use state 
services for maternal healthcare but said she was unable to avail such services as ‘an outsider’. 
Shivraj claimed he could not use his native voter card for proof of identity in Ahmedabad and 
gathered information from his neighbours that it would cost Rs, 500 to obtain a PAN card, almost 
five times the official fee (set by the government).   
 
In Nashik, whilst most of the migrant workers at Site One construction site possessed at least one 
document – usually the voter card, or ration card linked to their home address – hardly any bring 
them to Nashik. If anything is brought, it is usually a ‘xerox’ of the original.  Most of the inter-
state migrants from UP and Bihar kept a xerox of their voter card with them and left their portfolio 
of documents in the village. Migrants with ‘contested identities’ such as lone males from West 
Bengal underline the importance of the birth certificate over the ration card. In place of the ration 
card, Zaarib (from West Bengal, Site One) relied upon his voter card as proof of identity – a 
document of heightened value for migrants. Migrants from West Bengal commonly face 
extensive questioning and screening from authorities who suspect they may be undocumented 
migrants from Bangladesh (Sadiq, 2008). The voter card is also useful for accessing healthcare, 




document, corroborating Reema’s, a fellow West Bengal migrant at Site One, statement that they 
are all that is required for school enrolment, “that’s the way it works in Bengal.”   
 
7.7 Summary 
A number of strategies, ranging in their impact and sustainability are deployed by the urban poor 
overall, in overcoming or mitigating barriers to accessing the PDS. For migrants in particular, 
another category of ‘translocal’ or ‘multi-locational’ strategies are deployed through a variety of 
‘linkages.’ The findings suggest that linkages are maintained by migrants due to a combination 
of agency and structural barriers - in line with Giddens’ vision of structuration and further 
interpretations of the various dialectical configurations of structure and agency (Jessop, 2001; 
Katz, 2004; Coe and Jordhus-Lier, 2010; Carswell and de Neve, 2013).  
 
Whilst Chapters Four to Six looked at the barriers faced by migrants and their non-migrant 
counterparts alike when it comes to access the state, their entitlements and the quality of 
resources; this chapter summarised various strategies undertaken by migrants to overcome the 
lack of access to the PDS. The findings show that both migrants and their non-migrant 
counterparts employ informal strategies, in order to confront barriers in different ways. Here, 
Katz’s (2004) framework of the different degrees of agency in labour (resilience, reworking and 
resisting), is useful to map against the strategies undertaken by the labourers in Nashik and 
Ahmedabad. Migrants are seen to practice ‘wilful’ refusal of options to extricate themselves from 
home-based entitlements, either a ‘self-exclusion’ practice or an outcome over which migrants 
feel they have no control given their diversified livelihoods and households, multi-locational lives 
and mind-sets and the exclusionary and hostile set of barriers for labour migrants in urban 
destinations.   
 
Most migrants are able to draw from translocal networks and live multilocational life-courses in 




of origin and type of migration. Those who are seasonal migrants and move together with their 
core ‘network’ so to speak, such as Ashwani and his family in Uvarsad brick kiln (discussed in 
Chapter Four) have a mutually exclusive approach to multilocational strategies compared with 
those who are more settled in one place and draw reciprocally from multiple locations. Lone 
migrants, such as Sumesh from UP, can for example strategically diversify household 
expenditures across multiple locations, with elder family members or children who are ‘left 
behind’ in migration, continuing to use ration cards while the migrants themselves use the open 
and/or black markets in their place of destination. Strategies can be undertaken at the household 
level when multi-locational linkages are maintained, due to self-exclusion choices or structural 
barriers. The durability and strength of such linkages are examples of ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ 
freedoms afforded by both structure and agency (de Haas, 2011) where policy design and 
implementation practice restrict the portability of rights and resources and where migrants 
strategically maintain linkages and ‘self-exclude’ themselves from rights and resources at their 
place of destination.  
 
The findings suggest that the temporal and spatial scales of migration are not necessarily related 
to the degree of linkage maintained with the place of origin. Linkages between long-term migrants 
can be maintained in several forms: through family, financial dealings or administrative affairs or 
for the maintenance of assets and resources. Whilst integration theory would posit that migrants 
loosen their ties with the place of origin the longer they are settled in their place of destination 
(Portes & Zhou, 1993; Taylor 1999; de Haas, 2005), both whole-household migrants and those 
with split households show sustained patterns of engagement, both functional and social, with 




8. FINAL CONCLUSIONS 
 
This thesis aims to improve our understanding of internal migrants’ access to formal social 
protection in urban destinations, by comparing migrants with their local counterparts. Both groups 
are engaged in low-paid labour and can be considered as vulnerable and poor. The research for 
this thesis took place in two cities representing high migrant-receiving states in India: 
Ahmedabad, in Gujarat and Nashik, in Maharashtra. By focusing on two sub-national states, I 
was able to examine the extent to which sub-national governance context - including the gap 
between policy and implementation – may impact the access structures and outcomes of internal 
migrants in a federalised national context. The PDS is used as an example through which patterns 
and structures of access are examined. As a nationwide and large-scale social protection 
programme jointly managed by central and sub-national governments, the programme enables 
insights into India’s governance context with regard to social protection, inclusion and access for 
vulnerable groups such as internal migrants engaging in low-paid labour. 
 
The theoretical framework of this thesis draws from the multi-disciplinary scholarship on 
vulnerability and precariousness, in relation to labour, migration and the combination of both. 
Without portability of social protection access migrants run the risk of heightened vulnerability 
in their place of destination, not necessarily offset by higher wages due to higher expenses and 
social disadvantages in urban contexts. The terms ‘vulnerability’ and ‘precariousness’ (or 
‘precarity’) are used in this thesis to describe processes of poverty, exclusion and conditions of 
risk and uncertainty (Waite, 2009; Anderson, 2010; Ori and Sargeant, 2013). Though the terms 
are closely linked and overlap in many ways, the broader “structural production” and political and 
institutional context acknowledged in conceptions of precarity distinguish it subtly from the 
relatively “individualised” focus of vulnerability (Waite 2009: 421). The lack of access to a 
programme that can formally help to alleviate food insecurity, malnutrition and mitigate 




concomitant rights, can heighten the already ‘hyper-precarious’ conditions of labour migrant lives 
(Lewis et al., 2014).  
 
In this thesis I focus on the state-led attributes of precariousness, and how access to social 
protection structures plays a role in shaping the livelihood trajectories and outcomes of labour 
migrants. The federalised, and decentralised system of Indian governance can be prone to policy 
dissonance - gaps between design and implementation of policy as filtered through sub-national 
levels of government.  While migration is constitutionally permitted, states, and other institutions 
enact a range of indirect or implicit movement controls including restricted access to social 
protection and anti-migrant city planning procedures. Strategies at the city level to prevent rural-
urban migration are usually based on fears of overcrowding, slums and crime and spurred on by 
desire for cities to become investment-friendly centres (Bhagat, 2017). The targeting systems and 
access structures of social protection can also be used as a form of government control over 
migrants (MacAuslan, 2011), despite their eligibility as citizens who are poor and vulnerable. 
With India’s population (and urban migration) projected to increase (Bhagat, 2011) and increased 
state-led efforts to innovate and mobilise technology to improve social and governance outcomes 
(Sarkar, 2014), this thesis sheds light on the importance of designing accountable and portable 
social protection programmes in order to be progressive in a way that includes all citizens.    
 
In this final chapter, I bring together the theory and evidence to present the core conclusions of 
this thesis. I revisit the main research questions and in summarising responses to these questions, 
I provide further insights and context on the main conclusions. I follow the framework of the 
loose and overlapping ‘spectrum’ of evidence that I introduced in Chapter One to organise my 
responses to the three research questions. I then examine the main points of comparison, and 
contrast, between the field-sites that represent two sub-national states in India in order to 
consolidate conclusions on the role of governance context in structuring access for labour 
migrants to the PDS, and other state resources and entitlements. Finally, the chapter acknowledges 




identifies the main scholarly contributions of this thesis. 
 
8.1 Summary of main findings  
The first research question asks whether migrants fare worse than their local counterparts in 
accessing social protection in India. The findings show that while a strong dichotomy between 
the degree to which labour migrants and local labourers experience vulnerabilities does not hold 
and their experiences are distinct and variegated, certain categories of labour migrants face more 
intense forms of vulnerability overall and specifically in accessing the PDS. The evidence 
presented in Chapters Four to Six show that both migrants and local labourers who are poor face 
a range of barriers in accessing the PDS and state resources. The findings also confirm that 
different sets of access conditions exist for migrants and local labourers.  
 
The second main finding is that labour migrants are diverse, and thus homogenising them 
according to categories of labour and wage amounts can be restrictive. As per multidimensional 
and capabilities-based approaches to understanding poverty and vulnerability – referenced in 
Chapter Two - a spectrum of vulnerabilities and of precariousness exists and can offer a useful 
analytical framework for understanding the intersectional and variegated experiences of labour 
migrants within India. Intersecting with spatial and temporal categories of labour migration, 
various nuanced and differential experiences exist depending on social identities such as caste, 
religion, ethnicity and gender as well socio-political factors such as regional background within 
India. In terms of lacking access to the PDS, the place of destination can affect the vulnerabilities 
of migrants in diverse ways. The impacts will be more pronounced among household migrants, 
particularly those with many young children, than for lone male migrants. As the different groups 
of migrants presented on my spectrum of evidence show: inter-state migrants’ experiences of 
lacking access to the PDS in urban destinations can depend on their state of origin. It can either 
provide a stark contrast to well-resourced experiences in migrant home states, or a continuation 
of poorly implemented social protections in their home contexts. The gendered dimension of PDS 




not easily accommodate for the social realities of household patterns in India, particularly for 
women. Daughters-in-law are routinely excluded from the ration cards of the families they join 
as well as new children born into joint households. The process of separating ration cards for new 
families who migrate and leave their joint households with in-laws is difficult and prone to 
dhakkas from the state.  Discriminations and dhakkas that emerge from barriers of implementation 
can also influence who is allocated a valid ration card according to certain religious and caste 
categories. Personalised discriminatory targeting replaces institutional systems of targeting in 
place for programmes such as the PDS.  These examples demonstrate the ways in which gender, 
regional background, caste and religion can impact PDS access even within temporal and spatial 
categories of migrants, as well as among local labourers.  
 
A third finding is that the role of the PDS is not only instrumental for food security but can have 
indirect impacts on broader conditions of health, safety and security for claimants. As a social 
protection programme, the PDS is designed to both promote food security and prevent food 
insecurity (Devereaux and Sabates-Wheeler, 2004). By focusing on resource – rather than cash – 
transfers, the programme can potentially alleviate the risk of malnutrition among poor households 
and ensure food security in households vulnerable to the prioritisation of non-food expenditure 
(for example, where the head of the household abuses alcohol). This was the premise of upholding 
the PDS as part of the Right to Food movement discussed in Chapter One. Going beyond food 
security, the PDS can also influence broader health impacts (Balhotra, 2002) and economic 
impacts (Jha et al., 2009). In contexts such as the precarious sites of labour discussed in Chapter 
Four - where labour migrants face significant health risks; restricted access to health services; 
precarious wage payments and high costs incurred by debt, medical emergencies and high-cost 
urban food expenditures in the absence of a ration card - their economic and health-related 
vulnerabilities can increase. The findings on the vulnerable and precarious conditions in which 
labour migrants work and live, highlight the importance of PDS access in fulfilling its role as a 




negative impacts of lacking urban access to the programme).  
 
The evidence also highlights the instrumental value of the ration card as an identity card - helping 
to address gaps in ‘substantive’ citizenship outcomes experienced among inter-state migrants, and 
to a lesser extent intra-state migrant and local labourers (Jayal, 2009; Abbas, 2016). The 
combination of contemporary security concerns and responsive ‘biopolitics’ (Sarkar, 2014) and 
historical prejudices against so-called ‘illegal’ international migrants from neighbouring countries 
(Sadiq, 2008) create precarious conditions for labourers from states such as West Bengal, 
particularly those who work in the nativist context of Maharashtra, where recent anti-migrant 
violence has also been seen in Nashik. Existing documents that constitute India’s ‘identity 
infrastructure’ (Sadiq, 2008), including the ration card, are biased toward sedentary rather than 
migrant citizens. Despite new developments in identity documentation such as the Aadhaar card, 
migrants and local labours alike prioritised the value represented by ration cards. They are seen 
as intrinsically linked to identity and security and access to a range of social entitlements and 
services (such as financial services and mobile phone sim card purchases), that extend beyond 
their official remit. 
 
The fourth main finding relates to the role of governance context in structuring and determining 
access for different types of labour migrants in comparison with local labourers. Both sedentary 
and labour migrants experience the outcomes of a hostile policy environment which wields 
adverse outcomes regarding social inclusion, social protection and constitutional rights for Indian 
citizens – regardless of class or movement within national borders. Migrants are delinked from 
access to social protection partly due to a dichotomy in governance attitudes.  Policies are 
fractured along one stance that promotes social protection and improved targeting of the poor, 
and another stance which either disfavours or neglects migrants and their needs in terms of social 
protection. The implementation patterns of both types of policy can overlap to compound the 




in terms of divergences from India’s constitutional rights, through to the government’s departure 
in practice from its rights-based agenda promoted under the Congress-led government before 
2014 and also filters down to the mediation and ‘unruly’ (Fraser, 1989 as cited in Kabeer, 2000) 
practices that characterise local government. 
 
Overall, a dual policy attitude can be observed – one aspect is related to internal migration and 
another is related to social protection for the poor – these combine to create ‘hyper-precarity’ for 
migrants (Lewis et al., 2014). In addition, the variegated nature of Indian citizenship also 
contributes to differentiated policy outcomes (Jayal, 2009; Abbas 2016). The absence of an 
explicit policy framework or accountable legal framework to formally protect migrant workers in 
India both fuels the ‘distress’ narrative and impedes any empowerment or development potential 
of migration itself. Ideas of governance as developed by Corbridge et al. (2005) and Chatterjee 
(2004) are articulated in this thesis through focusing on how strategic negotiations between the 
poor, migrants, and representatives of the state determines patterns and outcomes of access rather 
than policy norms. Despite the emergence of the rights-based movement and resultant legal 
reform, migrants remain excluded from both judicial and advocacy agendas. Migrants find 
themselves in a ‘greyzone’ of citizenship and must navigate and negotiate their entitlements – 
thus heightening and extending their precariousness and vulnerability. 
 
In Ahmedabad, the policy dissonances which characterise its governance context are manifested 
in attempts to modernise ‘governmentality’ (Foucault, 1978) and “re-imagine” state-citizen 
relations (Sarkar, 2014: 516).  The failure of attempts to make ration cards portable for intra-state 
migrants in 2003, and ongoing chaos incurred by the introduction of a barcoded ration card system 
during the time of my fieldwork were articulated in experiences of the PDS claimants themselves.  
Awareness of the roaming ration card system was nil among its intended ‘beneficiaries’ and many 
of the local labourers complained of system errors in terms of misallocated or inaccurate ration 




and observations of state representative at the municipal and state level in Ahmedabad and Gujarat 
showed that failures specific to urban governance, insufficient digital and communication 
infrastructures and incompetence had created a divergence between policy design, 
implementation and outcomes. Advancements in technology can therefore not achieve socially 
equitable outcomes without accountable systems in place and while spaces for ‘unruly practices’ 
remain. The widespread practices of patronage and mediation described in Berenschot’s study of 
Ahmedabad (2010) signal the need to ameliorate such practices with attempts to modernise 
governance. The emphasis on governance and policy shows that rhetoric, policy design and 
technology are not effective in isolation to address these issues but rather a concerted and 
collaborative effort though accountability measures and the recognition rather than contestation 
of vulnerable groups such as migrants. 
 
In comparison, Nashik is a smaller but fast-growing city where socially inclusive and pro-migrant 
welfare governance has been dependent upon the agency of municipal individuals such as the 
District Collector at the time of my fieldwork and NGO organisations. This contrasted with 
Ahmedabad, where its vibrant civil society organisation appeared to be more focused on the 
labour aspect of migration rather than access to state provisions and welfare. The state of 
Maharashtra also introduced a Temporary Ration Card (TRC) scheme targeting intra-state 
migrants and aiming to improve inclusion for vulnerable groups – however the lack of incentives 
and awareness for implementing the programme, in a governance context embedded with systems 
of patronage (Deshpande et al., 2017), inhibited policy outcomes.  
 
As a rapidly urbanising city, the governance context of Nashik has exhibited relatively positive 
aspects for labourers such as conforming to legislative protections for vulnerable workers in 
sectors including construction, to an extent. When compared with Ahmedabad’s more ironclad 
sites of precarious labour, this can be seen more as an oversight of a ‘younger’ city less in thrall 




evaluation reports (YUVA, 2010) also suggest that the NMC had prioritised urban development 
over poverty alleviation and welfare despite JNNURM commitments, suggesting that the 
governance context is in a state of flux, as well as the city’s development. During this period of 
extending its urbanisation, the city of Nashik appears to offer spaces for proactive agents and 
NGO assistance that co-exist along exclusionary practices, particularly for migrants.  
 
Finally, in keeping with theorisations of the dialectical and reciprocal processes involved in 
structuration (Giddens, 1984; Jessop, 2001), the findings show that labour migrants and local 
labourers draw upon their own agency in various forms that can be articulated through Katz’s 
(2004) framework of resilience, reworking and resistance. In Chapter Seven, I present evidence 
on various strategies undertaken by local labourers and migrants to overcome or mitigate access 
barriers. I argue that local labourers have more access to strategies, local resources and social 
networks in the city – thus making them marginally less vulnerable than labour migrants. 
However, labour migrants have access to distinct and geographically varied forms of agency. 
They strategically maintain linkages with their places of origin and deploy multilocational 
strategies to help ‘cope with’ or ‘rework’ barriers (Katz, 2004). The evidence highlights the ‘false 
dichotomies’ of rural versus urban livelihoods (Mosse et al., 2005) and policy lessons can be 
drawn from the evidence in this thesis that both life-courses and livelihoods can be multi-
locational and ‘trans-local’ (Brickell and Datta, 2011) and there is a need for portable social 
protection rights to reflect this.  
 
8.1.1. How do labour migrant experiences fare against their non-migrant counterparts in terms 
of access to the Public Distribution System? 
As summarised above, both migrants and non-migrants experience barriers to PDS access, though 
a strong dichotomy does not hold. The findings from my sampling survey, as shown in Annex 
Four and Five show that ration card possession occurs across both groups, though not at the place 




security, compulsions to procure items such as kerosene on the local ‘black’ market, and the lack 
of support in household expenditures.  Indirectly, a lack of PDS access can have long-lasting 
impacts on nutrition particularly for children in the most vulnerable households, including 
migrant households (not observable in my research but established in the literature). Local 
labourers also face various dhakkas in their experiences with the state when trying to resolve 
issues with their ration cards, or even when applying for access. However, local labourers have 
the strongest social networks within the cities of Nashik and Ahmedabad. They can establish trust 
with mediating agents, are often charged lower fees than their migrant counterparts and face lower 
risks of agents exploiting them by evading delivery of services.   
 
However, for labour migrants in particular, the lack of PDS access also creates vulnerabilities that 
are specific to migrants in terms of legal security, poor ‘citizenship outcomes’ and identity 
(Abbas, 2016). The ration card is an essential document required for a broad range of citizenship 
rights and protections in addition to entitlements for mobile and migrant citizens who are away 
from their fixed and proven address. In conclusion, the findings show that while both migrants 
and their non-migrant counterparts fare poorly in terms of PDS access, the outcomes are distinct 
and more broad-ranging for migrants.  
 
  
8.1.2. What are the structures and patterns of social protection access for different types of labour 
migrants and how are they affected? 
Though the evidence shows that both poor labour migrants and poor local labourers are 
vulnerable, I argue that it also confirms the distinctive vulnerabilities and precarious conditions 
for different types of labour migrants.  Furthermore, the evidence from labour migrants is not 
uniform and a diversity of precarious and vulnerable experiences are represented according to 
multiple intersecting factors including social identity, economic background, labour sector and 




in Chapter One, migrants working in precarious sites of labour such as remote construction sites 
and brick kilns can be considered among the most vulnerable. They are migrating to the city and 
working in urban industries yet unable to access resources, infrastructure, as well as services 
available in the city. This can be attributed to a combination of structural barriers related to urban 
governance – including the specific spatialisation of urban infrastructures and basic services - and 
exploitative labour markets and contract arrangements. These structures of access appear to be 
more deeply embedded in the larger and more developed city of Ahmedabad, than in Nashik.   
The second assemblage of labour migrants are loosely categorised as naka workers who are also 
vulnerable but face slightly less intensive barriers different patterns of PDS access can be 
observed. As long- and medium-term migrants, they are relatively more settled in their cities of 
destination and familiar with governance infrastructures, so they can try to apply for ration cards, 
or they are familiar with informal routes such as mediating agents who can procure ration card 
access, though for a high fee. Access conditions and outcomes overall are more closely linked to 
the socio-economic backgrounds, type and duration of migration as this can dictate how migrants 
navigate general structural barriers to access, rather than to individual state context.  
 
8.1.3. How do labour migrants and non-migrants respond to such structures and patterns of 
access? b) How can the state learn from these responses to improve access for migrants? 
The findings show that neither labour migrants nor local labourers passively accept the multiple 
barriers they face in terms of accessing the PDS and other state resources. While a greater access 
to strategic options exist in Nashik and Ahmedabad for local labourers – hence their relatively 
lower positioning on the gradient of vulnerabilities and precariousness - labour migrants exercise 
agency in distinct and varied ways based on linkages actively maintained between their places of 
origin and destination. Despite a hostile policy environment at inter-state governance levels 
(Deshingkar and Farrington, 2009; KII with representative of Cabinet Secretariat of India, May 
2014), labour migrants manage to navigate access structures to cope with and ‘rework’ barriers 




influenced by the spatiality and temporality of migration but are individualised according to 
subjectivities such as personal aspirations, life paths and attachments (which entail practices of 
‘self-exclusion’ from state entitlements at destination). 
 
Both local labourers and labour migrants experience dhakkas in their sightings of the state, though 
local labourers appear to be more confident, vocal and active in these engagements than their 
migrant counterparts. However, migrant encounters with the state can either represent a 
continuum of ‘dhakkas’ and barriers or a rupture in access to state entitlements, sightings of the 
state and governance context depending on their state of origin as shown in the findings. Certain 
migrants compared their positive experiences of the PDS with the current situation in either 
Nashik or Ahmedabad, while others took for granted a broader sense of state failures and ‘state 
scarcity’ (Corbridge et al., 2005).  
 
Finally, the states of Gujarat and Maharashtra both attempted to develop ‘responsive’ approaches 
to limitations of PDS access for labour migrants – though this was restricted to intra-state 
migrants. However, at the time of fieldwork both interventions had failed and been cancelled. In 
Gujarat, characterised by an ambitious state project to modernise programme implementation and 
targeting through technology, the failures of this programme and flawed implementation of 
similar PDS initiatives at the time of fieldwork were attributed to gaps in technological 
infrastructures. In addition, a culture of patronage, rent-seeking behaviour, collusion with market 
forces and other forms of corruption pervade the governance context in Ahmedabad, and Gujarat 
overall (Dayal and Agarwal, 2005; Berenschot, 2010, KIIs with NGOs in Ahmedabad, 2014) 
which can also account for failures of implementation in pro-migrant access programmes. In 
Maharashtra, an active civil society platform for improving the rights of unorganised workers – 
which encompasses labour migrants – clashes with deeply embedded networks of patronage (KII 
with representative from Nashik Municipal Cooperation, 2014; Deshpande et al., 2017). This 




including in Nashik, though the flaws in the scheme’s design itself were also highlighted in an 
interview with a district-level official. These ‘responsive’ strategies highlight the need to align 
governance incentives and objectives through mechanisms of accountability as well as robust 
infrastructures (such as computerised systems of access and targeting) at all levels of governance. 
 
As discussed in Chapter One, the Aadhaar card and other e-governance initiatives that have been 
piloted across the country have generated highly controversial outcomes (and failures) in terms 
of accountability, transparency and enabling social inclusion through portable access 
(Ramanathan, 2010; Rao and Greenleaf, 2013; Khera, 2017). Though the Aadhaar card was hailed 
as a “key mechanism for addressing the knowledge asymmetry between the government and the 
governed,” (Nilekani, 2008: 350), its legacy has unfolded in a less than celebratory way. 
Implementation became embroiled in highly political dynamics – Gujarat’s ruling party at the 
time and the incumbent government, the BJP openly critiqued the ‘unconstitutional’ and invasive 
nature of the Aadhaar card, and in 2013, when I started my fieldwork, a Supreme Court ruling 
derailed the process of coverage.  
 
The programme initially claimed to enable portability of access, thus potentially transforming 
access structures for migrant workers.  However, at the time of fieldwork, both public and political 
responses were mixed, and the level of uptake to the new centrally mandated programme varied 
from state to state. Khera (2011) warned that linking the Aadhaar to programmes such as the PDS 
was not infallible to operational flaws and corruption/leakage in the ‘last mile’ of implementation 
and could indeed perpetuate existing inclusion/exclusion errors in the PDS. My findings from 
both Nashik and Ahmedabad do not suggest that the Aadhaar card had yet made a significant 
impact on the lives of migrants in terms of access to the PDS, and contemporary criticism from 
Khera (2017) argues that Aadhaar empowers the state rather than citizens. My findings also 
showed that the ration card is still considered one of the most reliable and trustworthy documents 




as well as a reliable proof of identity.  
 
 
Considering these findings against the rise of digitalised access structures in ‘Digital India’98, the 
findings of this thesis make an important contribution to the literature by highlighting the scope 
of need for accountable and inclusive innovations in making rights portable.  The improvement 
of access conditions for all Indian citizens regardless of movement is necessary, given the 
inadequacy of state instruments for measuring and understanding migration; the scale of 
migration; the complex and highly mobile practices of labour migration itself and multitude of 
nuanced differentiations within groups of labour migrants and the ways in which they are 
vulnerable across different states in India.  
 
 
8.2. A holistic ‘hostile policy environment’ for labour migrants  
The enquiry underpinning this thesis is anchored in this paradox: the right for Indians to move 
and settle anywhere within the country, and the curtailments of their rights and entitlements as 
citizens if they do so. The heterogeneity of social protection outcomes in different states across 
an increasingly decentralised India further problematises access conditions for labourers who 
move across (and within) state boundaries. I selected two different states in Western India to try 
and identify how far specific state (and city) contexts influenced patterns and structures of PDS 
access and their impacts for labour migrants.  The empirical findings show that migrants typically 
experience different social protection outcomes in terms of PDS access in their places of 
destination, compared with home states. The lack of portable access to state social protections 
such as the PDS means that migrants are at a disadvantage (Sabates-Wheeler and MacAuslan, 
2007; MacAuslan, 2011). However, the differentiation of PDS experiences were highly nuanced 
and do not fall neatly along binary lines, defined by state boundaries. According to my findings, 
                                                     
98 Nationwide campaign launched by Government of India in 2015 aiming to increase internet connectivity and make 




the “hostile policy environment” (Deshingkar and Farrington, 2009) described in the literature 
appears to be holistic in the sense that it is pervasive across all migrant-receiving states rather 
than more specific to one state than the other.  
 
For those who migrate, the resulting negation of citizenship – through the denial of access to state 
resources - can have damaging impacts on an existing set of deprivations and vulnerabilities. 
When considering the PDS, citizenship rights related to food security are curtailed. Migration 
itself is often driven by the need to find livelihoods that will in turn contribute to household food 
security in the places of origin, for households left behind and when migrants return, as well as 
in the place of destination. Another right that is denied specifically in both Ahmedabad and 
Nashik, and cities across the rapidly urbanising landscape in India, is the ‘right to the city’. This 
is based on the idea that if poor and vulnerable migrants are compelled to leave the bleak prospects 
of their rural origins to help (literally) build new cities, they should be able to partake in the fruits 
of urban ‘progress’ and development (Harvey, 2003; Bhagat, 2017). 
 
The limited success of both rural development schemes (such as the MRNEGS) in migrant-
sending states (Khera, 2013; Imbert and Papp, 2015) and urban social development schemes 
(including the JNNURM) (Maringanti, 2012) have contributed to an overall ‘hostile policy 
environment’ for rural-to-urban migrants (Deshingkar and Farrington, 2009; Mitra, 2010). While 
both Gujarat and Maharashtra have employment protection laws in place for ‘unorganised 
workers’ (those engaged in the informal sector including migrants) my findings are aligned with 
the literature in indicating that implementation is weak (Srivastava and Sasikumar, 2003; Breman, 
2013). However, in the realm of social protection, both states had introduced sub-national 
innovations in the early 2000s, designed to improve PDS access for intra-state migrants,99  though 
neither were successful nor sustained. 
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The cities of Ahmedabad and Nashik were selected because they are located in states that are 
similar in terms of unorganised labour wage markets; composition of migrant stocks and flows 
and rate of urbanisation (Bhagat, 2011). The cities themselves are at contrasting levels of 
development and scale and reveal how barriers to access persist in both types of contexts. 
According to findings from key informant interviews, the failure of the roaming ration card 
scheme in Gujarat was attributed to weaknesses in infrastructure, such as the lack of technology 
and digital information systems, and lack of clear accountability in municipalities. In 
Maharashtra, awareness and action on the Temporary Ration Card scheme seemed the domain of 
NGOs rather than local bureaucrats who lacked both interest and awareness in promoting the 
scheme. The very implementation of the scheme in Nashik can be attributed to a mix of NGO 
action and the personalised, rather than institutionalised, support of the District Collector at the 
time of implementation.  
 
The role of NGOs is prominent in both cities, in trying to address barriers to access for the urban 
poor overall and specifically for migrants. However, in line with the size and development of each 
city, Ahmedabad has a continuing legacy of a vast and rich network of civil society organisations 
(driven by specific historical and social factors such as ongoing social and environmental 
disasters), whereas this is not present in Nashik. However, small NGOs such as the Disha 
Foundation played a prominent role not only in grassroots movements to support labour migrants 
in areas such as access to the PDS, but also in stimulating interest in policy innovations, though 
this was not sustainable. Much of the innovation appetite for redesigning access to the PDS was 
generated at district level in Nashik at the time of fieldwork, in contrast to the broader scale of 
‘transformation’ sought by the state of Gujarat. The governance and social context of 
Ahmedabad creates a specific landscape of encounters with the state – not only in terms of 
dhakkas with officials, engagement with agents and brokers but also in term of the city’s wide-
reaching civil society sector. Such organisations work with both migrants specifically (such 




and proximate thekedar relations such as those that run through the Rajasthan-Gujarat 
corridor. In comparison, the institutional and semi-institutional networks in place for vulnerable 
migrants in Nashik appear to be less robust. However, for labour migrants working in particularly 
vulnerable forms of labour – on construction sites and brick kilns – access to local social networks 
beyond one’s contractor is limited in both city contexts.  
 
Finally, another attribute of each state which formed the basis of the site selection was the level 
of ‘nativist’ discrimination. Despite Maharashtra’s, and in particular Nashik’s recent history of 
anti-migrant hostility, generated at both social and political levels, a significant finding was that 
migrant groups, particularly the longer-term and more settled migrants, did not vocalise any 
complaints or negative views on local populations. Such views were more overtly expressed by 
local communities in both Ahmedabad and Nashik. This implies that migrants who are longer-
term and engaged in naka work, are more likely to use strategies to help their integration (for 
example refraining from expressing resentment and promoting social harmony) and face 
significant social, as well as structural barriers in the cities of Nashik and Ahmedabad. In 
Ahmedabad, the social tensions are predominantly divided along lines of religion (among other 
social factors) rather than overt nativism and as the findings showed, this played into the 
experiences of migrant as well as local labourers.  
 
8.3. Considerations and research contributions 
In this final section, I set out the considerations and limitations of this research, before presenting 
recommendations of how the themes of this thesis can be developed further in different directions. 
I conclude by setting out the main scholarly contributions of the research on which this thesis is 
based. In terms of research considerations and limitations: while the question of vulnerability is 
at the centre of this thesis, methodological constraints and my positionality as a researcher 
prohibited wider access to the most vulnerable groups, such as migrants from nomadic and tribal 




be further probed. Though this thesis is preoccupied with discrimination of labour migrants at the 
hands of the state, this is bound up with social forces, as demonstrated in the case of long-held 
nativist politics in Maharashtra and other evidence on structure and agency presented in this 
thesis. However, a relative lack of explicit evidence on experiences of social discrimination 
emerged. These limitations can be placed in a broader context of power relations and trust within 
Indian society and in terms of insider/outsider research scenarios in developing country contexts 
overall (Mosse, 2005). The lack of self-reported evidence on social discrimination themselves can 
be seen as important evidence of the complex nature of integration strategies undertaken by 
migrants in nativist contexts and is a crucial consideration for further research in this area.  
 
In terms of externalities, the research itself was conducted at what can be termed as a time of 
political upheaval, though within the framework of a functioning democracy. This was marked 
by a divided and contentious campaign atmosphere in the period foregrounding a national 
election. In the specific context of Ahmedabad, formerly governed by the elected Prime Minister 
who had been accused of fomenting violent inter-religious tensions in the city, this created a 
climate of suspicion and additional strategic social ‘masking’ among migrants and the urban poor 
overall when it came to interactions with ‘outsiders’ of any sort. Many participants made reference 
to the increased number of politicians visiting their slums or native villages and, in some cases, 
were primed to discuss their experiences of vulnerabilities and in others, suspicious of sharing 
information about their lives.  
 
Another consideration arising from these contextual factors is how they locate my findings firmly 
within its temporal framework. The rights-based approach culminating in the Food Security Act, 
discussions on more inclusive polices (though limited in the area of migrant access), and the 
launch of the Aadhaar card which originally promised to make rights portable for all citizens, 
contributed to the inspiration behind this thesis However many of these movements have 




Aadhaar card has shifted course from national state mandate to a reversal of this by the Supreme 
Court. The implementation of the programme has been chaotic, according to narratives both the 
literature and media, and most recently has been exposed as being vulnerable to the very 
corruption it was designed to eliminate.100 Though recent proliferations in the area of e-
governance provide potential directions for further research in access to social protection for 
vulnerable groups and the role of governance.  
 
Further and additional directions in which the research in this thesis can be taken and developed, 
include an exploration of the role of civil society organisations in influencing the governance 
context, and addressing the barriers that labour migrants face. An ample and continually growing 
evidence base, to which this thesis hopes to contribute at least indirectly, from across cities in 
India illustrates the different ways in which the urban poor (including migrants) draw upon 
mediators and local leaders to exert influence in opening up access to basic entitlements and 
services. A focused study on interactions with labour migrant communities would also make a 
valuable contribution to this evidence base. Traditional forms of civil society governance in urban 
locales, such as NGOs and community-based organisations tend to fit with Chatterjee’s 
description of ‘political society’, but do not fully represent the specificities of the Indian urban 
‘demos’ (cf: Chatterjee, 2004; Harris, 2010; Mahadevia, 2010; Nijman, 2008; Berenschot, 2010). 
A focus on the experience of urban migrants interacting with civil society and labour 
organisations, would further enrich the findings of this thesis both in terms of understanding 
available strategies for labour migrants but also in terms of further understanding governance 
context in terms of unorganised labour and social protection.  
 
In terms of continuing to broaden out the scholarship on internal migration; qualitative and multi-
disciplinary explorations of the linkages between internal and international migration would 
                                                     






provide worthwhile research endeavours in the context of India.  Both vague aspirations and 
concrete plans for overseas migration were expressed by some of the labour migrants encountered 
in both Ahmedabad and Nashik, by men in their early 20s and in older age groups. Some of these 
migrants were already in the process of preparing their passport applications, while others alluded 
to future aspirations. This points to the potential for further research (invoked by King et al., 
2008) on the linkages between internal and international labour migration from India, and the 
dissonant roles and attitudes of the state regarding each form of migration.  
 
In terms of access to social protection, the research in this thesis could be developed further by 
visiting contemporary debates on the effectiveness of resource transfer programmes versus cash 
transfer programmes – popular in Latin America. Debates within India have questioned the role 
cash transfers could play in India’s welfare system.  Direct Benefit Transfers (DBT)101 – linked to 
the Aadhaar card have been trialled in certain states under the Modi government and mark further 
efforts to digitalise India’s social protection programmes. Going beyond the PDS to understand 
the impact of other food security and social protection schemes such as the Midday Meal Scheme 
for children, and MRNEGS public works schemes in rural areas for migration would also 
complement the findings of this thesis and take them further in expanding our understanding of 
migration and social protection in India. While studies on the inter-related impacts of such 
schemes exist, they are mainly restricted to quantitative approaches, and do not specifically focus 
on the impact on migrants. Beyond the specific case of India, the trend for studying the close 
reciprocal linkages between social protection approaches and precarious workers such as labour 
migrants have gained traction in the overall development and social and labour protection 
literatures (Sabates-Wheeler and Feldman, 2011; MacAuslan, 2011; Lewis et al.,2014, Cheng et 
al., 2014). Migration and social protection can potentially reduce vulnerability and precariousness 
and improve or protect livelihoods – they yet remain complex, lack consensus across practice and 
theory and yield multiple possibilities for further research.  
                                                     




Finally, my findings showed how both the impact and necessity of the PDS, as perceived the 
claimants themselves, changes over an individual’s lifecycle. Transitioning from a child, to lone 
migrant, to household migrant and then to elder aged citizens based either in the place of origin 
or destination, can change the relationship to vulnerability and social protection. Both 
observations lend themselves to further and deeper enquiries into the temporality of how migrants 
experience barriers to access – already probed in the precariousness literature (Lewis et al., 2014) 
to further understand broader temporal as well as spatial aspects of ‘access-scapes’ for social 
protection programmes as experienced by migrants.  
 
Overall, this thesis contributes important findings in the relatively understudied area of internal 
migration in the context of the overall migration literature. It also focuses on the role of 
governance on vulnerability and precariousness experienced by labourers overall, and particularly 
among migrants. While narratives, and evidence, of the vulnerabilities faced by labour migration 
exist on a global scale, the literature review suggests there is comparatively less by way of 
qualitative evidence on how they compare with their sedentary counterparts in India. I present 
findings that indicate policies in India are biased toward sedentary populations and fracture 
citizenship along spatial lines. Considering India’s governance context as democratic, its (former) 
focus on articulating and realising constitutional rights and lack of explicit restriction on internal 
movement (unlike its regional neighbour China, another large and populous country undergoing 
rapid urbanisation and with a contrasting governance context), this can be seen as a form of policy 
dissonance. Data gathered from fieldwork carried out among labourers themselves and policy 
officials provide a rich insight into how existing policy frameworks need to be made inclusive for 
both migrant and sedentary populations: through governance reform and a deeper understanding 
of internal migration patterns in the informal economy, as well as technological advances.  
 
The thesis also provides insights into the nature of labour migration itself, both short-term and 




addition to households split between place of origin and destination; migrants travel back and 
forth regularly; remit money over long periods of time; maintain both economic and state assets 
(such as identity documents) and express emotional and aspirational linkages with their places of 
origin. Some migrants also express aspirations to migrate overseas – a pattern of migration 
behaviour in Asia established in the literature (Skeldon, 2006; King et al., 2012). The other 
linkages are evidence of such aspirations and also shed light on the ‘self-exclusion’ practices and 
attitudes displayed by many long-term and household migrants who would theoretically benefit 
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Appendix 1: Operations of the Public Distribution System 
 
Source: Rajagopalan, S. 2010. The role of targeted public distribution system and food stamps in promoting 
better access to food in poor households. In: Towards national nutrition security, Nutrition Foundation of India 





Migrants’ Access to PDS - Initial Sampling Survey 
 
Serial No. _________ 
Date: _____________________________________________________________________ 
Location type: ______________________________________________________________ 
Location name: _____________________________________________________________ 




➢ This survey is intended only for participants aged 18 years and up.  
➢ This survey is intended only for Indian citizens. 
➢ Shaded boxes are for migrants (intra-state, intra-district, inter-state) only.  
➢ All instructions within survey are in bold and italic. 
 
 
  SECTION I. DEMOGRAPHIC 
No. Question Response Choices Code 
1 Name  
 
 
2 Age 1 – 18-30 
2 – 31-45 
3 – 46–60 
4 – 60 + 
 
3 Gender 1 – Male 
2 - Female 
 





4(b) Contact number (optional)   
5 Religion 
 
(If 2-4, skip to Qu.7) 
1 - Hindu 
2 - Muslim 
3 - Buddhist/Neo-Buddhist 
4 - Christian 
50 - Other 
 
 
6 If Hindu/Other, what is your caste/tribal 
status? 
1 – UC 
2 – SC 
3 - ST 
4 – OBC 
5 – Don’t know 







  SECTION II. MIGRANT STATUS 
No.  Question Response choice Code 
   7 When did you first arrive here to stay? 
 
(If answer is 1 then go directly to Qu.13 ) 
1 – Native 
2 - <1 year 
3 – 1–4 years 
4 – 5-9 years 
5 – 10 years + 
 
 8 Where did you stay before you came here? 
 
1 – intra-district 
2 – inter-district 
3 – inter-state 
 
 9 What type of place did you stay at before here? 1 – rural 
2 – semi-urban 
3 – urban 
4 – mega-city 
 
 10 Where were you born? 
 
1 – intra-district 
2 – inter-district 
3 – inter-state 
 
 11 Why did you leave your last place of residence? 1 – Livelihood 
2 – Social/political pressure 
3 – To join household 
4 – Natural disaster  
50 - Other 
 
 
 12 Frequency of visiting native place 1 – ≥ Once a month  
2 – Once every 3 months 
3 – Once every 6 months 
4 – Once a year 
5 – Less than once a year 
6 - Irregular 
7 - Never 
 
 13 Marital Status 1 – Single 
2 – Married 
3 – Widowed 
4 – Divorced/separated 
 
 14 Number of people in current household 1 – Single 
2 – 2 members 
3 – 3-5 members 
4 – >5 members 
 
 15 Number of working people in current household 1 – 1 
2 – 2 
3 – 3-5 
4 - >5 members 
 
 16 How long do you think you will stay here? 1 – More than one year 
2 – One year 
3 – Less than one year 




  SECTION III. POVERTY ASSESSMENT 
No.  Question Response choices Code 
 17 Education completed 
 
(If answer is 3, skip to Qu. 19)  
1 – Up to Primary 
2 – Up to Secondary 
3 – Beyond Secondary 
4 – Dropout from Primary 
5– Dropout from 
Secondary 





 18 If drop-out, why? 1 – Economic 
2 – Social/family reasons 
3 – Lack of interest 
4 – Health 
5 – Marriage 
6- Migration 
7 – Lack of access 
50 – Other 
 
 19 Name which amenities you have in your native 
place 
 
(Please list all the items when you ask the 
respondent this question) 
1 – >One room per family 
2 – Water source near 
premises 
3 – Electric lighting 
4 – Latrine on premises 
5 – Land (up to 3 acres) 
6 – Livestock 
7 – Pukka house 
8 – None 
50 - Other 
 
 
 20 Name which assets you have in your native 
place 
 
(Please list all the items when you ask the 
respondent this question) 
1 – Vehicle 
2 – >3 acres land 
3 – Irrigated land 
4 – Television 
5 – Radio 
6 – Electric/LPG cooking 
fuel 
7 – None 
50 – Other 
 
 
 21 What type of house do you live in now? 1 – Open space 
2 – Squatter 
3 – Kacha 
4 – Semi-pukka  
5 - Pukka 
6 – Labourer camp 
7 – Other 
 
 
 22 House ownership status 1 – Rent  
2 – Free 
3 – Own 
 
 23 What is your current average monthly entire 
household income? 
In Rupees: 
1 – >5,000 
2 - 3,500–5,000  
3 - 2,000-3,500 
4 – <2,000  
50 – Other/irregular 
 
 
 24 On average, how many days per month do you 
and/or members of your household work? 
1 – >25 days 
2 – 20-25 days 
3 – 15–20 days 
4 – <15 days 
50 – Other/irregular 
 
 
 25 What was your household income before you 
arrived here? 
 
(For migrants only)  
In Rupees: 
1 – >5,000 
2 - 3,500–5,000  
3 - 2,000-3,500 
4 – <2,000  






 26  In the last 12 months, have you ever gone 
without a meal for one day or more? 
 
(Please list all the options when you ask the 
respondent this question) 
1 – Many times 
2 – Once/occasionally 
3 – Don’t know 
4 – No  
 
27(a) Do you have a ration card in your place of 
residence and/or native place?  
(If 2, skip this question)  
1 – Yes 
2 – No 
3 – Formerly 
 
27(b) If yes or formerly yes, what type? 1 – BPL 
2 - APL 
3 – Antyodya 












Table 9.1: Breakdown of sample clusters in Ahmedabad, Gujarat 
Site Type NUMBER NOTES 
Juhapura Naka 14 Predominantly  
Muslim –  
historically linked 
with social tensions 
Akbar Naka 14  
Gurukul Naka 11  
CMT Naka 18  
Vasana Naka 6 Predominantly 
Hindu – historical 
social tensions 
Rampir No Tekro Slum settlement  15 Mixed – both  
migrant and ‘local’ 
communities 
Shastri Nagar Slum settlement 5  
Chandhola Slum settlement  16 One of the city’s 
largest slums 
Jamfel Wadi Slum settlement  12  
Jawarha Nagar Slum settlement  11  
Site 2 Construction site  25  
Iqbal Construction site  13 Located near  
Juhapura, predomi-
nantly Muslim area 




11 Semi- and unskilled 
labourers in the fac-
tory 
Bavla Brick kiln 7  
Uvarsad Brick kiln 20  







Table 9.2: Breakdown of sample clusters in Nashik, Maharashtra (October 2013-January 2014)  
Site Type Number Notes 
Sakal Naka 16  
Pett Naka 18  
Rana Pratap Naka 25  
Gangapur I Naka 9  
City 1 Construction site 
(large) 
30  
Makhmalabar Construction site 
(small) 
11  
Manumay Mahar Construction site 
(small) 
5  
Gangapur II Construction site 
(small) 
10  
Siddha Puja Construction site 
(small) 
5  
Ramwadi Temporary roadside 
settlement 
4 Mostly nomadic or 
tribal status migrants 
Swa Babar Nagar Slum settlement 8 Mostly non-migrants 
Siddarth Nagar Slum settlement 5 Mostly non-migrants 
Sant Kabir Slum settlement 10 Mostly non-migrants 
NDC Colony Slum settlement 6  










Appendix Four- Local Labourers – Aggregate of Nashik and Ahmedabad 
 
Based on data from sampling survey 
 
Table 9.3: Age 
Age Range Frequency Percentage 
18-30 32 42.7 
31-45 34 45.3 
46-60 5 6.7 
61+ 4 5.3 
Total 75 100.0 
 
 
Table 9.4: Gender 
Gender Frequency Percent 
Men 48 64 
Women 27 36 
Total 75 100 
 
 
Table 9.5: Religion 
Religion Frequency Percent 
Hindu 49 65.3 
Muslim 20 26.7 
Buddhist 5 6.7 
Christian 1 1.3 
Total 75 100.0 
  
 
Table 9.6: Caste 
Caste Frequency Percent 
n/a 20 26.7 
Upper Caste 4 5.3 
Scheduled Caste 12 16 
Scheduled Tribe 18 24 
OBC 18 24 
Don't know 3 4 









Table 9.7: Education 
Education Frequency Percent 
Primary 5 6.7 
Secondary  6  8.0 
Beyond Secondary 1 1.3 
Dropout - Primary 6 8.0 
Dropout - Secondary 35 46.7 
Illiterate 22 29.3 
Total 75 100.0 
 
 
Table 9.8: Housing status 
House status Frequency Percent 
Rented 20 26.6 
Free102 8 10.7 
Owned 47 62.7 
Total 75 100 
 
 
Table 9.9: Ration card possession 
Ration card Frequency Percent 
Yes 56 74.7 
No 9 12.0 
Formerly 10 13.3 
Total 75 100 
 
  
                                                     




Appendix Five - Labour migrants – Aggregate of Nashik and Ahmedabad 
 
Based on data from sampling survey  
 
Table 9.10 Age 
Age Range Frequency Percentage 
18-30 157 52.2 
31-45 105 34.9 
46-60 32 10.6 
61+ 7 2.3 
Total 301 100.0 
 
 
Table 9.11: Gender 
Gender Frequency Percent 
Men 229 76 
Women 72 24 
Total 301 100 
 
 
Table 9.12: Religion 
Religion Frequency Percent 
Hindu 241 80.1 
Muslim 46 15.3 
Buddhist 13 4.3 
Christian 1 .3 







Table 9.13: Caste 
Caste Frequency Percent 
n/a 43 14.3 
Upper Caste 29 9.6 
Scheduled Caste 82 27.2 
Scheduled Tribe 74 24.6 
OBC 42 14.0 
Don't know 31 10.3 
Total 9 100.0 
 
 
Table 9.14: Education 
Education Frequency Percent 
Primary 25 8.3 
Secondary 36 12.0 
Beyond Secondary 7 2.3 
Dropout - Primary 33 11.0 
Dropout - Secondary 78 25.9 
Illiterate 122 40.5 
Total 301 100.0 
 
 
Table 9.15: Housing Status 
House status Frequency Percent 
Rented 131 43.5 
Free 118 39.2 
Owned 52 17.3 











Table 9.16: Ration card possession (at home or in destination) 
Ration card Frequency Percent 
Yes 251 83.4 
No 47 15.6 
Formerly 3 1.0 
Total 301 100.0 
 
 




<1 year 55 14.6 
2-4y 81 21.5 
5-9y 48 12.8 
10y+ 117 31.1 
Total 301 100.0 
 
 
Table 9.18: Type of migrant 
Type of migrant Frequency Percent 
Intra-district 47 12.5 
Intra-state 109 29.0 
Inter-state 140 37.2 
Total 296 100.0 
 
